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Abstract 
 
Global economic integration and urbanisation are two of the main processes which 
characterise contemporary globalisation. Urbanisation is so pervasive that urban 
landscapes now stretch far beyond the traditional city limits such that ‘the city’ may 
no longer be the most appropriate unit to reflect how contemporary urban life is 
organised. Today, city-regions – even mega city-regions – are considered by some 
to be the primary spatial scale at which competing political and economic agendas 
are convened. Moreover, proponents of the ‘new regionalism’ believe that 
decentralisation of state power is producing new forms of political-economic 
regulation at supranational and subnational levels which are more appropriate for 
effective governance. However, it is argued that the geoeconomic logic for city-
regionalism is focused too narrowly on the functional economic side of regional 
development, thereby overlooking how city-regions represent geopolitical 
constructions both of, and inside, the state. This thesis therefore aims to explore the 
constitutive role of politics in the construction of mega city-regions. The starting point 
is to complement North Atlantic accounts of city-regionalism by focusing on the 
geopolitics of city-regionalism in China. Using the Yangtze River Delta mega city-
region as its case study, this thesis stresses that theories of ‘new city-regionalism’ 
must increasingly be derived from, rather than applied to, the Chinese case. It is 
revealed how the unprecedented rate of city expansion, scale of urbanisation, and 
context of a highly centralised, one-party state, produces a distinctly Chinese city-
regionalism that requires a combination of new conceptualisation, alongside 
refinement and modification of existing theories on mega city-regions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“… the significant impact of global economic change is at the regional scale 
where we are asked now to imagine core cities as economic drivers linked in 
regional clusters that dominate global networks” (Herrschel and Newman, 
2002: 15). 
“… bigger and more competitive economic units – megaregions – have 
superseded cities as the real engines of the global economy” (Florida, 2008: 
38). 
“The scale and pace of China's urbanization promises to continue at an 
unprecedented rate. If current trends hold, China's urban population will 
expand from 572 million in 2005 to 926 million in 2025 and hit the one billion 
mark by 2030. In 20 years, China's cities will have added 350 million people – 
more than the entire population of the United States today. By 2025, China 
will have 219 cities with more than one million inhabitants – compared with 35 
in Europe today – and 24 cities with more than five million people” (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2008: 1). 
 
1.1 City expansion into larger city-regions 
According to UN-Habitat’s State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of Cities 
report, cities are merging into new spatial configurations – namely city-regions, 
megaregions, and urban corridors – which are acting as nodes where: 
“global and regional flows of people, capital, goods and information combine 
and commingle, resulting in faster growth, both demographic and economic, 
than that of the countries where they are located” (UN-Habitat, 2013: 34).  
This is not the first time UN-Habitat has highlighted a trend towards large-scale 
urban regions or their significance in terms of economic prosperity, demography and 
environment (see also UN-Habitat, 2006, 2008, 2010). UN-Habitat posits that these 
new spatial units will become more and more important for locating urban 
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development around the globe. But is this really happening? And has this 
phenomenon been widely recognised in this globalising world? 
UN-Habitat (2013: 26) recommends that:  
“Growing cities are located in growing regions – cities and the surrounding 
regions are typically interdependent economically and tend to share similar 
socioeconomic and demographic trends. In most North American cities, 
growing cities correspond to the most dynamic regions and those 
experiencing population losses are located in less dynamic regions.”  
This thesis can borrow the logic here and extend it to our approach of identifying the 
emerging system of global city-regions, though not admittedly adequate, as “simply 
to assimilate it into the worldwide network of large metropolitan areas” (Scott, 2001a: 
1). Although this is not an adequate approach for defining city-regions around the 
world, it may generate an easy starting point for picturing the accelerating birth trend 
for city-regions.  
Even more importantly, the global urban landscape is shifting. To be explicit, 
McKinsey Global Institute (2011: 1) boldly predicts how:  
“Over the next 15 years, the centre of gravity of the urban world moves south 
and, even more decisively, east. One of every three developed market cities 
will no longer make the top 600 [world cities]. … By 2025, we expect 136 new 
cities to enter the top 600, all of them from the developing world and 
overwhelmingly (100 new cities) from China.” 
We have already witnessed initial signs of the rise of Chinese mega city-regions 
around their main world-class cities – Pearl River Delta (PRD) around Hong Kong, 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) around Shanghai, and Jing(Beijing)-Jin(Tianjin)-Ji(Hebei) 
(JJJ) around Beijing. According to the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) 
Research Network’s 2012 categorisation of world cities, Hong Kong, Shanghai and 
Beijing are Alpha+ cities, meaning they are highly integrated cities within the global 
economy and rank alongside the cities of London and New York in the top tier 
(GaWC, 2012).  
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1.2 Introducing the new city-regionalism  
In his seminal edited collection, Allen Scott (2001b: 814) introduced the concept of 
the ‘global city-region’. He identified global city-regions as “constitute[ing] dense 
polarized masses of capital, labour, and social life that are bound up in intricate ways 
in intensifying and far-flung extra-national relationship”, places where globalisation 
was crystallising out on the ground at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Scott’s (2001a, 2001b) work opened up the vision of the increasing functional 
importance of major urban regions to national and even global performance. It is an 
intellectual argument which has been exported to conceptualise and identify cases of 
widespread urbanisation across the world. At its centre, the so-called ‘new city-
regionalism’ (Ward and Jonas, 2004) is underpinned by the dual processes of 
increased global economic integration and rapid urbanisation meaning cities are 
expanding beyond their traditional city limits and in some cases merging to form 
larger networks of globalising city-regions. These trends have served to activate city-
regions as “bases of all forms of productive activity, no matter whether in 
manufacturing or services, in high-technology or low-technology sectors” (Scott, 
2001a: 11). 
Scott is not alone in advancing this argument. According to Michael Porter, one of 
the world's most influential thinkers on management and competitiveness, “many of 
the most important levers for competitiveness arise at the regional level, and reside 
in clusters that are geographically concentrated” (Porter, 2010: 156). Likewise, 
Richard Florida, a leading public intellectual and urbanist, has emphasised the need 
to improve regional competitiveness through increased productivity and innovation 
by establishing the industrial clusters at the scale of metropolitan regions: 
“[Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Lucas] identifies the underlying 
economic power of the clustering force – the clustering of people and 
productivity, creative skills and talents that powers economic growth. That's 
why cities and megaregions are the true economic units that drive the world 
forward. These organized geographic production systems and markets… offer 
social and economic advantages that other places simply can’t” (Florida, 2008: 
57). 
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Saskia Sassen, author of The Global City (Sassen, 1991), goes on to suggest that 
global city-regions provide a more “encompassing economic base” because they 
offer both “global finance and the leading specialized services catering to global 
firms and markets - law, accounting, credit rating, telecommunications” from the 
global city and “large manufacturing complexes” in its surrounding larger regional 
scale (Sassen, 2001: 80-81). Moreover, Peter Hall and Kathy Pain’s (2006) attempt 
to specify their spatial structure led them towards the concept of “polycentric mega-
city regions”. In their book, The Polycentric Metropolis, Hall and Pain (2006) argue 
that service industries are experiencing “concentrated de-concentration”, which they 
suggests sees a complex of different but interconnected clusters replacing the 
previous single cluster within the main global city and its adjacent regional space for 
concentrating the service industries even more specifically on the basis of cheaper 
and stronger public transport links, while manufacturing industries are dispersing and 
moving into lower hierarchical cities (see also Hoyler et al., 2008c).  
And finally, more recently, there appears to be enhanced interest in contributing to 
debates over the new city-regionalism across both Global North and South (e.g. 
Coombes, 2014; Jonas, 2013; Kanai, 2014; Kantor et al., 2012; Lee and Shin, 2012; 
Li and Wu, 2013; Yeh, Yang and Wang, 2014). Overall, there is a large amount of 
work contributing to expand the understanding of agglomeration economies and the 
significance that this is giving to the concept of globalising city-regions. What we 
have experienced is the increased discussion generated based on a growth in the 
number of city-regions or, at least, a surging interest in the city-region concept for 
describing, analysing and understanding the spatial configuration of urban 
economies around the world.  
Given all of these contributions, there has appeared to be increasing recognition of 
the primary role of city-regions in relation to more places, settings, topics, issues and 
contexts over the past decade. As Scott (2001a: 28) initially noted:  
“because these city-regions constitute the basic motors of a rapidly globalizing 
economy, much is at stake as they steadily sharpen their political identities 
and institutional presence.”  
One of the most pressing issues posed by the on-going geoeconomic logic for city 
expansion in globalisation is that increasingly these urban processes are happening 
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beyond the traditional city boundary, and across the traditional urban and rural divide. 
Nevertheless, planning and governance arrangement are typically still administered 
by, and configured around, the long-existing and now lagging structures, frameworks 
and supports, considered by many to be inappropriate for how city-regionalism 
operates in an era of globalisation (Harrison and Hoyler, 2014; Herrschel and 
Newman, 2002; Jones and MacLeod, 2004; MacLeod and Jones, 2007; Rodríguez-
Pose, 2008). Emerging circumstances associated with globalising cities expanding 
into large global city-regions, such as a growing population, enhanced commuting 
flows and commodity exchange, integrating markets across traditional jurisdictional 
boundaries, are all challenging the functioning and appropriateness of localised and 
fragmented governance structures.  
Hence what is insufficient is the collective action which shall be organised by a well-
established framework for the aim of promoting city-regional competitive synergy at 
the city-regional level. Therefore, “what main governance task do global city-regions 
face as they seek to preserve and enhance their wealth and well-being” (Scott, 
2001a: 12) has become one of the critical concerns for contemporary city-regional 
research (see also Harrison, 2012c; Harrison and Hoyler, 2014). 
Following Scott (2001a) and the rise of new city-regionalism we have witnessed a 
rush by policy elites to construct city-regions as “a strategic and political level and 
administration and policy-making, extending beyond the administrative boundaries of 
single urban local government authorities to include urban and/or semi-urban 
hinterlands” (Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000: 131). Some people argue that the 
result has been unsatisfactory institutional arrangements, often based on “centrally 
orchestrated national planning” (Harrison, 2015b: 46) imposed top-down rather than 
in response to autonomous local action from below. Many such institutional 
arrangements simply construct a brand new consolidated or allied administrative 
space to cover several different urban and rural jurisdictional areas without carefully 
considering the process of how this new scale of governance shall fit into the extant 
state scalar organisation (Harrison, 2012c; Luo and Shen, 2008; Ward and Jonas, 
2004). This is happening in the absence of seriously researching and understanding 
the “constitutive role of politics” in constructing the city-regional administrative space 
(Jonas and Ward, 2007: 171).  
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From this perspective, geopolitical city-regionalism “is best understood as 
representing an ongoing, dynamic and conflict-ridden politics of and in space (which, 
in turn, is ‘scaled’ in a variety of ways) rather than a smooth switch to a new post-
national era of capitalist territoriality” (Ward and Jonas, 2004: 2134). In short, it is 
important to treat the geopolitical city-regionalising as an ongoing changing process 
rather than a perceived outcome on the basis of recognised functional significance of 
any particular city-centric regional space. This is one of the fundamental reasons for 
conducting this research and, through doing so, contributing to theoretical debates 
over ‘new city-regionalism’. 
Drawing on the argument of Andy Jonas (2012: 6) that “there has been too much 
emphasis in recent research on a functional economic view of city-regions and too 
little on how city-regions represent geopolitical constructions of/inside the state” this 
thesis focuses on the issue of designing more appropriate planning and governance 
arrangements at the scale of city-regions. The purpose of the research is to examine 
the constitutive role of politics in the process of city expansion into larger city-regions 
process through the case study of the Yangtze River Delta in China (see next 
section). My aim is to contribute to current city-regional debates by explaining how 
new governance frameworks for city-regionalism have evolved in the Yangtze River 
Delta and are integrating and aligning with other forms of state scalar organisation, 
both of which are usually highly supervised by the central state in administering the 
cross-jurisdictional activities at the city-regional level. 
Before this section ends, it shall be mentioned that there is another important 
principle underlying this thesis. According to Brenner (1998: 27), “our understanding 
of how this [spatial re-scaling process] takes place in distinct historical-geographical 
contexts remains underdeveloped.” Hence city-regional research should be context 
sensitive, or as Jonas (2013: 284) reminds us, the researcher must recognise how 
city-regionalism takes on a diversity of “national and sub-national forms” which 
cannot be attributed solely on “economic development considerations”. Following 
Ward and Jonas (2004), Herrschel reveals the similarities and differences between 
North American (especially US) and European city-regionalisms. He points out how 
specific contexts ‘on the ground’ matter “to people and policy makers when seeking 
answers to the challenges of a globalised, rapidly changing world” (Herrschel, 2014: 
1). Being more specific, Herrschel (2014) primarily focuses on city-regional 
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governance in North Atlantic contexts, and then demonstrates both European and 
North American city-regionalism’s multi-scalar nature by investigating how they are 
rooted in nationally and regionally shaped cultures and political-institutional 
structures, practices and values while responding to the ongoing pressure of 
globalisation. But critically, Herrschel goes on to argue that: 
“although both have been following neo-liberal arguments and paradigms for 
three decades now, there is still an inherently more statist, protectionist 
‘streak’ in Europe, compared with more business oriented, entrepreneurial, 
but also more self-reliant tradition in the USA” (Herrschel, 2014: 49).  
More recently, and in the context of mega city-regionalism, Harrison and Hoyler 
(2015a) account for differences between North American and European approaches 
to engaging with megaregions. The former, they argue, take rapid urbanisation – 
urban form – as their starting point for considering megaregions; in contrast, the 
latter, take global economic integration – city functions – as the basis for identifying 
megaregions and megaregionality. Harrison and Hoyler (2015a) also go on, albeit 
briefly, to identify an Asian approach to megaregions. Referring to work conducted in 
the 1990s, this Asian approach, they suggest, derives from work on mega-cities and 
rapid population growth. Despite this, their focus and that of the other chapters in the 
book Megaregions: Globalization’s New Urban Form? (Harrison and Hoyler, 2015c) 
remains largely concentrated on North American and European examples. 
In recent years there have been a growing number of accounts documenting city-
regionalism in the Asian context, and especially China. Many of the accounts apply 
Western notions of city-regionalism to the Asian/Chinese context, but arguably there 
is scope to do this in a more critical way. For example, can we put Chinese city-
regionalism into conversation with other city-regionalisms? Would a deeper 
understanding of Chinese city-regionalism impact understanding – by confirming, 
refining or rejecting – other models of city-regionalism? These and other questions 
are central to this thesis.  
In this way the research also connects to wider debates in urban studies. Over the 
past 25 years we have seen how the global cities idea (Sassen, 1991) has been 
criticised, most clearly by Jennifer Robinson (2002), for presenting a Northern 
perspective on cities in globalisation as a ‘global’ urban theory. Robinson (2006, 
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2015; Robinson and Roy, 2015) and others (e.g. Roy, 2009, 2015; Vainer, 2014) 
writing from a Southern perspective have argued the need to consider ‘ordinary’ 
cities and distinctive local characteristics. Today, there is a strong agenda to 
provincialise urban theory (Leitner and Sheppard, 2015; Sheppard et al., 2013, 
2015), with particular emphasis on how to put Northern and Southern perspectives 
into conversation. Accounts of city-regionalism arguably have much to gain by 
pursuing a similar agenda. Yet, despite some literature on city-regionalisms beyond 
Europe and North America over the past decade (e.g. Segbers, 2007), there remains 
very little integration. When there is, the approach is to apply North American and 
European frameworks onto the Chinese case. 
Although this thesis focused on the Chinese context, two important points need to be 
made at the outset. On the one hand, the Chinese context is very specific and 
therefore should not be read as an Asian, or even South East Asian, model of city-
regionalism. There is little published work on city-regionalism in India, Japan, South 
Korea or other Asian countries, meaning it would be easy to misappropriate Chinese 
city-regionalism as Asian city-regionalism (in the same way that US city-regionalism 
is often seen to represent North American city-regionalism; or the UK, Germany are 
indicative of European city-regionalism). On the other hand, there are other 
examples where city-regionalism in transitional economies is markedly different – 
especially politically – to North America and Europe. Perhaps most significant for this 
research are the post-socialist countries that up to 1989/90 were behind the so-
called Iron Curtain. Although beyond the scope of this research, they provide an 
important link between North American-European city-regionalisms and the Chinese 
city-regionalism which is the focus of my thesis.  
China is therefore not alone in this, but it is the most notable absentee given the 
work being published over the past 5 years accounting for the rapid urbanisation and 
economic expansion that has been underway. It has been noticed that there is 
increasing research attention towards the mega-scaled urbanisation and regional 
governance in newly industrialising countries, such as India and South Korea in Asia, 
and Mexico and Brazil in Latin America (e.g. Derudder et al., 2012; Lee and Shin, 
2012; Park, 2013; Phadke, 2014; Samara et al., 2013); and particularly in former 
communist or post-socialist states which have experienced political transformation 
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(e.g. Golubchikov and Phelps, 2011; Herrschel, 2011; Libman and Vinokurov, 2012; 
Scott, 2009; Ubarevičienė, Burneika and Kriaučiūnas, 2011).  
Therefore, we have seen the ‘new city-regionalism’ theory was received widely in the 
global arena. However, in comparison with established debates in relation to the 
North Atlantic city-regionalism, Chinese city-regionalism is comparatively under-
researched. This is perhaps surprising because city expansion into larger city-
regions is nowhere more evident than in China, especially in its three main economic 
engines – the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in south China, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 
in southeast China and the Jing(Beijing)-Jin(Tianjin)-Ji(Hebei) (JJJ) in north-eastern 
China. Of these three, the YRD is the research location for this thesis.  
 
1.3 Introducing the Yangtze River Delta 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) is widely considered to be a mega-city region crossing 
three provincial-level jurisdictions - Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang (Hall and Pain, 
2006; Zhang and Wu, 2006; Xu and Yeh, 2011). Provincial-level government lies 
between central and municipal governments and thus becomes the authority which 
holds greatest regulatory power in the subnational agenda. There are four main 
reasons for explaining why it is important and urgent to conduct a case study of the 
YRD for advancing research on Chinese city-regionalism. First of all, the YRD is the 
region around Shanghai which is currently considered as China’s mainland financial 
centre. In terms of global economic integration, Shanghai is China’s second-highest 
ranked city according to GaWC’s ranking list for global cities, meaning Shanghai is 
China’s most connected city in the world city network after Hong Kong (Derudder et 
al., 2010, 2013; Derudder et al., 2012). Shanghai is the gateway between its larger 
expanding regional and even national scale and the global market; it is better 
connected to the major global cities London and New York than Beijing (Taylor et al., 
2014).  
Additionally, as one of China’s main economic engines, YRD is experiencing the 
transforming of industrial structure from manufacturing centre to service economy 
(Chinahourly, 2001; Xinhuanet, 2015). To be explicit, at the moment YRD is growing 
high-technological manufacturing and service industries, meanwhile shifting the 
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traditional mass manufacturing industries towards surrounding peripheral areas. This 
is significantly improving the intra-regional linkages. According to Florida (2008), the 
leading global regions concentrate population, talents, productivity and innovation, 
comparative advantages, economic capability, large scale markets and huge volume 
of economic output. Referring to this perspective, high technology industries, which 
usually require a mix of specialised skills and resources, are an important element of 
concentration in metropolitan-scaled clusters of economic activity (Scott, 2001). 
Furthermore, for many western and some Asian developed regions, service 
industries are already replacing manufacturing as the pillar of the regional and even 
national economy. For instance, by the early 21st century, the United States had 75 
percent of its workforce in services; and in Japan this figure was 67 percent (Ohmae, 
2001). According to the MOHRSS’s (the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security of the People’s Republic of China) official statistics, the most recent figure in 
China is 40.6 percent for 2014 (MOHRSS, 2014), up from 27.7 percent in 2001 
(MOHRSS, 2001). 
The third point is the YRD is, in comparative terms, a new rising area and it is still 
under-researched in comparison to the PRD. Relating to the PRD, we have seen 
emergent debates over different concerns, such as city-regional planning and 
governance arrangement (e.g. Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2010; 2011; Ma, 2008); the 
establishment of state-led metropolitan governance (Ye, 2014), and cross-boundary 
governance in the Greater PRD (Shen, 2004; Yang and Li, 2013). Compared to the 
publications in relation to the city-regional governance arrangement in the mega city-
region of PRD, the YRD remains comparatively under-researched.  
But perhaps the most interesting point is the YRD was issued official strategic ‘city-
region’ planning guidance by the central State Council in May 2010. This is important 
because it is the first time the national level has issued a guide for a regional space 
which crosses different provincial jurisdictions in relation to economic and social 
development. The issuing of the YRD regional plan reflects the importance of the 
YRD within national interests and developmental objectives. Relating to this 
perspective, YRD has been recognised as a key development coastal region in East 
China by a continuous series of national ‘Five-Year’ plans which begins with the 
ninth version (1996-2000). Given the aforementioned reasons, this thesis will be 
produced around the case study of the YRD.  
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1.4 Research aim and objectives 
Following Andrew Jonas and Kevin Ward’s (2007: 171) initial call for debate and 
empirical studies about the “constitutive role of politics” in the governing of city-
regional functional economic space, particularly at a moment in which there were 
many state-led attempts for establishing city-regional spaces, usually in the belief 
that this shall bring about competitiveness in the national and global economy, this 
thesis is situated within the strand of research examining the geopolitics of city-
regionalism (Harrison and Hoyler, 2014; Herrschel, 2014; Jonas, 2013). More 
specifically, it is John Harrison’s (2012) paper stating that there is no blank space out 
there waiting for the rescaling arrangement of state power to take place that is 
particularly central to this research. It is problematic to mobilise the local 
administrative territory as a passive policy container. Therefore, the conflictual 
‘layering’ process reported in the literature, in which it is argued that emergent urban 
and regional governance arrangements have to be made to fit extant landscapes of 
state scalar organisation, will be the empirical focus of my research. The overall aim 
of my thesis is to investigate the ‘constitutive role of politics’ in the spatial 
construction of the Yangtze River Delta (mega) city-region. 
By following this aim, there are three main research objectives, which are,  
1. To account for the transformation of the YRD as a new state space: The 
YRD is defined from a variety of perspectives during various time periods 
since the beginning of this century. Each time, the attempt for defining the 
megaregional space is serving either a geoeconomic or geopolitical purpose. 
By exploring the rationale behind each definition, the research seeks to 
illustrate the transformation between functional economic area and state-
involved administrative space at the megaregional scale of YRD. 
2. To analyse how new (mega) city-regional governance and institutional 
arrangements can enhance the YRD’s competitive capabilities in the 
global economy: Regional economic competitive synergy is one of the 
critical elements which improve the linkage between cities and their 
surrounding larger areas. This research objective is searching for how the 
new megaregional scale of governance is improving the YRD’s functional 
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competitiveness as an integrated entity. For achieving this, the historical path 
and contemporary structure of the governance framework is investigated.  
3. To analyse the struggles and tensions around (mega) city-regional 
governance and the barriers to regional integration: To remain context 
sensitive, this last research objective looks into the issues accompanying the 
operation of the YRD’s current governance framework in relation to the 
specific Chinese context. Therefore, how they are going to affect the 
appropriateness of the current framework shall be analysed in this section.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two 
explains the research rationale in detail. To be more specific, it is important and 
urgent to reinforce the realisation of the role of politics within the construction of 
megaregions at this particular moment when the megaregion as an economic 
functional mind-set is in vogue with those who aim to improve city-regional 
competitiveness. Referring to this geopolitical debate, the thesis chose to focus on 
local governments’ reaction towards city-regionalised functional activities and 
horizontal connections among local authorities. Furthermore, we have witnessed the 
development of the discourse of the ‘new megaregionalism’ on the basis of North 
Atlantic megaregions during the past decade. Hence, by following Brenner’s (2004) 
methodological suggestion of researching locational specifications, thus China’s 
megaregion of Yangtze River Delta is chosen to be the case study in order to further 
extend the current theories surrounding (mega) city-regionalism.  
Chapter Three then focuses on the Chinese context in relation to the regional 
governance and the research location of the YRD before unpacking the research 
questions. The historic path of Chinese (mega) city-regional governance after the 
People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 is firstly reviewed to illustrate the 
strong hierarchical state organisation which is controlled by the central state even in 
today’s China. The chapter then explains why locational decision-making has 
become more important than ever in the globalisation of China’s economy, politics 
and society. Finally, chapter three justifies why it is important to choose the YRD as 
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the research location for understanding China’s city expansion into larger (mega) 
city-regions.  
Chapter Four, the research methodology, justifies the employment of semi-structured 
interviews in the YRD and the use of mixed data source for this research project. 
Particular attention is given to explain how the participants who live and work in a 
Chinese context affect the interview process. Furthermore, this chapter answers 
some other questions, such as: How were the interviewees recruited? How were the 
asymmetric power-relation between interviewee and interviewer assessed and 
managed? How did self-reflection facilitate the meetings with a range of different 
interviewees, i.e. official planners, university professors, business leaders and 
governmental officers? How was the ethical consideration defined in relation to this 
particular research? 
Chapter Five investigates how state-led governance seeks to engage with the 
functional activities across the traditional administrative jurisdictions by examining 
the YRD’s transformation from megaregional functional geography to state-
coordinated administrative space. The case study of the relocation of chemical 
manufacturing industry from Wuxi to peripheral YRD’s space is included to explain 
the transformation from market-led to state-promoted megaregionalism. This chapter 
will shed light on the changing relation between market forces and politics during the 
megaregionalism which is currently under-researched. It is important not to see any 
one of these two actors become subsidiary to another. 
Chapter Six explains why it is unlikely for the most appropriate city-regional 
governance framework which aims to improve the city-regional competitiveness as 
an integrated entity to be accomplished in one-step. The YRD’s three-level 
governance framework and the YRD regional plan were reviewed to illustrate that 
the governance framework may be operated and then continuously modified by the 
extant local state organisation on the basis of updated and changing social-
economic context. The ongoing interaction among framework’s component 
governments enables the modification to happen. 
Chapter Seven reveals the tensions which the current three-level governance 
framework is facing. The appropriateness of the megaregional governance 
framework is often compromised due to the imbalance between geoeconomic and 
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geopolitical forces. However and for the case of YRD in particular, potential 
modification applies to the current governance framework for the aim of minimising 
the tension on the basis of inter-local government interaction.  
Finally, Chapter Eight links all the research findings, and generates a critical 
conclusion for the research aim. This research does not only mobilise the new 
megaregionalism theory to explain and guide what is happening to the Chinese 
megaregions, but is also extending the extant theory by looking into the Chinese 
context. The thesis concludes by stressing that new theories of city-regionalism must 
increasingly be derived from, rather than applied to, the Chinese case.   
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Chapter 2: The Geopolitics of City-Regionalism 
 
2.1  Introduction: the politics of constructing city-regions 
There is no denying that the world is currently experiencing an era known as 
‘globalisation’. Global economic integration and urbanisation are two of the main 
processes which characterise globalisation and have seen the role of cities become 
even more pivotal in this era (Derudder et al., 2012; Hoyler and Taylor, 2013; Taylor 
et al., 2007, 2011). Part of this globalising process has seen urbanisation result in 
cities expanding far beyond their traditional geographic boundaries (the ‘city limits’), 
such that the city may no longer be the most appropriate unit to “reflect … how urban 
life is being organised in globalisation” (Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Harrison, 2015b; 
Wachsmuth, 2014). For many researchers there is a new spatial unit which could be 
considered “as the primary spatial scale at which competing political and economic 
agendas are convened [in globalisation]” (Harrison, 2015b: 20). This unit is the city-
region (Ellingsen and Leknes, 2012; Herrschel, 2014; Neuman and Hull, 2009; Parr, 
2005; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008; Scott, 2001a/b; Turok, 2009), or mega city-region (Hall 
and Pain, 2006; Hall, 2009; Xu and Yeh, 2011; Hoyler et al., 2008b; Harrison and 
Hoyler, 2015c). 
The city-region has emerged to become one of the most important spatial scales for 
organising human activities during the past two decades (Herrschel, 2014; OECD, 
2007). More importantly, city-regions appear as localised and functionally 
concentrated complexes, which is counter to previous accounts of the extinction of 
geography arguing in favour of a borderless space of flows across the globe in the 
post-Keynesian age (cf. Friedman, 2006). According to the dominant ‘new regionalist’ 
discourse of the past two decades, the city-region’s capability for concentrating 
economic activities at this sub-national scale has been much admired amid the 
literature on globalised economic development (e.g. Hall and Pain, 2006; Herrschel, 
2014; Hoyler et al., 2008a; Porter, 1998; Scott, 2001a; Scott and Storper 2003). 
Consequently, considerable attention has been drawn to this spatial unit. 
However, being an advocate of the new city-regionalism is not easy. Even agreeing 
to a definition for the city-region concept has proved challenging. It is not the case 
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that no one is trying to define it; rather there have been many different conceptions 
of city-regions, and other competing spatial imaginaries, over the past ten years (cf. 
Knox and Taylor, 2005; Harrison, 2015b). The problem is that few ‘city-regional’ 
accounts, both in academic and policy circles, can avoid the criticism of failing to 
adequately define – empirically or conceptually – what they actually mean when they 
use the term city-region. Critics argue that as a result, the city-region has “remained 
an ‘object of mystery’ in many accounts pertaining to a new city-regionalism” 
(Harrison, 2015b: 22).  
To make the situation even more complicated, as Allen et al. (1998: 2) suggest, we 
must always remember how:  
“Regional studies are always done for a purpose, with a specific view. 
Whether territorial, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a specific 
focus. One cannot study everything, and there are multiple ways of seeing a 
place: there is no complete ‘portray of a region’. Moreover, ‘regions' only exist 
in relation to particular criteria. They are not ‘out there' waiting to be 
discovered, they are our (and others') constructions.”  
This statement provides the essential mind-set for understanding the 
conceptualisation of regions/city-regions. In short, how the ‘city-region’ is constructed 
is a deeply political act. It serves an actor’s (or actors’) purpose, often at the expense 
of (an)other actor(s). One inherent tension within regional debates is how city-
regions derived from an economic logic are rarely coterminous with city-regions 
derived from a political logic (see Jones and MacLeod (2004) on ‘new regional 
economic spaces’ vs. ‘new spaces of political regionalism’). In particular, the 
mismatch between administrative jurisdiction and functional geography is a common 
problem for constructing city-regional frameworks, policies and supports (cf. 
Coombes, 2014). So more than one decade since Allen Scott’s (2001a) edited 
collection Global City-Regions – Trends, Theory, Policy proved the cornerstone for 
realising the new city-regionalism, plenty of current empirical evidence reveals that 
we are still not able to make the perfect design of governance framework for 
managing agglomerated functional activities at a definitive city-regional scale 
(Harrison, 2012c).  
27 
 
To start to make sense of what we mean by the term city-region, the literature on 
city-regionalism, broadly speaking, can be divided into three distinct approaches to 
the study of city-regions. These are: (1) city-regional form, which shows an interest in 
the theoretical and practical shape of the city-region, often visible in the urban 
landscape (e.g. Parr, 2005; Lang and Knox, 2009; Florida et al., 2008); (2) 
geoeconomic studies, most evident in the work of agglomeration economists, such 
as Allen Scott and Michael Storper (Scott, 2001a; 2001b; 2012; Storper, 1997, 2013; 
Scott and Storper, 2003); and (3) geopolitical studies, where particular focus is on 
the role of state scalar organisation within a broader process of rescaling (e.g. 
Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Herrschel, 2014; Jonas, 2013; Jonas and Ward, 2007; 
Jones et al., 2015; Harrison and Hoyler, 2014).  
Relating to the last topic, Neil Brenner is one of the prominent authors in debates 
relating to the rescaling of state power. Brenner’s (2004b) framework of ‘new state 
spaces’ (NSS) illustrates the transformation of state scalar formation in favour of 
sub-national spatiality during the period known as post-Fordism. The framework is 
constructed in the context of European political-economic change. The NSS 
framework provides an essential conceptual basis for researching new city-regional 
governance, consisting of highlighting the interdependent relationship between 
economic and political processes, and the embedding of emerging spatial 
governance in the continuous historical path of locational economic-political context.  
Furthermore, Jonas and Ward (2007) state that the city-regional scale is the 
accomplishment of the global and local restructuring processes through economic-
political struggles rather than a necessary outcome which follows particular political 
or other agencies’ interests. Their understanding of city-regional development is to 
theorise the city-region concept by recognising both of the processes of “down-
scaling from the global scale to the level of conditions within the communities and 
neighbourhoods of city-regions and up-scaling from the local geographies of 
competition and conflict across the city-region in order to make sense of the 
production of larger geographic processes and territorial structures” (Jonas and 
Ward, 2007: 172).  
The construction of the city-regional geography shall be full of interplays among a 
range of stakeholders across different spatial scales (Agnew, 2013; Allen and 
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Cochrane, 2007; Cox, 2010, 2013; Dickinson, 1967; Keating, 2014; MacLeod and 
Jones, 2007; Mackinnon, 2011; McGuirk, 2004, 2007; Purcell, 2007). Consequently, 
more attention and empirical research is needed for the consideration of the internal 
coherence within the new spaces and the response of extant state scalar 
organisation towards the emergence of this new spatiality. It is also Jonas and 
Ward’s (2007: 175) expectation that it is now the appropriate moment to conduct 
locational research about the “constitutive role of politics in the brave new world of 
‘city-region’”. 
Brenner’s NNS framework focuses on illustrating the broad trend of the 
transformation of state governance towards the emerging city-regional scale. On the 
other hand, the explicit interplay among stakeholders in the subnational context only 
received some attention; in particular there is limited knowledge about the dynamism 
of territorial politics which is relevant to existing state scalar organisation. It has been 
too simple to only state the general importance of place-specific administrative 
strategy for economic development at sub-national scale.  
Therefore, following Brenner’s NSS framework, this chapter aims to employ the 
concept of territory in order to enrich the understanding of new spatial governance by 
searching for the constitutive role of politics within the construction of city-regional 
geographies. Similar to what MacKinnon and Shaw (2010) suggest for combining the 
frameworks of ‘politics of scale’ with a post-structural approach, the intention of this 
chapter is not to see territory as a pre-given spatial geography for containing social 
relations and processes. Instead, tracing the interplay among stakeholders and their 
respective interests entrenched in the territory in relation to the wider economic-
political change is essential. They, not the territory per se, are the actors which are 
constitutive to the construction of new state spaces (Keating, 2014; McGuirk, 2004, 
2007; Park, 2008, 2013; Smith, 2013). As Mayer (2008: 416) remarks: 
“it is never the spatial form that acts, but rather social actors who, embedded 
in particular (multidimensional) spatial forms and making use of particular 
(multidimensional) spatial forms, act.”  
As such it appears important to focus on “questions of agency (who is involved), 
process (how they are involved), and specific interests (why they are involved)” when 
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examining how new state spaces in general, and city-regions in particular, are 
constructed politically (Harrison and Growe, 2014b: 2337). 
Referring to methodological considerations, it is important to stress the locational 
methodological principle for the aim of disclosing underlying power relations among 
stakeholders in any emerging spatial unit. The raised attention towards many 
different prominent city-regions across the map over the past decade reveals the 
shift of sights from general conception of city-regionalism to locational specification 
study for current new city-regionalism research. For example, the famous European 
‘blue banana’ (Brunet, 1989) covers a group of city-regions which have been 
frequently focused on in past literatures, including Brenner’s (2004b) diversified 
regional governance policy across the European major regional spaces; Peter Hall 
and Kathy Pain’s (2006) leading research on functionally connected networks within 
eight European mega-city regions (Hoyler et al., 2008b; Halbert et al., 2006); and 
Harrison’s (2012a, 2012c) critical analysis of Labour’s previous governance 
institutional arrangement for a group of England’s city-regions over the past two 
decades.  
What becomes crucial from these recent spatial re-scaling researches is the 
prioritisation of localised ‘exceptional’ development in favour of pursuing the local 
characteristics at the city-regional territorial scale. It means it is now the right 
moment for undertaking a closer look at this locational scale by separately dealing 
with each unique localised city-regional circumstance. The broad and general 
principle and definition relating to city-regional identification will no longer satisfy our 
realisation of current spatial rescaling process; as Brenner (2004b, 2009) suggests, 
locational specifications will be needed for better understanding the new city-
regionalism. Thus to begin with the geopolitical city-regionalism research, it is crucial 
to bear in mind that we need to turn our major attention to the explicit locational 
dynamics within our targeted city-regional space in order to well understand this 
particular scale. 
To achieve this, the chapter aims to explain the significance of understanding the 
constitutive role of politics in the construction of the city-region. City-regions, and 
arguably now mega city-regions, have been recognised as a primary spatial scale in 
terms of economic success, political significance and social development for North 
30 
 
Atlantic geographical research. These will be introduced here, before Chapter 3 
examines their potential applicability in the Chinese context. Essential theories and 
arguments in relation to the rise of large scale city-regions will be included in Section 
2.2 and 2.3.  
 
2.2 Three distinct perspectives on conceptualising city-regions 
This section will look at the theoretical development of three various city-
regionalisms with referencing to the work of prominent scholar’s in each subsection. 
The aim of the section is to locate knowledge gaps by critically reviewing the existing 
Western-dominated literatures before moving on to consider their applicability for 
understanding Chinese (mega) city-regionalism.  
 
2.2.1  Model 1: form dominant approaches to mega city-regionalism  
City-regionalism is evidence itself of how in the last century we have seen 
continuous urban expansion of cities into larger city-regions, and even mega city-
regions in this century. One of the first approaches to conceptualising city-regions by 
looking at urban form was put forward by Sir Patrick Geddes. A pioneering Scottish 
town planner, Geddes (1915) suggested that the term ‘conurbation’ would be 
appropriate for highlighting the structure of Glasgow, a city which he saw as 
expanding outwards to capture surrounding villages. Two decade later, McKenzie 
(1933) emphasised the wider economic and social influence of a large city over its 
surrounding area, and thus used the term ‘metropolitan community’. 
Another term to emerge in the early decades of the last century was ‘megalopolis’. 
Usually associated with the work of Jean Gottmann (1961), ‘megalopolis’ was a term 
used by Geddes (1915), and later by Lewis Mumford (1938). Geddes and Mumford 
were both concerned by city-expansion and argued that large scale city-expansion to 
form ‘megalopoli’ was the limit of urban expansion. After that Geddes argued cities 
would become too large and experience a period of decline towards a more 
manageable size, while Mumford predicted a terminal decline for that city.  
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This changed in the 1960s when in North America, John Friedmann and John Miller 
(1965) became more concerned with the newly enlarged urbanised areas in the 
spatial organisation in the post-war era, employing the notion of ‘urban field’ (Parr, 
2005: 556). Moreover, Jean Gottmann’s (1961) idea of ‘the megalopolis’ identified 
the giant industrial and urbanised regional clusters on the north-eastern seaboard of 
the United States as being the urban future. Unlike Geddes and Mumford, Gottmann 
saw large scale urban areas (megalopolis) as bringing about a positive urban future, 
not a sign of concern (Hesse, 2015).  
As early as the beginning of the 20th century, Geddes (1915) and Herbert George 
Wells (1902) anticipated that big cities would sprawl over their traditional boundaries 
or merge with adjacent settlements to make much larger urbanised aggregates in 
Europe (Dickinson, 1967). Robert Dickinson (1967), who is seen by many as the 
founding father of the city-region concept (Harrison, 2015b), stressed that Geddes 
and Wells’ successful prediction was related to the regional urbanisation which was 
supposed to happen at the larger geographical scope than city and town, and more 
specifically, “a single urbanised area, with a compact core and a wide periphery” 
(Dickinson, 1967: 13). In the previous moment at which city was dominating the 
functional networked map as the core node, these pioneering views truly show some 
advanced foresight. They proposed an adequate description of the trend of our 
expanded urbanisation over large geographical spaces which happened since the 
post-war era.  
Moreover, Friedmann and Miller’s (1965) ‘urban field’ and Gottmann’s (1961) 
‘Megalopolis’ identified extended urbanisation from the existing metropolitan core 
into the periphery. More importantly, it was Friedmann and Miller’s (1965: 313) 
expectation that their term would “constitute the new ecological unit of … post-
industrial society [and] replace traditional concepts of the city and metropolis” that 
was important for getting people to think about city-regions more than just cities.  
This raised the question of how to define the urban form when cities expand beyond 
their traditional ‘city limits’ and into their regional hinterland. Terms such as 
‘megalopolis’ and ‘urban field’ were used, but more generally it is the term ‘city-
region’ which has had the widest use.  
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There has never been a lack of voices calling for a precise definition for the term city-
region. As mentioned, there are many different definitions. There is, however, one 
generally agreed upon definition for the theoretical structure of the city-region. This 
particular city-regional form definition was produced by an urban studies scholar, 
John Parr, who states that a city-region should be thought of as:  
“an area comprised of two distinct but interrelated elements: the city 
(sometimes a regional or national metropolis), possessing some specified set 
of functions or economic activities; and a surrounding territory, which is 
exclusive to the city in question” (Parr, 2005: 556). 
 
Figure 1: A theoretical city-region 
 
Source: Based on ODPM (2006) 
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Parr’s city-region definition is a useful starting point, and is illustrated by Figure 1. To 
make a simple explanation, the central urban core, or the traditional city limit, is 
sitting in the centre of the diagram (or the biggest light blue area); and now what has 
happened in globalisation is the city has expanded as a result of urbanisation 
beyond the traditional city limit to capture other urban settlements (B, C, D, E and F) 
and has expanded its functional economic role. However, this idea may be 
considered too simple and if you look at the academic literature on city-regions from 
the past century, it would be difficult to believe there was a single and simple 
definition of what a city-region is. Even Parr himself admitted that:  
“the term ‘city-region’ is used to refer to a variety of spatial structures, 
involving substantially different territorial scales, and there appears to be no 
commonly accepted definition of the term” (Parr, 2005: 556).  
Illustrating the problem, there are numerous examples in the literature expressing 
difficulty in locating the city-region’s boundaries. Perhaps the most striking example 
in the context of this study is Peter Hall and Kathy Pain’s attempt, in The Polycentric 
Metropolis: Learning from Mega City-Regions in Europe, to show the geography of 
the South East England mega-city region (Hall and Pain, 2006: 38). This map shows 
how London has expanded beyond the traditional city-limit (London’s 32 boroughs) 
to capture urban settlements in the surrounding hinterland, the functional economic 
area has also expanded as far as Peterborough to the north, Margate to the east, 
Swindon to the west, and the south coast (from Bournemouth in the south west to 
Hastings in the south east). This map also shows the extent of the connections 
between London and other cities, and between regional cities themselves. For 
instance, Cambridge is shown spreading its influence within this (mega) city-region 
as a dominant educational centre and connects to the rest of the world through 
London as a global city. In this, as in other cases, it is extremely difficult to define the 
accurate extent of London’s functional hinterland (see also Taylor et al., 2009; 
Reades and Smith, 2014).  
Supplementing the current variety of theoretical city-regional forms, Harrison (2015b: 
22) suggests a long list of even more terminologies which emerged over the past 
decade. Similar to the previous experience of conceptual diversifications in the last 
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century, those various terms are created for diversified purposes. Hall and Pain’s 
(2006) ‘polycentric mega-city region’, for example, focused on the region’s internal 
networked functional economic relations and intra-regional urban hierarchy. Florida’s 
(2008) ‘mega region’ regards the concentration of factors such as population, 
productivity and innovation capability as crucial for recognising this sub-national 
scale. Xu and Yeh’s (2010) ‘mega-city region’ emphasises the new spatial scale for 
administration purpose as a result of its privileged position in the global economy. 
Other examples in Harrison’s list include global city-region (Scott, 2001); world city-
region (Kunzmann, 1998); metro region (OECD, 2007); metropolitan region (Brenner, 
2002); polycentric metropolis (Hall and Pain, 2006); mega urban region (Douglass, 
2000); poly-nuclear urban region (Turok and Bailey, 2004); super urban area 
(Harrison, 2015a); mega-urban region (Douglass, 2000); cross-border metropolitan 
region (Harrison and Growe, 2014a); new megalopolis (Lang and Knox, 2009); and 
megapolitan region (Lang and Dhavale, 2005; Lang and Nelson, 2007).  
Again I am not going to produce judgment over the rationality for each term 
mentioned above. The key point here is although these concepts appear very 
different, they all attempt to define similar geographical patterns which are, broadly 
defined, city-regional in appearance. Moreover, they are all heavily influenced by the 
economic arguments for city expansion into larger city-regions making the latter 
increasingly important locations for economic and social life. 
 
2.2.2  Model 2: the geoeconomics of mega city-regionalism 
To discuss the geoeconomic importance of large scale urban regions, there is no 
way of neglecting Allen Scott’s (2001a) concept of the ‘global city-region’ which he 
explored in his book Global City-Regions – Trends, Theory, Policy. In this book, 
Scott and a group of other notable scholars (e.g. Peter Hall, Saskia Sassen, Kenichi 
Ohmae, and Michael Storper) stated their understandings about the realisation of the 
important role for global city-regions within contemporary globalisation.  
There are three reasons why Scott’s work is important. Firstly, by following the 
pioneers’ efforts, he developed the concept of ‘global city-region’ in recognition of the 
increasing functional role of cities (Sassen, 1991) and regions (Scott, 1998) in 
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globalisation. Scott (2001) admitted in his book the concept of global city-regions can 
be traced back to the idea of ‘world cities’ and ‘global cities’ which comes from Hall 
(1966), Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Sassen (1991) respectively. Scott’s 
conceptual contribution is to replace global cities and recognise global city-regions 
as the newly functional nodes in global networks. Secondly, his work extends the 
1990s ‘global city’ research, which focused on the importance of cities’ external 
relations, to focus on the external global and internal regional linkages of cities (Hall, 
2001). And thirdly, Scott and others suggested that city-regions might be 
superseding the nation-state as the primary spatial scale for organising economic 
and social life (cf. Barber, 2013).  
This last point cannot be understood alone without relating to his agglomeration 
model; and this proposal earns appreciation as much as the criticism which is 
incurred. In favour of recognising the primary role of city-regions in functional 
development and policy decision-making, Ohmae (2001) stated that the nation-state 
was no longer the unit of prosperity; and even further, Storper (1997) mentioned that 
the globe was stepping into a ‘regional world’ where major urban regions (e.g. Silicon 
Valley) were the fundamental bases of economic and social life as we entered the 
twenty-first century. Referring to the agglomeration modelling of geographical 
economists, Scott’s (2001b: 814) ‘global city-regions’: 
“constitute dense polarised masses of capital, labour, and social life that are 
bound up in intricate ways in intensifying and far-flung extra-national 
relationships. As such, they represent an outgrowth of large metropolitan 
areas – or contiguous sets of metropolitan areas – together with surrounding 
hinterlands of variable extent which may themselves be sites of scattered 
urban settlements.”  
Scott then adds that the agglomeration of everything means to reduce the location-
dependent transaction costs, and meanwhile produce ‘synergistic outcomes’, such 
as “the collaborative relationships that occasionally set in when firms work together 
in social divisions of labour, or the knowledge spillovers that occur in day-to-day 
business dealings” (Scott, 2001b: 818).  
More examples include Porter’s (1998) inter-firm cooperation, such as outsourcing 
and sub-contracting, and Hall and Pain’s (2006) focus on advanced producer service 
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firms (i.e. accounting, law, advertising and consultancy) where high spatial costs are 
raised for face-to-face information exchange. Thus it turns out to generate economic 
efficiency and effectiveness as a result of collective functional activities, and more 
importantly build competitive economic giants within a limited extent of area. Plenty 
of existing empirical regions illustrate that these areas are recognised as the 
economic growth poles within the larger geographical scope based on their clustered 
economic power. Thus localised functional concentration is leading to concerns 
about how geographical distance affects socio-economic behaviours, particular in 
view of the current increasing pace of technological advancement in 
telecommunication and transportation around the globe.  
Agglomeration models are the essential principle for many others to engage with the 
construction of their various city-regional terms. For example, Florida’s (2008: p42) 
idea of ‘megaregions’ is derived from a simple upscaling of the agglomeration model, 
because he argues that bigger economic units (i.e. larger urban economies) are 
more competitive economic units. This can also be seen in the UK through the work 
of Henry Overman and others (Nathan and Overman, 2013). Likewise, all eight of 
Hall and Pain’s (2006) European polycentric mega city-regions are the respective 
major economic engines within their own nations. Xu and Yeh’s (2010) Pearl River 
Delta (PRD) and Yangtze River Delta (YRD) are currently the two most developed 
regions on the basis of industrial agglomeration in China. Harrison’s (2015a) ‘super-
urban area’ is the combination of global cities and global city-regions in order to 
construct the contemporary competitive territories. All in all, despite a variety of city-
regional terms, these terms share the common recognition of the capability of 
concentrating capital, labour and social life at a variously defined city-regional scale. 
There is no denying that the agglomeration model promotes the city-regional unit to 
become the motor of the contemporary globalised economy (cf. Scott, 2001a). As a 
consequence, it is important to remember the functional significance of the 
agglomeration model because it is this idea that provoked the increased realisation 
of city-regionalism in the first place.  
However, for the critics, Scott and others’ geofunctional conclusion is pushing too 
hard with overoptimistic attitudes towards the all-round role of global city-regions and 
thus underplays the role of state forces in and through processes of rescaling (see 
Brenner, 2009; Jonas and Ward, 2007; Lovering, 1999; Harrison, 2015b). 
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Furthermore, the researcher finds it hard to believe that the governance task which 
city-regions are currently facing is simply appending ‘the’ new governance 
framework to existing political administrative systems, whatever the configuration is 
like now. Moreover, in order to be clear of this difficult situation, it is necessary to 
trace the specific state dynamics which exist in any particular city-region. Thus it is 
this geopolitical conflict that inspires the main discussion in the following sections; 
and more crucially, this is why the thesis is going to step in while bearing in mind the 
importance of paying attention to the locational specific context which is stressed by 
Neil Brenner (2004), one of the prominent leaders in the debates relating to state 
rescaling. This chapter will focus on this economic-political conflict in the next 
geopolitical section.  
 
2.2.3  Model 3: the geopolitics of mega city-regionalism 
As the last section states, Scott’s (2001a) notion of the ‘global city-region’ is 
fascinating and successfully generated significant interest in the city-region concept, 
even pushing it to a new level of intrigue among academics. However, some political 
geographers critique this, arguing that: 
“there has been too much emphasis in recent research on a functional 
economic view of city-regions and too little on how city-regions represent 
geopolitical constructions of/inside the state” (Jonas, 2012; 6).  
Jonas and others, notably Kevin Ward, argue that policy elites have become 
seduced by Scott’s argument and have set about constructing city-regions in the 
belief this will bring about competitiveness in the global economy (Jonas and Ward, 
2007a; Ward and Jonas, 2004). The result is a rush to create a city-region level of 
governance, and an alternative definition of city-region as 
“a strategic and political level and administration and policy-making, extending 
beyond the administrative boundaries of single urban local government 
authorities to include urban and/or semi-urban hinterlands” (Tewdwr-Jones 
and McNeill, 2000; 131). 
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There is one particular Chinese empirical case reflecting this concern. Xiangming Ma 
is the chief official planner in Guangdong Urban and Rural Planning and Design 
Institute. He (2012) defined the Greater Pearl River Delta which covers Guangdong’s 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) and two special administrative zones – Hong Kong and 
Macao - as global city-regions by referencing Scott’s definition. This then 
underpinned the Guangdong Provincial Government’s 2009 ‘Five Integration Plan 
(The Integration of Infrastructure Plan, The Integration of Industry Plan, The 
Integration of Public Service Plan, The Integration of Urban and Rural Development 
Plan and The Integration of Environmental Protection Plan) which aimed to promote 
integration of the PRD in various aspects, arguing it was “crucial to enhance city 
competitiveness” (Ma, 2012: 103). There is nothing wrong about recognising the 
functional linkage between PRD and two special administrative zones with the aim of 
enhancing the competitiveness of PRD and enlarged Greater PRD. The concern 
here is that Guangdong provincial government is treating the Greater PRD as a 
passive policy ‘container’ which shall be filled with a provincially-orchestrated city-
regional plan in the belief that this will improve the competitiveness of the entire city-
regional unit. For this section, what this thesis is presenting here does not mean to 
undermine the significance of improving city-regional competitiveness. What this 
thesis is trying to achieve is to shift attention from a narrow focus on the economic 
importance of global city-regions to the dynamics of how city-regions are constructed 
politically in the belief that this will make their (global) city-region more economically 
important on a national and international scale.  
At the beginning of the 20th century, Geddes had already realised that cities may no 
longer be an appropriate unit for organising human behaviour and thus it became 
vital to figure out a common treatment for solving the larger, city-regional issues such 
as sanitation, transport and government (Dickinson, 1967). His view was then 
followed by Dickinson half a century later. Dickinson stressed that those city-regional 
issues had remained and thus been aggravated by the fact that “any one area 
includes literally hundreds of administrative and ad hoc division” (Dickinson, 1967: 
13). More recently, at the time Scott was writing about global city-regions, Alan 
Harding questioned whether the city-region – not the administrative region – was a 
more appropriate scale at which to organise subnational development (Harding, 
2000). In a European context, Tassilo Herrschel and Peter Newman (2002) argued 
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that the construction of city-regional governance shall be spatially varied in 
accordance with differing institutional contexts and specific local cultural-political 
legacies.   
Going further Harrison (2015b: 42) argued that “little thought is given to the 
coherence of these large urban complexes” in the face of continuing identification of 
different types of city-regions. With city-regions increasing in size, especially in China, 
it becomes even more urgent to consider the construction of these large-scale mega 
city-regions and attempts to reorganise state power at local, regional and national 
levels to plan and govern at this extended urban scale. However and unfortunately, 
this urgent issue still remains unsolved even today. Many prominent city-regions are 
still facing administrative divisions and even inter-/intra-state competition inside their 
valid functional areas. Simply appending a brand new city-regional strategic 
governance framework into the long-existing political configuration may find it difficult 
to deal with this fragmented administrative issue because the researcher cannot 
afford to overlook the role and function of long-existing local political actors.  
Furthermore, there is another important concern relating to the scale of the city-
region’s jurisdiction which in many cases does not properly reflect the rapid pace of 
the city-regional functional economic expansion (Harrison, 2012c). Saying that the 
fast-pace urbanisation and economic restructuring is outgrowing the re-organisation 
process of the state power in many cases is the supplement to this issue. To borrow 
Scott’s prominent global city-region of Greater London and Harrison’s (2012c: 314) 
critical words:  
“while London has the greatest powers and most closely maps onto Scott’s 
concept of the global city-region, it is noteworthy how even here the 
institutions of city-regional governance only have jurisdiction over Greater 
London. Noteworthy is how the boundary of Greater London has remained 
fixed since 1963, and thus the new governance arrangements only have 
jurisdiction over an area of 1579km2 and a population of 7.6 million … not the 
global city-region and its population of 21 million that Scott identifies.”  
The question here is how this comparatively static city-regional governance 
framework is going to govern this city-regional area over many affairs, such as 
transportation, construction and inter-state competition, when the framework does 
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not even expand to fully cover the functional geography? Thus assessing the overlap 
between the city-region’s extended functional scope and local governmental 
boundaries becomes crucial for judging the appropriateness of the city-regional 
administrative arrangement as the geopolitical response to the local functional 
development. Referring to this perspective, it is hard to believe that the geographical 
mismatch concern could be solved instantly in the face of fast-pace urbanisation and 
economic restructuring processes. Thus as Robert J. Bennett (1997) suggested 
fifteen years ago, constructing the city-regional governance framework shall not be 
seen as a one-off task; instead, it is an on-going process. Administrative re-
organisation is not static, so it is important for us to constantly track and study the 
geopolitical dynamics inside the city-regional formation in order to assess whether 
administrative configuration and coverage at the city-regional level is ‘fit for purpose’. 
The researcher can clearly see evidence for this in the move towards mega city-
regionalism. As globalising cities expanded into global city-regions, so too this 
chapter argues that globalising city-regions are being considered in the context of 
expanded mega urban regions comprising two or more global city-regions (Harrison 
and Hoyler, 2015a). Once again, the initial focus of recent work in this area was on 
the geoeconomic logic for mega urban regions (see Chapter 1) but attention is 
increasingly shifting towards the question of designing, planning and governance 
arrangements that are ‘fit for purpose’, not only for global city-regions but ever larger 
metropolitan areas. This raises a series of concerns, for as Wheeler (2015: 99) 
recently remarked, “we can hardly plan at the regional scale, let alone for 
megaregions”. For sure, the geopolitics of mega city-regionalism is even more 
important today in the transition from city-regionalism to mega city-regionalism. 
To conclude for this section, the researcher deeply appreciates the success of Scott 
and others’ agglomeration model in the study of new city-regionalism. As Jonas and 
Ward (2007: 173) highlight, “it is no coincidence that the resurgence of city-regions 
as economic spaces has been accompanied by their re-emergence as political 
spaces”. Nevertheless, administrative arrangements for city-regions rarely 
correspond to the functional economic geography of city-regions; and this issue is 
important to study. The criticism is that we have previously experienced considerable 
efforts devoted to rushing into centrally-orchestrated plans for governance and 
planning at the city-regional level in the belief that this enforced institutional 
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arrangement will improve city-regional competitiveness – something which is highly 
debated. The concern here is the lack of consideration for the dynamics of extant 
state scalar organisation within the current spatial rescaling process. Although we 
have long discovered the issues of locational administrative division and inter-state 
conflict at the city-regional level, they have not been fully considered or central to a 
lot of city-regional accounts over the past fifteen years. To sum up, there is no way 
for the geopolitical dynamics to be overlooked within the contemporary city-
regionalising process. The next section is going to dig deeper for this geopolitical 
consideration. 
 
2.3 State power and the political construction of city-regions 
“The [current] world economy is … based on economic, social, cultural, and 
informational flows that straddle the boundary-making and territory-protecting 
activities of states” (Scott, 2001a: 27). 
It would be wrong to say that the geopolitics of city-regionalism was absent from 
Scott’s account of global city-regions. It is more appropriate to say that it was often 
hidden behind the geoeconomic arguments for global city-regions, or its importance 
underplayed. Central to Scott’s understanding of global city-regions is a belief in their 
increasing autonomy within the global era. Together with firstly the current pervasive 
promotion of spatially rescaling to more functionally connected subnational 
agglomerations, and secondly calling for re-organisation of governance frameworks 
at the city-regional level, which seems to act in response to the emergence of city-
regional functional geography, they lead Scott and others to conclude that:  
“the geographic structure of these networks tends more and more to override 
purely political boundaries so that they are increasingly free from regulatory 
supervision on the part of national states” (Scott, 2001a: 4) 
For this statement, city-region is considered by Scott and his proponents to become 
the primary scale for organising economic, social and political life. To reach their 
expectation, the extant scalar state system which is controlled by nation states to 
exert administration power within national boundaries will need to be somehow 
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dismantled to be replaced by new governance structures in order to ‘free’ city-
regions to better compete globally. 
However, it is rather a big issue to think of the city-region as an autonomous force 
within global economic and political change. In the words of Jonas and Ward (2007: 
172):  
“there are very great dangers in reading agency into city-regional institution 
developments un-problematically from dis-embedded logics of globalisation, 
spatial competition, or the immanent logic of post-Fordist state restructuring. 
Such a view amounts in effect to a reification of the city-region as a discrete 
‘actor-scale’”.  
Thus the re-arrangement of governance scales is no longer seen to be independent 
from state power but a deliberate political strategy on behalf of the state (Brenner, 
2004b). Referring to the logic of state restructuring, this section is saying that the 
functional importance does not earn city-regions the privilege to underplay the 
regulatory control from the state scalar system. The rest of this section is going to 
explain two arguments in favour of this proposal. 
First of all, it is very hard to believe that there is one blank space waiting out there for 
city-regional governance arrangements to fill. According to Brenner (2009: 134):  
“the rescaling of state power never entails the creation of a ‘blank slate’ on 
which totally new scalar arrangements could be established, but occurs 
through a conflictual ‘layering’ process in which emergent rescaling strategies 
collide with, and only partially rework inherited landscapes of state scalar 
organisation.”  
He means that there is no way for the construction of a city-regional governance 
framework to prevent the extant scalar state system which is controlled by the nation 
state from carrying on exercising regulatory control over city-regions. The city-
regional transformation cannot be fully understood if the political economy and the 
dynamics of extant state scalar organisation are not considered. To be more explicit, 
the re-scaling process does not generate a discontinued timeline for the past 
governance model and lead to a fresh start for the newly emerging arrangement.  
43 
 
From this perspective, both Bennett (1997) and Harrison (2012c) illustrate that it is 
too hard for the spatial rescaling of state power to reach its ideal modelling with only 
one-step fast change. What we have witnessed over recent years is a continuous 
mismatch between functional geography and administrative boundaries, where 
governance structures evolve slowly to fit the new demands for more appropriately 
scaled political arrangements (e.g. Freytag et al., 2006; Hoyler et al., 2006). This 
echoes Brenner’s (2004: 75) statement of state spatiality being “a process rather 
than a container, a platform or a thing”. Thus logic suggests that the combination 
between the recently emerged city-regional governance arrangement and long-
existing state organisation shall not be realised easily and is an on-going process 
which is capable to generate conflict. To reach a conclusion by borrowing Jonas and 
Ward’s (2007: 172) phrase, geopolitical city-regionalising cannot be considered as a 
‘discrete actor-scale’.  
Secondly, the recent facts reveal that city-regions are currently not stepping away 
from the long-existing state scalar organisation’s regulatory control. Scott (2001b) 
thought of the governance arrangement at the city-regional tier as a necessary tool 
for improving a city-region’s functional competitiveness in both the short term, i.e. 
policy making in favour of increasing the economic return effects, and the long term, 
i.e. achieving social fairness and preserving economic wellbeing. The reason for 
Scott to affirm the importance of city-regional governance arrangements is he 
believes that markets alone can never fully secure local levels of efficiency, 
productivity and competitiveness (Scott, 2001b). Central to his city-regional 
governance arrangement is the ‘social democratic politics’ which is associated with 
collective social forces in the administrative agenda. Thus Scott is encouraging the 
complete participation of economic, political and social actors in favour of democratic 
administration.  
This is a brief summary of Scott’s design for a city-regional governance framework. 
We admire his theoretical recognition of the relations between functional importance 
and administrative requirement within certain city-regional functional geographies at 
this micro or sub-national level. However, what this thesis doubts is how we are 
going to count on the social democratic politics and its social infrastructures on its 
own to effectively govern over the most appropriate scale when we are not even 
certain about how to define the accurate geographical scope of the inclusive city-
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regional functional area; not mentioning the contemporary fast-pace urbanisation 
and continuous economic restructuring. We do not have a perfect solution to answer 
for this dilemma in a real case yet. A few recent geopolitical research projects 
relating to prominent European and Chinese city-regions reveal that it is challenging 
for all national, regional and local forces to construct the ‘ideal’ city-regional 
governance framework (cf. Harrison, 2012c; Xu and Yeh, 2011; Vogel, 2010). Thus 
by corresponding to Harrison’s (2015b: 40) conclusive finding, what we have 
witnessed in most recent cases is “the city-region concept being bent and shaped to 
fit particular political agendas”, often under the central state’s orchestration.  
Referring to this conclusive statement, this thesis appreciates Harrison’s (2010) term 
of ‘compromised city-regionalism’ for precisely commenting on this difficult situation. 
As a result, the delegation of the political power from the central state to the regional 
and urban scale should not be seen as the decay of the national power. The nation 
state is still bearing substantial regulatory responsibilities of orchestrating strategy to 
promote the regional and urban development (Harrison, 2015b). It is therefore 
difficult to see city-regions become largely free from state organisation’s regulatory 
control at least at this stage. 
To conclude for this section, this chapter appreciate city-region’s functional 
agglomerating capacity, and the resulting external functional relations between the 
city-region and other parts of the globalised economic network. However, the 
globalised functional relations, which exist mostly beyond the long-established 
national administrative boundaries, shall not be over-referenced to evidence the 
quasi-autonomous existence of city-regions. Current empirical data illustrates that 
many administrative institutional arrangements at the city-regional level have to deal 
with the extant state scalar system which already functions as the administrative 
entity within the inclusive functional geography. More importantly, the design work of 
city-regional governance framework is still relying on central state power rather than 
the collective social forces in favour of democratic politics, which many would like us 
to believe, although many of the centrally-orchestrated arrangements are critiqued 
for not being ‘ideal’. Based on the current discussion, state power shall not be over-
stated as retreating from city-regional construction when it is relating to geopolitical 
agenda at least at this stage. 
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2.4 Political city-regionalism shall be context-sensitive 
The agglomeration model underpinning contemporary urban economics has been 
much admired across the world and underpins arguments recognising the functional 
importance of large scale city-regions within the global economy. While much of the 
prevailing focus has been on European and American city-regions (Hall and Pain, 
2006; Herrschel, 2014; Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Kantor et al., 2012), there is 
increasing realisation of East Asian, but in particular, Chinese mega city-regions over 
the past decade (e.g. Xu and Li, 1990; Hall, 1999; Yeh, 2001; Vogel, 2010; Yeh and 
Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011).  
Following this geoeconomic discovery that unprecedented urbanisation places 
China’s large urban areas at the forefront of arguments in favour of agglomeration 
being critical to global urban competitiveness, there is a rising interest in studying 
how to construct an ‘ideal’ governance framework for covering the functional 
geography of the rapidly expanded city-regional scale. We have seen geopolitical 
research over a range of diversified governmental models across Europe; however, 
much of this is difficult to translate into the Chinese context – not least because of 
the rapid pace of urbanisation, the larger scale of city-regions, and the very different 
political-economic conditions. The new geopolitical city-regionalism which we are 
facing now no longer means to construct a static policy ‘container’ in the form of city-
regional geography. On the contrary, administrative institutional arrangement for city-
regions largely depend on dynamics among a group of various actors, such as 
relations between functional development and city-regional governance, horizontal 
relations among local governments, and hierarchical relations among national, 
regional and local governments.  
There are a large number of different locational variables involved in the creation of 
city-regional administrative arrangements for each unique circumstance. However, 
“our understanding of how this [spatial re-scaling process] takes place in distinct 
historical-geographical contexts remains underdeveloped (Brenner, 1998: 27).” Thus 
for the geopolitical research to be more global, this thesis needs to relate our 
broader debate – the new city-regionalism – to specific geographical contexts. More 
importantly, we need to see if our current theory is still compatible with other specific 
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city-regional contexts; and if not, how we are going to fill the research gap. At last, 
this section is not going to discuss whether current city-regionalism is able to provide 
reference to any other particular case. Instead, this chapter focuses on digging 
deeper into the importance of researching the differences of localised context in city-
regionalism theory development. 
Neil Brenner’s (2004) book ‘New State Spaces – Urban Governance and the 
Transformation of Statehood’ highlights the importance of researching locational 
transformation within the current trend of spatially re-scaling state power across the 
world. For this aim, Brenner made explicit statements about the historical 
background of the transformation from nationalised to localised spatial development 
in the post-war decades. For the former, national space participated in the world 
economy as a single entity; and for the latter, sub-national space becomes primary 
for agglomerating economic activities and then competing with other economic 
entities in globalisation.  
To correspond with this functional spatial transformation, state intervention’s aim has 
been undergoing a change from even geographical development across the national 
jurisdiction to the promotion of localised territorial competitiveness, which is 
apparently uneven within global economic network. This is leading the previous state 
intervention to be spatially rescaled in order to cope with the emergence of new 
functional space, although we are still lacking a generally-agreed solution for 
constructing the new scaled governance framework. This is why he suggests we are 
facing the production of ‘new state spaces’. The emergence of these new state 
spaces is important because according to Jones (1997: 951), “spatial selectivity 
refers to the processes of ‘spatial privileging and articulation’ through which state 
policies are differentiated across territorial space in order to target particular 
geographical zones and scales”. Relating this to my research, any decision to 
prioritise the competitiveness of city-regions is not apolitical. We therefore need to 
understand the geopolitics of city-regionalism, especially the extent to which political 
decisions around investment, infrastructure, governance and planning prioritise 
growth in some areas over others. This can be prioritising growth and investment in 
city-regions rather than non-city-regions, but increasingly research is looking within 
city-regions to see whether city-regionalism benefits some interests more than others. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.3, the re-organisation of state spatial 
administration has not appeared out of nowhere, instead it is a conflictual ‘layering’ 
process, which tends to embed a new spatial scale into its entrenched locational 
system. Brenner (2004: 110) suggests:  
“the evolution of state spatiality is strongly path-dependent insofar as many of 
its fundamental characteristics may be reproduced, reinforced, and even 
locked in during the process of historical development”.  
Discussion relating to the current emergence of new state spaces should not be split 
from the extant local system which already experienced historical evolution. As a 
consequence, there is likely to be differentiation among the arrangements for 
governance frameworks at the new scale over the past decades. Thus researching 
and amplifying the context-oriented differentiation of the state re-scaling process 
within any particular geographic area becomes the key task for furthering geopolitical 
city-regionalism research. 
To summarise, context sensitivity is the main element of consideration for tailoring 
the city-regional governance model across different geographies. Again, as Brenner 
(2004) recommends in his book, ‘state spatial projects’ and ‘state spatial strategies’ 
are two main inclusions in the geopolitical re-organisation process. The former 
arrangement “intended to establish customised, place-specific regulatory capacities 
in major cities, city-regions, and industrial districts and, more generally, to 
decentralise key aspects of economic regulation to subnational (regional or local) 
institutional levels”; and the latter strategies “intended to re-concentrate 
socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructural investments within the most 
globally competitive city-regions and, more generally, to enhance the territorial 
competitiveness of major local and regional economies” (Brenner, 2004b: 176). 
 
2.5 Coda: City-regionalisation is an economic-political conflicted process 
This thesis appreciates the arguments for city-regions becoming the new primary 
scale for agglomerating economic activities amid the contemporary globalising 
economy. Together with the recognition of increasingly global processes and flows of 
capital, knowledge, and people, which mostly happen beyond the traditional 
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jurisdictional boundaries, the city-region is identified as an important unit politically, 
economically and socially within the era of globalisation. The first half of this chapter 
has explained city-regionalism from three various perspectives with reference to past 
city-regionalist literatures. They are city-regional spatial form, geoeconomic and 
geopolitical city-regionalisms. The non-stoppable trend of creating new definitions 
and terms for city-regional units did not successfully guide us to understand our 
conceptual space; instead, even more issues have been generated. Among these 
issues, there is one relating to economic-political conflict inspiring us to produce the 
main discussion in the second half of this chapter.  
There is no denying about the economic importance of city-regions in the current 
globalised economy, and this is the initial idea provoking us to engage with this new 
spatial scale at an accelerated pace. This thesis also understands it is crucial and 
necessary to establish a governance framework in order to “preserve and enhance 
their wealth and wellbeing” (Scott, 2001a: 12) since we can never rely on the market 
itself to exercise governance over its inclusive functional area. Referring to this point, 
how we are going to make this happen becomes a difficult task. And here is the 
issue we chose to focus on in this chapter, which is there is no way to underplay the 
role of politics within the potential construction of city-regional governance models. 
This political task shall not be seen as subsidiary to functional development. We 
have seen many centrally-orchestrated institutional arrangements which have aimed 
to create socio-economic prosperity at a new spatial scale in the pursuit of Scott’s 
description of city-regional success. However, many of these arrangements are not 
being constructed within an effective city-regional functional space, or fail to cover 
the inclusive functional geography.  
What is largely missing from the past realisation of city-regionalism is a consideration 
over the dynamics of the extant state scalar organisation within the current 
construction of city-regional governance frameworks. More importantly, this research 
is supposed to be context sensitive. It is problematic to see state regulatory power as 
retreating from the emergence of this city-regional scale. The emergence of the new 
spatial scale shall not be seen as independent from extant state scalar organisation; 
rather, it is a new layer which is trying to fit itself in the long-existing state scalar 
organisation. This ‘layering’ process shall be the focus of our empirical research. 
This is an extremely difficult combining process, and we do not have a perfect 
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solution for this city-regional governance task yet. Harrison’s (2010) ‘compromised 
city-regionalism’ is a good characterisation of the current dilemma. Furthermore, on 
the way looking for an effective design for city-regional governance frameworks, we 
need to be careful in dealing with the dynamics of state actors within each different 
city-regional context according to Brenner’s (2004) methodological suggestion about 
locational research. Distinct locational economic-political contexts could lead us to a 
diversified structure of our expected ‘ideal’ city-regional governance framework. 
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Chapter 3: Chinese Mega City-Regionalism in Continuity: A Critical 
Review 
 
3.1. Introduction: the under-researched Chinese historical-geographic context 
As chapter 2 explains, in the prevailing Western discourses on contemporary city-
regionalism, theorising the new enlarging urban areas as spatial, economic and 
political units in response to global urbanisation and economic integration is nothing 
new (e.g. Brenner, 2004a, 2004b; Florida, 2008; Harrison, 2012b; Harrison and 
Hoyler, 2015a, 2015b; Jonas and Ward, 2007; Lang and Knox, 2009; Scott, 2001a, 
2001b). Among many of their discussions, there is no one denying the functional 
importance of city-regional or their derivative scales within the networked global 
economy. Instead, one central focus for the debate is whether the new spatial 
spaces shall become the contingent outcome of function-based relational processes 
as a response to external economic-political change as the relational approach 
suggests; or new state spaces which involves the mobilisation of state spatial 
projects and strategies and more importantly the realisation of locally dependent 
territorial politics. The relational approach sees new spatial scales as the product of 
flows, networks and connectivity. Relating to this perspective, there is the danger of 
disconnecting the new spaces from extant social relations and state scalar systems.  
On the other hand, and based on the framework of ‘new state spaces’, Brenner 
(2004b) brought us a novel line of thinking for the construction of new state spaces. 
He suggests that we pay continuous attention to the restructuring process of state 
spatial formation rather than its outcome, in particular the subnational governance 
arrangement per se. Besides the realisation of an ongoing rescaling process, what 
this thesis shall also become alert to is continuity and historical-geographical 
contexts. Hence this chapter is inspired by Brenner’s (1998: 27) question of “how this 
[state rescaling process] takes place in distinct historical-geographical contexts”.  
Following on from this and relating it to my research it is crucial to investigate the 
historical continuity of Chinese city-regionalism, which is comparatively under-
researched. Borrowing the statement from Park (2013: 1115) who focuses on spatial 
transformation in South Korea:  
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“the existing literature is limited in its conceptualization of the diverse and 
concrete ways in which the spatial and scalar restructuring of capitalist state 
takes place in different historical, political and social contexts beyond North 
America and Western Europe.” 
Hence for geopolitical research into city-regionalism to become more global, it is 
urgent for us to relate our terms and conceptions, which are largely raised on the 
basis of North Atlantic cities and regions, to a wider range of diversified economic-
political contexts, and Asian regions in particular given the rapid pace of urbanisation. 
In particular, the research opportunity in relation to the Chinese historical-
geographical context shall be valuable for extending the current understanding of city 
expansion into larger city-regions and the production of new non-Western state 
spaces.  
For South East Asia in general, and China in particular, city-regionalism is a much 
more recent phenomenon than in Western contexts; and similarly there is lack of 
clear conception of the constructing process for new city and regional spaces since 
the 1978 Chinese economic reform. The transitional stage from centralised 
regulatory system to decentralisation of economic decision-making rights during the 
post-reform period attracted comparatively much attention for studying the 
governance over new state spaces, including cross-boundary governance (Yang and 
Li, 2013; Shen, 2004), reorganisation of local state spatiality (Shen, 2007; Zhang and 
Wu, 2006), and regional strategic planning (Luo and Shen, 2008; Wu and Zhang, 
2007; Xu, 2008). Nevertheless, the constituted role of interaction among political-
economic actors in the realisation of enlarging city-regional spaces is largely under-
researched.  
Furthermore, even fewer analyses have been generated to explain the continuous 
linkage between the historical path of Chinese regional governance from city 
expansion into larger city-regions and the current trend towards mega city-
regionalism. Prior to 1949, hundreds of years of chaos caused by war and semi-
colonial national territories as a result of foreign domination led the previous state 
organisation to lose its full control over national space (Zhang, 2015). The resulting 
historical gap for state spatial governance was then closed by the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, P.R. China). Consequently, the historical 
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transition of Chinese state spatiality experienced three main stages since the P.R. 
China was founded in 1949.  
First among many who focus on Chinese mega city-regionalism is Jiang Xu, a 
Chinese urban and regional specialist, who has taken to arguing that the renewal of 
regional governance arrangements in China, in the period since market reform and 
characterised by deepening globalisation, and accelerated urbanisation in the past 
two decades, is a result of a number of negative externalities such as intense inter-
city competition (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Wu and Zhang, 2007; Xu and Yeh, 2011) 
and local political fragmentation (Xu, 2008). That the re-making of Chinese mega 
city-regions has drawn significant attention of late (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2009; Vogel, 
2010; Wu and Zhang, 2007; Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011) suggests studying and 
analysing China’s newly rising and path-dependent mega city-regions may be 
important for injecting new insights into the city-regionalism debate nationally (in 
China), regionally (in south East Asia), and globally to complement and challenge 
Western accounts. 
Across Chinese national territory, nowhere have these fresh insights been more 
obviously available than that in the Pearl River Delta (PRD), which since the early-
2000s has become one of the key research locations for studying mega city-
regionalism in China. Using the PRD as a case study, this thesis has seen, for 
example, Wu and Zhang’s (2007) analysis of the strategic planning for regional 
places in order to cope with the fragmented economic and political landscape; Xu’s 
(2008) review of the Chinese regional planning system and governance; Xu and 
Yeh’s (2010) argument about the mismatch between political administrative 
jurisdiction and functional economic space in the emerging mega city-regional plan; 
Xu and Yeh’s (2013) examination of path dependencies in the inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation; Ye’s (2014) investigation into the state-led cross-territorial governance; 
and Li, Wu and Hay’s (2015) exploration of cross-territorial conflicts embedded in the 
intra-regional integration. 
Nevertheless and in comparison to the PRD, much less research has been 
conducted over the development of the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) mega city-region. 
This is potentially a significant oversight because interestingly, YRD’s political 
structure and economic context are arguably more complex than the PRD since it is 
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a trans-provincial territorial mega-city region composed of three entire different 
provinces, including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. In short, the 
involvement of more jurisdictional administrations even exacerbates the potential for 
political fragmentation and economic competition across the mega city-regional 
space – certainly when compared to the PRD.  
This chapter introduces the YRD as a prime location for enunciating new 
understanding of political spatial re-organisation at the scale of mega city-regions in 
China. Besides this, this chapter is going to investigate the political-economic legacy 
which was inherited by contemporary mega city-regionalism as a result of the 
historical transition of Chinese state spatiality. Following this introductory section, 
section 3.2 briefly examines the transitional trajectory of regional policies starting 
with the 1950s. This section will analyse the historical elements raised in past 
Chinese regional development - what I refer to as the historical legacy - which may 
affect the current regional planning and governance. Then at the end of this part, 
brief summaries about the regional planning and governance in three of the most 
crucial Chinese mega-city regions will be stated for the intention of making 
introductory comparisons for the study of YRD. The case studies will include the 
Pearl River Delta (PRD), Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and Jing-Jin-Ji (JJJ). The 
unique economic-political context in which Chinese mega city-regions are sitting, and 
the current Chinese regional planning and governance arrangements will be the 
main aspects covered in this chapter.  
Section 3.3 will explain the research background of YRD through highlighting its 
strategic importance, examine the YRD regional plan in planning details and finally 
illustrate one of the key intra-regional city network constructions - the Suzhou-Wuxi-
Changzhou project, which was initiated by the Jiangsu provincial government. The 
purpose of explaining this intra-regional construction project is in order to read 
through it the conflicts inherent within current Chinese regional planning and 
governance. Finally, a concluding section will link sections 3.2 and 3.3 to reveal the 
underlying economic-political consistency which this chapter is able to distract from 
the historical path of changing Chinese state spatiality.  
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3.2. The historic path of Chinese state spatiality 
This section presents the historical transformation of Chinese spatial governance 
after the P.R. China was founded in 1949. This chapter responds to Brenner’s call 
for collecting the historical-geographical specifications for understanding the 
contemporary geopolitical restructuring processes. The centrally planned economic 
regulation (Unger, 1987; Zhang, 2002) and administrative regional division (Solinger 
1978; Liu and Feng, 2008) become two essential characteristics for state spatial 
governance during the pre-reform stage. After the 1978 Chinese economic reform, 
political administrative division remains as the main obstacle for cross-territorial 
economic connection even in the context of decentralisation of economic decision-
making rights. Specifically, territory-dependent political interest and economic 
development constitute the historical transformation of Chinese state spatiality and 
the emergence of new state spaces. 
To make a brief summary, table 1 outlines the transition of Chinese urban and 
regional policies since P.R. China was founded in 1949. The transitional path gives 
special attention to the changing primary administrative scale at the subnational level 
and the role of urban jurisdiction within its locating political administrative regions. As 
table 1 illustrates below, the transitional path experiences three main stages during 
the last six decades.  
The first stage is the pre-market reform period between 1950s and 1970s. Under the 
centrally-commanded regulation at that time, spatial equality was prioritised and 
hence city expansion was largely restricted. To begin with, in the 1980s, China 
experienced economic reform in favour of regulatory decentralisation and more 
importantly constructing market socialism. The city once again became the primary 
space for organising developmental activities and this is the second stage. Finally 
and since the 2000s, Chinese urban and regional policy swings to favour the 
regional construction which this time focuses on the spatial scale which is deployed 
around the functionally developed cities. The Chinese historical path of regional 
governance will be reviewed on the basis of this transitional thread.  
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Table 1: The transition of Chinese urban and regional policies since 1949 
 Period National 
Governmental 
Arrangement 
 
National Aim Planning 
Authority 
Plan Names Central- 
Local State 
Relationship 
Centrally-
conducted 
Urban Policy 
Stage 
1 
1950s 1. Centralised 
regulatory 
system; 
 
2. Centrally-
planned 
economy; 
National 
capital 
accumulation; 
 
National 
Planning 
Commission 
(NPC) 
Five-Year 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
Plan (Five-
Year Plan) 
Top-down 
command and 
control; 
Specialised 
development of 
city planning; 
1960s – 
1970s 
1. Cross-
regional 
equality; 
 
2. Self-
sufficient city 
and region for 
industrial 
production; 
1. Aborting the 
previous 
specialised 
planning of land 
use;  
 
2. Constructing 
producer cities 
in favour of 
heavy 
industrialisation; 
 
3. Anti-urbanism 
in terms of 
limiting urban 
growth rate; 
 
Stage 
2 
1980s – 
1990s 
1. 
Decentralisation 
of economic 
decision-making 
and fiscal rights; 
 
2. Promoting 
market-oriented 
policies in favour 
of local 
economic 
development; 
Transforming 
to market 
socialism in 
favour of 
market 
principles and 
collectivisation 
of means of 
production; 
 
Chinese 
urban 
planning 
bureaucraci
es 
Urban System 
Plan 
1. Relaxed 
vertical 
hierarchical 
state control; 
 
2. Fierce inter-
jurisdictional 
competition, 
especially for 
inward 
investment; 
1. Growing 
specialisation of 
cities; 
 
2. Promoting the 
comparative 
advantages of 
each cities’ own 
localities; 
 
3. No longer 
restricting the 
sprawl of urban 
space to cities’ 
periphery; 
 
Stage 
3 
2000s – 
Present 
1. Construction 
of mega city-
regional 
planning; 
 
2. Promoting 
coordinated 
development 
across local 
jurisdictions; 
Administrative 
efficiency and 
economic 
rationality at 
regional and 
national scale; 
A multi-
scalar 
central 
planning 
system 
Many different 
versions of 
cross-
jurisdictional 
plans which 
are high likely 
overlapping; 
1. Central 
state-led plan 
is difficult to be 
directly 
enforced in the 
local agenda; 
 
2. Mega city-
regional 
identity 
becomes 
strong in YRD 
and PRD after 
2005; 
 
Promoting mega 
city-regional 
synergy by 
coordinating 
inter-city 
relationship; 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Leaf (1998) and Xu (2008) 
 
3.2.1. State centralism and egalitarian-focused urban and regional governance 
in the pre-reform period (1950s -1970s) 
The first three decades after the founding of the P.R. China in 1949 were 
characterised by a centrally-commanded administrative system and the national 
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strategy of self-reliance. Top-down hierarchical regulation dominated the operation of 
local urban and rural activities, including the distribution of production resources. 
Regional and local level governments acted as the central branches which were 
responsible for enforcing vertical commands. In particular, the implementation of 
central authority’s strategic plan became the statutory duty of local governments. 
During the pre-reform stage before the 1978 economic reform, Chinese central 
authority mainly built a centralised regulatory system by maintaining the vertical 
administrative relationship within the state scalar organisation.  
Relating to this vertical regulatory system, firstly there was one particular 
comprehensive plan, named the national Five-Year Social and Economic 
Development Plan (Five-Year Plan), which was prepared by the National Planning 
Commission (NPC and known as National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) later). The plan was renewed consistently every five years while providing 
specific planning provisions, for example it specified the location of particular state-
controlled enterprises. Therefore, the Five-Year Plan was widely considered to be 
‘tooled’ to govern the industrial location and production capacity at the local, regional 
and national level, and more importantly redistribute resources among administrative 
regions in order to achieve spatial equality which is related to our latter discussion (Li 
and Wu, 2012a).  
Secondly, the entire national territory was divided by the central authority into several 
trans-provincial mega administrative regions which each were regulated by a 
regional consolidated government in order to improve the execution of central 
command and planning tasks within local and regional administrative territories (also 
see Solinger, 1978; Liu and Feng, 2008). Each regional consolidated government 
was equipped with a regional bureau and a regional economic planning office.  
As table 2 illustrates, Six Great Administrative Regions (daxingzhengqu) were 
initially constructed and then replaced by different numbers of Economic 
Cooperation Regions (jingjixiezuoqu) at different decades. Each of these mega 
administrative regions constituted several different but contiguous provinces, such as 
North China which included Beijing, Tianjin and four other adjacent provinces. 
Beijing and Tianjin have been the municipalities or provincial-level urban jurisdictions 
which are under the direct control of central government all the time. Besides these 
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two exceptions, the provinces were the lower level administrative regions which 
included a number of prefectures and counties. Before the 1980s, territories at the 
prefecture and county level were largely rural, and the number of cities was fewer 
than 200 across the entire nation (Cartier, 2015). In other words, unlike the 
prefecture and county-level cities which we have seen after the 1980s, the majority 
of prefecture and county level areas in that period were not cities. 
 
Table 2: Regional administrations from 1949 to 1978 
Perio
d 
Regional 
administration 
 
Regional constitution Institutional settings Intention and task 
1949 - 
1954 
Great 
Administrative 
Regions (da 
xingzhengqu) 
 
Six regions, including the 
Northeast, North China, the 
Northwest, the Southeast, 
the Central South, and the 
Southwest 
 
The regions housed the 
military, Party and complete 
governmental departments 
 
To strengthen central 
regulation, and facilitate 
sending down mandatory 
orders 
 
1958-
1961 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions (jingji 
xiezuoqu) 
 
Seven regions, including 
North China, the Northeast, 
East China, Central China, 
South China, the Southwest 
and the Northwest 
 
The regions were equipped 
with coordinating commissions 
and regional economic 
planning offices 
 
To function as self-reliant 
economic regions under 
central guidance 
 
1961 – 
1966 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions (jingji 
xiezuoqu) 
 
Six regions, including North 
China, the Northeast, East 
China, the Central-South, 
the Southwest and the 
Northwest 
 
The regions were equipped 
with Party Bureaus and 
regional economic planning 
offices 
 
To function as self-reliant 
economic regions under 
central guidance 
 
1970 Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions (jingji 
xiezuoqu) 
 
Ten regions including the 
Southwest, the Northwest, 
Central China, South China, 
North China, the Northeast, 
East China, the Mingan 
region, the Shandong region 
and the Xinjiang region 
 
Not materialised 
 
To function as self-reliant 
economic regions under 
central guidance 
 
Source: Compiled from Li and Wu (2012: 61) 
 
The regional plan was required to be subservient to the national Five-Year Plan; and 
similarly each provincial plan was enforced to correspond to the regional plan. It was 
these middle and local level governments’ statutory duty to enforce the 
implementation of their plans at this early stage. During the pre-reform period, the 
Five-Year Plan was full of specific targets, including the specified production outputs 
and distribution of production resources and investment projects among 
administrative jurisdictions. Such commanded tasks would then be sent down 
through the vertical planning system, and finally divided and allocated to the ‘work 
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units’ (danwei) which was the sub-prefecture and sub-county administrative 
composition of each individual administrative division (Leaf, 1998). Knowing this 
historical context is important for understanding the dominating role of hierarchical 
state scalar organisation in planning and operating the strategic development of 
regional and urban jurisdictions during the pre-reform stage.  
However, the aim of urban and regional policy did not remain fixed under the central 
command during the entire pre-reform stage. In the absence of local autonomy, the 
process of constructing the urban space towards various purposes was under the 
direct control of central authority. For the first decade of the 1950s, Chinese urban 
planning was highly shaped in favour of a Soviet-style planning approach, which was 
characterised by extended and more importantly specialised construction of cities, 
and furthermore infrastructural linkages among these urban spaces (see Xu, 2008; 
Leaf, 1998).  
Similar to the contemporary urban policy of promoting local comparative advantages, 
the specialisation of urban development at that moment aimed to achieve a general 
picture of complementary display of industrial output. Hence, the city was still the 
primary scale for organising economic activities during the decade of the 1950s, the 
first half period in particular. Chinese cities only experienced a short honeymoon 
planning period on the constructing path of Chinese mega administrative regions. 
The end of this first period was triggered by the abortion of the Sino-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty and the retreat of Soviet planning specialists in the late 1950s 
(Leaf, 1998: 146).  
Afterwards, between the 1960s and 1970s, the main emphasis of central urban and 
regional policy shifted from the previous specialised construction to the self-sufficient 
productive capacity within each provincial and regional jurisdiction. Contrary to these 
two spatial scales, the city was no longer regarded as a substantial unit for 
containing functional activities (Wu, 2007). Enlarged urbanisation across city 
administrative boundaries, growth of urban population in particular, was dramatically 
suppressed by central command. It was Mao Zedong, the first president of the P.R. 
China, who instructed Chinese urban planners that “It’s no good if cities are too big 
(Chengshi taidale, buhao)” (McGee et al., 2007: 33). One of the critical 
considerations of Chinese regulators at that time was to prioritise the development of 
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comparative under-developed rural areas instead of cities’ advantageous economic 
growth. Relating to the cognition of ‘anti-urbanism’ (Leaf, 1998: 146) or ‘pro-ruralism’ 
(Kirkby, 1985: 4), state power not only restrained the number of migrants from rural 
to urban space, but also periodically forcefully transferred a certain number of urban 
residents to the countryside.  
Firstly and for the former restriction, in 1958 the National People’s Congress created 
the framework of ‘permanent registration booklet’ (hukou bu) which divided the entire 
Chinese population into two categories, ‘urban residence’ (chengshi hukou) and 
‘rural residence’ (nongcun hukou) (Kirkby, 1985). Thereafter the unauthorised long-
term resident exchange between city and countryside was monitored and restricted; 
people were thus settled into where they were registered for the following two 
decades until the 1980s reform.  
Secondly and for the latter forcing arrangement, there was a continuous trend of 
state-led ‘sending down’ (xiafang) of urban residents from cities to rural areas during 
the 1960s and 1970s; and the population movements reached a peak twice, in the 
early 1960s and in the period between 1966 and 1976 (Kirkby, 1985). By making 
these relocating arrangements, the respective disparities between urban and rural 
demography, and industrial and agricultural development were expected to be 
reduced by the central decision-makers at that time. As a consequence, achieving 
spatial equality at the provincial, regional and national levels replaced economic 
growth as one of China’s primary aims before the 1980s reform. Thus the city was 
no longer the primary scale within regional planning and governance. 
For the aim of balancing the industrial distribution within each administrative region, 
the function of the city was identified as “self-reliant concentrated sites for industry, 
rather than centres promoting regional economic growth, trade and technological 
progress” (Wang, 1994: 257). The underlying intention of this central identification 
was to build ‘producer cities’ instead of ‘consumer cities’, which was seen as 
promoting capitalist and feudalist urbanism by Chinese socialist decision-makers at 
that moment (Leaf, 1998). There are two perspectives for introducing the process of 
constructing urban self-reliant productive sites.  
Firstly, a limited extent of agricultural hinterlands was assigned to each prefecture 
government in order to feed the residents within their administrative base (Leaf, 
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1998). The second point was the growth of industrial outputs within each 
administrative jurisdiction outweighed the pre-existing condition of the selected 
production location under the centrally-controlled hierarchical planning authority 
(Kirkby, 1985). The most prominent example was that a large number of cities were 
keen to invest in constructing state-controlled steel plants regardless of their own 
condition and capability, and more importantly, the functionally complementary 
display of industrial productive capacity within the larger regional scale. 
Consequently, the development of each city became a part of the egalitarian-
oriented layout within its located administrative regions.  
 
Table 3: State spatial selectivity in the pre-reform China 
 State Spatial Projects 
 
State Spatial Strategies 
Scalar Dimension Concentration 
 
Centralisation of state decision-making rights - 
central state-commanded regulatory system; 
Singularity 
 
1. Nation was the primary scale for planning; 
 
2. Planned activities were allocated into a number 
of cross-provincial regions; 
 
Territorial 
Dimension 
Uniformity 
 
1. The nation consists of a number of 
regionally consolidated governments which 
each had a similar governmental structure; 
 
2. The city was greatly undermined within the 
regional construction; 
Equalisation 
 
1. Promoting egalitarian and self-reliance at the 
cross-provincial administrative regional and 
national scale; 
 
2. Promoting both industrial and agricultural 
development in urban and rural places 
respectively; 
 
 Source: Structure derived from Brenner (2004b: 97) 
 
To summarise, the regional development was highly planned and administered by 
the centrally-controlled hierarchical state scalar organisation during the pre-reform 
stage. The strong cross-provincial consolidated governments at regional level were 
mobilised firstly to strengthen the central control over local and regional development 
through issuing a national plan, and secondly to construct regional balance in the 
form of even development between rural and urban areas within each mega 
administrative region. Under this circumstance, the role of cities was quickly 
transformed from an economic focus during the 1950s to becoming a part of the 
greater orchestration of achieving region-wide spatial equality and self-reliance. The 
previous urban specialised development had to give way to the regional egalitarian 
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approach, which applied to both urban and rural spaces under the central command. 
Overall, cities were only seen as parts of located mega administrative regions which 
aimed to become egalitarian regional spaces within its jurisdictional territory during 
most of the pre-reform stage.  
 
3.2.2. Economic decentralisation and urban jurisdiction’s dominion in the 
reform period (1980s – 1990s) 
To begin with 1978, as a result of the transformation of primary national interest from 
political concentration to economic advancement under the command of the new 
central leadership, China experienced economic reform and the ‘Open Door’ policy. 
As a consequence, we saw weakened hierarchical control and decentralised 
economic decision-making rights toward prefecture and county level governments in 
China (Wu, 2002; Wu and Zhang, 2007; Wu and Zhang, 2010; Luo and Shen, 2009). 
The regulatory role of the former cross-provincial administrative regions in relation to 
economic affairs was soon significantly undermined as well as the relaxation of the 
central commanding plan, including the National ‘Five-Year Plan’ (Li and Wu, 2013: 
139). The relaxation of central planning and control were argued to be triggered on 
the basis of considerations stated below.  
Firstly, the market reform and decentralisation of economic decision-making rights 
made local authorities, such as the city halls and town halls, no longer a passive 
regulator, but rather a primary actor in local development (Wu and Zhang, 2007). 
That is, they are able to make their own decisions and pursue for their own good on 
the basis of their localised conditions. One particular example is the reformed fiscal 
system since the 1980s, which has changed from being dominated by the central 
state to a tax sharing system between central and local states. This has made local 
governments eager to expand their economic bases in their jurisdictions, for instance 
generating more GDP by making preferential policies for attracting inward 
investments.  
Therefore, due to the rising fiscal and administrative powers of local governments, 
the provincial authorities have only limited influence over local decision-making. In 
this circumstance, without regulatory legislations or solid regional institutions 
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enforcing the implementation of the central plans locally, it became extremely hard to 
expect the local governments to rigorously follow the central master plans when 
partial planning provisions were formulated against the growth of the local tax base.  
Secondly, the content of central territorial or regional plans is criticised as inflexible 
and too broad without much detailed explanations (Mao and Fang, 2002). For 
instance, the territory planning (guotu guihua), which was first launched by the 
National Planning Commission (NPC), provides guidance for national and regional 
sustainable economic and social development through planning the administration of 
land and natural resources. However, it has been critiqued that the content of the 
territorial planning is too general and lacks a specific focus. That is, the territorial 
planning provides general guidance only and overlooks each region’s unique 
background and path-dependent development (Mao and Fang, 2002: 270). The lack 
of flexibility leads the local development to be vulnerable to external changes, in 
particular amid the global economic integration.  
With respect to the above-mentioned 1978 Chinese reform, firstly, local authorities, 
city states in particular, autonomy over the local administration was dramatically 
extended in comparison with their role of passive regulators in the pre-reform stage 
(see more details in Leaf, 1998; Ng and Xu, 2000); and secondly, growing 
specialisation of urban space dominated the Chinese regional and urban governance 
for the aim of economic growth in the reform period during the 1980s and 1990s, 
which was contrary to the earlier central-led uniform and standardised spatial 
arrangement in the form of large administrative regions in order to reinforce top-
down hierarchical control (Leaf, 1998).  
Therefore, achieving regional equality for administrative jurisdictions is replaced by 
promoting the comparative advantage of each city’s unique localities due to the 
issues of enhancing production efficiency and addressing the state fiscal deficit as 
the primary strategic aims (Li and Wu, 2012a: 65). The reform enables the urban 
space to be filled by customised and place-specific governmental arrangements 
largely in favour of entrepreneurialism. Urban space supersedes administrative 
regional territory as the primary scale for organising human activities under the 
central orchestration. As a consequence, market-oriented commercial activities were 
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recognised by many to be concentrating in the city (e.g. Lei, 2014; Ng and Xu, 2000; 
Lin, 2002; Leaf, 2002; Zhao, Chan and Sit, 2003; Wu, 2008).  
The debates about the re-rising of the cities, such as the functional importance of 
urban space and urban governance, appeared to be the focus in many Chinese 
literatures (e.g. Wu, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang, 2002). Not only was the 
economic contribution of cities in the locating provinces improved, their 
administrative leading roles over adjacent regions was also formulated. In 1982, a 
new governmental relationship between cities and their adjacent counties was forged 
under central orchestration. The ‘city-leading-county’ (shi guan xian) framework 
expands cities’ jurisdiction beyond their traditional governmental boundaries to 
include adjacent counties which were previously under the direct control of provincial 
governments (Chung, 2007). Contrary to the contemporary inter-city alliance or 
cooperation, this is a vertical controlling relationship. The city once again re-emerged 
as the prominent node within Chinese geographical space under central political 
support. 
Here is the concern as a result of decentralised economic reform, of which the 
criticisms state that it is the growing autonomy of the local authorities and their 
market-oriented decision-making and governance policy that is responsible for the 
fragmented horizontal relationship among local administrative jurisdictions (Vogel, 
2010; Luo and Shen, 2008). To make the situation even further complicated, many 
lower level cities, for example at the prefecture and county level, and even towns, 
which were formerly seen as peripheral or in rural areas, have developed into active 
economic centres linked to inward capital investments and external consumer 
markets (Xu and Yeh, 2011).  
Hence in order to catch up or outbid the increased number of competitors in inter-city 
competition for inward investment and consumer market, urban governments, which 
are the primary local authorities, believe that it would not be enough to only pursue 
deregulation on the basis of the previous state-controlled economy (e.g. laissez-faire) 
without considering a strategy to enhance the economic competitiveness for local 
administrative jurisdictions (Jessop et al., 1999; Wu and Zhang, 2007). The fact is 
“working out a development strategy that can stimulate growth and expand the 
revenue base is an essential goal for local government” and thus “local government, 
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to a certain extent, has become a local developmentalist state with its own policy” 
(Wu, 2010: 23).  
Relating to the cross-territorial conflict, firstly, due to the rising fiscal and 
administrative powers, urban governments chose to engage with similar projects of 
constructing or upgrading the infrastructures within their respective jurisdiction in 
order to improve their local competitiveness. Many places “had scrambled to 
construct airports and seaports without considering their own comparative 
advantages” (Chien, 2008: 279). For example, Wuxi airport in the Yangtze River 
Delta was constructed not far from Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport; and it 
has only six flights a day (Chien, 2008).  
Secondly, there is no surprise to see the recognition of ‘localism’ as a severe issue in 
local bargaining (Xu, 2008; Liu, 2001; Vogel, 2010). In China, ‘localism’ is defined as 
“a special feature of economic organisation, in which market activities and economic 
development are normally organised on the basis of individual administrative units” 
(Xu, 2008: 164). Thus the national and regional trading market is artificially 
separated by local administrative boundaries. The division of administrative power 
exacerbates Chinese fragmented economy as a result of the accelerated local 
competition. This is especially happening at the local level, such as prefecture cities, 
county- and township-level units (Liu, 2001). To summarise, in the context of the 
weakening of top-down planning and governance system after the 1978 economic 
reform, the former hierarchical regulating control was loosened and intense 
horizontal competition among local urban jurisdictions increased.  
However, Chinese geopolitical regionalism did not fully retreat from state governance 
during the first two decades of the reform stage. Cities and their neighbouring 
counties were politically linked through centrally orchestrated ‘city-leading-county’ 
arrangements since 1982. The expansion of cities’ jurisdictions represents a change 
of power relations between cities and rural counties towards administrative union 
(Chung, 2007). Such politically allied relationships enable urban political actors to 
play a dominant role in running regional affairs. Due to the pro-development decision 
making, city state forces extract a variety of resources, such as non-monetary 
categories which include raw materials, agricultural products and farmland, and 
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monetary items, such as levies, from subordinate counties under often unfair terms 
in order to support the development of city space (see Chung, 2007).  
The result can still be seen in many Chinese cities’ jurisdictions today, for instance 
the city state is keen to recruit the subordinate towns’ enterprises into their directly 
controlled business zones in the name of industrial concentration. Overall, Chinese 
urban authorities became the dominant force which is able to manipulate the 
extended jurisdictional dynamics during the economic and political transformation 
stage. Hence urban administrative jurisdictions became the primary space for 
political actors organising and operating economic activities.  
 
Table 4: State spatial selectivity in the reformed China during 1980s and 1990s 
 State Spatial Projects 
 
State Spatial Strategies 
 
Scalar Dimension Decentralisation 
 
1. Economic reform – de-centralisation of 
state’s economic decision-making rights; 
 
2. Local authority’s, city state’s in particular, 
administrative power was greatly enhanced; 
e.g. the establishment of ‘city-leading-
county’ framework; 
 
Re-rise of urban space 
 
1. City was recognised by the state for 
concentrating market-oriented commercial 
activities; 
 
2. Counties were exploited by their superior 
urban authorities in terms of resources; 
 
Territorial Dimension Customisation 
 
1. Previous regional consolidated 
governments and rigorous hierarchical 
control was abandoned; 
 
2. Promoting the specialised utilisation of 
urban space; 
Concentration 
 
1. Promoting the comparative advantage of each 
cities’ own localities in favour of economic 
growth through tailored path; 
 
2. Inter-city competition for inward investment 
and consumer market; 
 
Source: Structure derived from Brenner (2004b: 97) 
 
3.2.3. Challenging mega city-regionalism and cross-jurisdictional governance 
since 2000 
After experiencing two decades of continuous downscaling of economic-political 
governance towards local governments and insisting on overriding economic growth 
and accumulation, there has been rising attention towards the switch between 
previously achieving economic growth and resource distributing efficiencies 
entrenched in urban jurisdictions, and constructing administrative efficiency and 
economic rationality at larger cross-jurisdictional scales among the scholars and 
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government planners since the 2000s (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2009; Vogel, 2010; Wang, 
2008; Wang, 2009; Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011). To begin with the country’s Ninth 
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), the national guidance plan proposed constructing 
several trans-provincial mega economic regions, and indicated regionalisation as a 
national strategy. YRD and JJJ were two of the proposed projects at that time. 
Although most of the proposed trans-provincial regions were showing little progress 
or were even barely realised in the first decade of the 21st century, such as the North 
East Region and the North West Region, the message from the central state to 
support regional planning was clear and thus encouraged the rise of a few mega 
city-regions, including the PRD (Xu and Yeh, 2010).  
There are a number of explanations for the motivations behind the promotion of 
constructing city-centric regional space by previous research. Xu (2008) summarises 
two primary reasons for why mega city-regions matter in China. Firstly, the cross-
jurisdictional regional strategic planning is seen by many as the new way to 
overcome the negative effects of fragmented political and economic landscapes 
which emerged after the 1978 economic reform. Xu argues that the strategic plan will 
reduce the impact of negative externalities, such as the ‘localism’ and inter-city 
competition, and thus improve the regional competitiveness as one unit by prompting 
inter-city cooperation and regional integration.  
Relating to this expectation, there is the hope that cross-jurisdictional mega city-
regions are able to be re-positioned in the national and global economic landscapes 
through regional planning. Secondly, the strategic planning at the mega city-region 
level, which is supervised and approved by the central authority, is seen as a 
potential and effective way to “regain control and reassert functional importance of 
provincial and central governments in the growing complexity of local and regional 
economic governance” since the decentralisation of state regulation (Xu and Yeh, 
2010: 18).  
There are three points which can be extracted from Xu’s statements above. Firstly, 
the rescaling of Chinese spatial governance is a process which is ‘layering’ into the 
existing state scalar organisation. It only happens on the basis of on-going territorial 
politics, such as central-local state bargaining and horizontal inter-government 
conflict. It emphasises the struggle over scales and analyses internal and external 
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factors and players within and beyond this targeted scale (Shen, 2007). Thus it is not 
independent from extant state organisation. Relating to the Chinese historical 
experience of strong state intervention in the social development and transformation, 
the state is still a critical actor in Chinese mega city-regionalism.  
Secondly, contrary to the establishment of egalitarian mega administrative regions in 
the pre-reform stage and the rise of the city in the first two decades of the reform 
stage, it is the mega cities-centric regions that have come to scholar and policy 
makers’ attention since 2000. It is expected that the synergy of regionalised 
neighbouring cities and their adjacent areas could improve the competitiveness of 
the identified mega city-regions.  
Thirdly, the thesis should consider carefully to what extent the role of the central 
state is being undermined by the decentralisation of economic decision-making 
rights. At this stage, it is hard to reach the conclusion that local government is able to 
make a certain kind of achievement which could benefit local development, however 
at the expense of national overall strategy and aim.  
However, relating to the Chinese state planning framework, the above-mentioned 
strategic intervention from the state is not easy to be transferred into practice. There 
is the argument that  
“the institutional structure for state intervention is problematic because the 
functions of regional planning are highly fragmented among different 
ministries” (Xu and Yeh, 2010: 18).  
According to Xu’s (2008: 168) research, the functions of regional planning have been 
divided among several central ministries. It has been difficult to draw a clear line 
between the different parts of regional planning. The consequence is there are inter-
ministerial conflicts on the basis of overlapping planning provisions. 
To be more specific, there are three ministries in the central State Council 
responsible for the urban and regional strategic plans which all could choose to 
engage with spatial planning. For instance, the National Development of Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and its local branches are responsible for trans-provincial 
regional planning in favour of socioeconomic development. In particular, the 
guidance about the specific function of city within the larger regions has been 
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contained in their plan since the 1978 economic reform. The Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development (MHURD) and its local subordinates, such as provincial 
construction commissions and municipal urban planning departments, are 
responsible for physical planning in terms of for example infrastructure construction, 
i.e. inter-city transportation, and specified use of urban space. The Ministry of Land 
and Resources (MLR) and its local branches are responsible for the land-use plan, in 
which the farmland planning is always one of the main targets (Xu, 2008).  
These are apparently generating overlaps among their respective planning 
provisions. First of all, all three departments realise the importance of planning at the 
cross-urban jurisdictional scale. Furthermore, NDRC provide guidance on the 
potential functional linkages among cities and specified usage of urban space which 
MHURD and MLR also choose to engage with. There is no direct statutory affiliation 
among NDRC, MHURD and MLR with the State Council. It is also a fact that “the 
NDRC is a central agency that is half-level higher than other ministries for historical 
reasons … [and] therefore social-economic planning has the capacity to guide, 
coordinate, and constrain spatial plans made by other ministries” (Xu and Yeh, 2011: 
225).  
However, it has been argued that MHURD and MLR do not take NDRC’s guidance 
seriously when they plan for the spatial formation and land administration 
respectively since they do not like their rival ministries plans which could compete for 
the regional planning market (Xu, 2008). Considering the above-stated conflicting 
institutional structure, the central governments’ intervention over the mega city-
regional administrative agenda is significantly undermined (Hu, 2006). Under this 
circumstance, the central planning framework is easily generating confusion about 
the development guidance for local authorities.  
In the context of historically inherited inter-city competition, cities compete for 
financial and natural resources, state and private investment, and projects of 
infrastructure construction in order to maximise the economic generation within their 
administrative jurisdictions. Hence it is challenging to fully reach the diversified 
expectation of all included cities by the cross-jurisdictional regional plan. To remind 
us, although the Chinese central planning system and mega city-regional plan was 
inherited from the pre-reform stage, the plan is no longer statutory since the abolition 
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of top-down command-and-control and economic decentralisation in the 1980s. It 
means the central or provincial plan cannot be directly enforced over the local 
agenda when there are conflicting demands across local territorial authorities. 
Therefore unlike in the pre-reform stage, the implementation of the regional plan has 
never been easy during the reform stage.  
Furthermore, there are currently too many efforts being wasted on rushing different 
versions of mega city-regional plans which are highly overlapping in the belief that a 
higher government-led cross-urban jurisdictional coordinated plan would improve the 
mega city-regional competitiveness. Analysing the difficulties of enforcing mega city-
regional plans since 2000, the missing part from the current higher government-led 
mega city-regional arrangement is, as Luo and Shen (2009: 55) suggest, “more 
attention to the process of the planning, especially building trust and consensus 
among cities”. There is a lack of interaction not only between higher and lower levels 
of government, but also among local authorities. Without reaching a consensus, it is 
difficult to force local authorities to give their local interest away for the enlarged 
picture of regional development.  
 
Table 5: State spatial selectivity in China since 2000 
 State Spatial Projects 
 
State Spatial Strategies 
 
Scalar Dimension Central state returns to the local agenda  
 
Central authority attempts to generate impacts 
over local development by issuing guidance of 
mega city-regional plan; 
Multiplicity 
 
1. Both the city and mega city-regions are realised 
as the important scales for concentrating socio-
economic activities; 
 
2. Mega city-regional plan is ‘tooled’ to relieve the 
path-dependent issue of inter-city competition; 
 
Territorial 
Dimension 
Customisation 
 
1. Expansion of cities’ administrative 
jurisdiction; 
 
2. Promoting local state-proposed inter-city 
governance network or association; 
 
3. Local mega city-regional governance 
framework is ‘tailored’ on the basis of local 
specific context; 
 
Concentration 
 
1. Promoting urban agglomeration for the aim of 
enhancing mega city-regional synergy and 
competitiveness; 
 
2. Achieving functionally complementary display 
among regional component cities; 
 
3. Concentration of infrastructural construction 
within the mega city-regional scale, transportation 
network in particular; 
 
Source: Structure derived from Brenner (2004b: 97) 
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There is an overlap between Luo and Shen’s (2009) argument and Brenner (2004b) 
in that they both agree with the conclusion that spatial rescaling of governance shall 
be realised as an on-going process which leads to a continuous evolution instead of 
a one-step outcome. Overall, this thesis borrows Xu’s (2008: 181) words to make the 
conclusion for many state-orchestrated mega city-regional coordinated plans since 
2000: 
“rather than shifting territorial development trajectories and coordinating 
regional growth patterns, regional strategic planning can appear to be little 
more than a cosmetic makeover that hides the intensifying competition within 
major city-regions in China”. 
  
3.2.4 Mega city-regional construction in PRD, YRD and JJJ 
There are exceptions to the top-down orchestration of mega city-regional 
construction. According to the Ninth National Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), Yangtze 
River Delta (YRD), Pearl River Delta (PRD) and Jing (Beijing) – Jin (Tianjin) – Ji 
(Hebei) (JJJ) were three of such mega city-regional construction projects. These 
mega city-regions’ regional identities have gradually become stronger since 2005, 
with clear support for increased intra-regional linkages. The intention of this section 
is to enable comparison for the research of YRD by looking at the regional 
governance and planning in PRD and JJJ since the 1990s. 
  
71 
 
Table 6: A summary of mega city-regional plans for PRD, YD and JJJ 
City-
region 
Plan name Issuing 
date of 
the plan 
Planning area Supervising 
mechanism 
over the plan’s 
implementation 
 
The content of the mega 
city-regional plan 
PRD Outline of the 
Plan for the 
Reform and 
Development 
of the PRD 
(2008 - 2020) 
2008 1. PRD is located within the 
Guangdong provincial 
jurisdiction; 
 
2. Members, 
 9 prefecture-level cities; 
1. Provincial 
Leading Group; 
 
2. Members: 
 50 top officials 
from the 
provincial 
governments; 
 9 mayors of the 
prefecture-level 
cities 
1. The plan has 12 
chapters; 
 
2. The plan stresses the 
need for upgrading the 
regional economic structure 
from traditional mass 
manufacturing to service 
and high-technology 
industries; 
 
3. The plan attempts to give 
a comprehensive guide to 
the regional coordinated 
development; 
 
YRD YRD Regional 
Plan (2009 – 
2015, but 
providing 
expectation 
until 2020) 
2010 1. YRD is a trans-provincial 
region and made up by 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang provinces; 
 
2. Members: 1 municipality 
which is under the direct 
control of the nation state and 
15 prefecture-level cities; 
  
1. Three 
provincial 
governments; 
 
2. NDRC; 
 
3. Not to be 
made specific; 
1. The plan has 12 chapter; 
 
2. The plan gives particular 
attention to define the 
functional and infrastructural 
distribution of each delta 
city; 
 
3. The plan attempts to give 
a comprehensive guide to 
the regional development; 
 
JJJ Waiting to be 
issued 
To be 
confirmed 
1. The current draft proposed 
a trans-provincial region which 
is made up of Beijing, Tianjin 
and a large part of Hebei 
province; 
 
2. Provincial Members: 2 
municipalities which are under 
the direct control of nation 
state and 8 prefecture-level 
cities; 
  
To be confirmed  To be confirmed 
 
 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
PRD is one of the most frequently researched mega city-regions in China. Being a 
part of the first wave of re-rising economic entities after the 1978 economic reform 
has enabled the PRD to become one of the main economic engines in China. In 
terms of regional coordinated planning and networked governance, the PRD has 
often been referenced as a comparator for the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and other 
Chinese regional areas (e.g. Zhang and Wu, 2006; Xu and Yeh, 2011; Yang and Li, 
2013).  
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According to NDRC’s Outline Plan, the now well-known PRD consists of two sub-
provincial level cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and seven other prefecture-level 
cities as table 6 shows, Dongwan, Foshan, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Shaoqing, 
Zhongshan and Zhuhai. It means the entire delta area is currently located in the 
Guangdong province. According to each delta members’ official statistical 
announcement, although the delta concentrates no more than 5% of the whole 
national population, it accounts for almost 10% of the total national GDP in 2012. 
This is the mega city-regional concept which has been officially recognised by the 
nation state and many scholars. Besides the term of PRD, the terms of Greater PRD 
and Pan PRD are also occasionally stated by recent research (e.g. Shen, 2004; Yeh 
and Xu, 2008; Yang and Li, 2013).  
The Greater PRD comprises Hong Kong and Macao as well as the entire PRD. The 
conception was invented on the basis of the current intensifying economic 
connection among PRD, Hong Kong and Macao. The Greater PRD will not be a part 
of the discussion of this chapter. Because this regional scale relates to the concern 
of cross-(national) boundary governance which is politically distinct in comparison 
with the political-economic context in YRD and PRD due to the exceptional status of 
Hong Kong and Macao as Special Administrative Regions (see Shen 2004; Yang 
and Li 2013). 
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Figure 2: The Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
 
 
Furthermore, the Pan PRD implies an even larger cross-provincial region. The 
concept was officially brought up by the former Guangdong provincial leader, Zhang 
Dejiang, and drew some attention from scholars around 2005 (e.g. Yeung, 2005; Xu 
and Yeh, 2008; Yeung and Shen, 2008). It consists of nine provinces in the mainland, 
including Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Hainan, Hunan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and 
Guangdong, and Hong Kong and Macao. Its physical size accounts for more than 
one fifth of the entire China. This mega scale was made for promoting the inter-
provincial cooperation in terms of various regional issues, such as economic 
74 
 
competition, political fragmentation, environmental protection and constructing 
projects of cross-jurisdictional infrastructures. However only limited attention remains 
from both government officials and scholars due to the critique of the Pan PRD as 
lacking internal coherence. Therefore, the mega city-regional scale of PRD will be 
the target which this section chooses to engage with. 
The entire PRD’s regional area is located in the Guangdong provincial jurisdiction. Its 
regional identity remained vague before the 1980s since all city members were 
under the direct control of the provincial government and there was lack of a shared 
sense of belonging (Xu and Yeh, 2011). The missing element was lack of 
interdependent relationship among the subsequent regional components. To begin 
with the late 1970s, the PRD was initially designated as the first ‘experiment field’ by 
the Beijing central authority by following the ‘Open Door’ policy (Yang and Li, 2013). 
Consequently, the PRD became one of the earliest places which experienced the 
decentralisation of economic decision-making from central to local governments, 
economic privatisation and opening up to foreign capital inflow.  
PRD’s all nine prefecture level cities at that moment adopted the favourable policy 
for the aim of attracting overseas financial capital into the delta, which was 
authorised by China’s central authority in the 1980s. As a result, during the 1980s, 
on the basis of the cheap labour and land expenditure and growth-oriented policy in 
favour of attracting inward investments, PRD became an attractive region for the 
establishment of manufacturing factories and mass production lines. PRD soon 
became a ‘back factory’ which was able to provide finished products to the ‘front 
shop’ of Hong Kong which was open to the global market (Xu and Yeh, 2011).  
Hence as one of the most developmental production bases in China, PRD becomes 
familiar to the external world as one of the most prominent Chinese mega city-
regions (Yang and Li, 2013).  
PRD’s economic growth was indeed significant, but the issue of intra-regional 
economic competition was following. The delta cities were each investing heavily in 
expanding their own industrial outputs without considering the functional 
complementary layout at the larger regional scale. It was criticised that most delta 
cities were continuously making similar efforts to build similar industrial structures 
(Weng, 2006). For example, Xu and Yeh (2011: 221) explain how: 
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“municipalities on the eastern side (Guangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen, and 
Huizhou) present their strengths in electronics and telecommunication 
equipment, instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery, electric power, 
and heat power, whereas those on the western side (Foshan, Jiangmen, 
Zhongshan, Shaoqing, and Zhuhai) have put more focus on the textile-related 
industries and metal products, and electrical machinery and equipment”.  
As a consequence, inter-city competition and economic fragmentation among the 
delta members intensified, and intra-regional networking was not much engaged.  
Furthermore and before the Outline Plan, the proliferation of overseas capital-driven 
economic activities brought forth a ‘laissez faire’ culture in the delta during the 1980s 
(Xu and Yeh, 2011). Each of the delta cities spent their own financial revenues 
improving the investment environment, infrastructural construction in particular, in 
order to maximise inward investment within their jurisdiction. After the 1978 
economic reform and decentralisation, the lack of sufficient fiscal resources resulted 
in the top-down coordination from the provincial government. Under this 
circumstance, The Outline Plan (Outline of the Plan of the Reform and Development 
of PRD) which is designated for the period of 2008-2020 is critiqued that the 
implementation of the regional Outline Plan shall face great challenges (e.g. Wu and 
Zhang, 2007; Ma, 2012). The criticism simply drives our attention to the outcome of 
this state-led vertical mega city-regional arrangement rather than how the 
arrangement shall be territorialised by considering the territorial politics. 
In December 2008, the NDRC and Guangdong provincial government together 
published the Outline Plan for the expectation of promoting coordinated regional 
development in PRD. According to the Outline Plan, there is one particular 
arrangement of constructing a sub-region, named Guangzhou-Foshan city region, in 
the PRD on the basis of intercity functional connection. The governmental integration 
between Guangzhou and Foshan has significantly intensified since 2009 according 
to Ye’s (2014) report of administrative interaction between the two city governments. 
For instance, the establishment of a joint mayoral meeting between the two cities 
has enabled the inter-city policies and projects to become more enforceable. The 
joint mayoral meeting speeds up the progress of a range of key cross-jurisdictional 
projects in urban planning, infrastructure, social policy, economic cooperation and 
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environmental protection (Ye, 2014). For this case, the Guangdong provincial 
government is acting a role of facilitating inter-city cooperation within its jurisdiction.  
However, what becomes even more crucial is the already agreed realisation of 
Guangzhou-Foshan cooperation before the outline plan. That was the process of 
building the consensus between two city governments before the formal 
establishment of sub-regional governance. The concept of Guangzhou-Foshan 
Metropolitan Area was previously proposed by Guangzhou city government in 2002 
and then received a positive reaction from the Foshan city government (Ye, 2014). 
The more recent joint mayoral meeting was organised based on the previous 
experience of several years of inter-city forum. Therefore, this thesis needs to be 
very careful in dealing with the implementation performance of a mega city-regional 
plan since more attention is needed towards the locational political dynamics within 
the geopolitical mega city-regionalism. Hence the analysis around the governance 
arrangements for PRD should be able to shed light on the research of the mega city-
regional planning and governance in the YRD. 
It should also be noted that there is a difference between the YRD and PRD in terms 
of regional context. In the YRD, Shanghai is the only global city which is classified as 
Alpha+ according to GaWC’s 2012 classification of cities. Other delta cities, such as 
Nanjing and Hangzhou which are provincial capitals, are not even defined as global 
cities. Shanghai has the highest economic output; and is leading the industrial 
transition to the service economy in the region. By contrast, all of the PRD 
component cites are much lower and similarly ranked in GaWC’s classification. 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen may be slightly higher ranked than others, which are in 
the Beta+ and Beta- group respectively. There is no one particular city which is able 
to generate absolute advantages over others in terms of socio-economic 
agglomeration. For example, in 2012, there was no big difference between 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen’s GDP, and Dongwan exported much more than 
Guangzhou as table 7 shows. Even the busiest and most important international 
airport which connects the region with the rest of the globe is located in Hong Kong. 
Based on this fact, the intense competition among the delta cities for the leading role 
in PRD’s mega city-regional development may not be difficult to understand while 
Hong Kong which is an Alpha+ global city stands on the other side of the geopolitical 
border.  
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Table 7: PRD component members' attributes (2012) 
Cities Permanent 
Resident 
Population 
(2010, 
million) 
GDP (￥’ 
billion) 
Industries’ proportion (%) Open-up 
Primary 
Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
New 
Contracted 
Inward 
Investment 
($’ billion) 
 
Export 
Volume ($’ 
billion) 
Guangzhou 
 
12.700 1355.121 1.63 34.78 63.59 6.802 58.912 
Shenzhen 
 
10.358 1295.008 <0.1 44.3 55.7 6.262 271.370 
Dongwan 
 
8.220 501.014 0.4 46.9 52.7 3.810 85.066 
Foshan 
 
7.194 670.902 1.9 62.5 35.6 3.305 40.150 
Huizhou 
 
4.597 236.800 5.39 58.08 36.53 2.650 20.3 
Jiangmen 
 
4.449 191.008 7.76 53.51 38.73 1.365 12.971 
Shaoqing 
 
3.918 145.384 16.69 45.21 38.10 2.913 3.781 
Zhongshan 
 
3.121 244.104 2.5 55.5 42 1.319 24.641 
Zhuhai 
 
1.560 150.381 2.6 52.9 44.5 2.190 21.631 
Source: 2012 Statistical Communiqué of the National Economic and Social Development 
 
(Bei)Jing-(Tian)Jin-Ji (JJJ) 
Firstly, there is barely doubt about the functional importance of JJJ. NDRC’s official 
speeches consistently reveal the central states’ expectation of supporting the mega 
city-region of JJJ to become one of China’s main economic engines. As early as late 
20th century, the national Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) proposed to construct 
the region of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei. By following this indication, there was the 
initiation of NDRC’s proposed regional plan for JJJ in 2004. But the plan still remains 
with the State Council and is waiting for approval. Before the official papers are 
published, there is barely commonly agreed scope for the region of JJJ.  
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Figure 3: The Jing-Jin-Ji (JJJ) 
 
 
The NDRC has disclosed that its draft regional planning scope for JJJ would be 
comprised of Beijing, Tianjin and a large part of Hebei province, which includes eight 
other prefecture-level cities within Hebei’s jurisdiction as table 6 shows, i.e. 
Shijiazhuang which is the capital of Hebei province, Baoding, Qinhuangdao, 
Langfang, Cangzhou, Chengde, Zhangjiakou and Tangshan. This regional area 
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concentrates no more than 6% of the total national population, but is accounting for 
almost 10% of total national GDP in 2012. Among all of JJJ’s regional members, the 
aggregated economic output from Beijing and Tianjin is more than the total of all 
other members’. Except the term of JJJ, there are other names such as Bohai 
Economic Rim or Bohai Rim (BER) to be used to regionalise this region in the 
literature (e.g. Cao, 1994). The concept of BER is stated to cover the Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which in fact enlarges JJJ’s scope 
significantly. But only the region of JJJ as defined above will be discussed in this 
section.  
Based on historical data, Hebei province consistently assisted Beijing and Tianjin’s 
advancement. Beijing and Tianjin are municipalities directly under the central state 
and, even more importantly, Beijing is the national capital. Due to their special 
political status, Beijing and Tianjin’s development was prioritised over Hebei by 
giving central policy support, such as Tianjin Harbour is authorised to play a more 
significant role than all of the big four deep-water ports in Hebei province, such as 
Qinhuangdao Harbour, Huanghua Port, Caofeidian Port and Jingtang Port, in terms 
of national and international economic transportation. In addition, from table 6, it is 
not difficult to see that most inward investment was attracted to Beijing and Tianjin. 
There is little interaction and coordination between Hebei and the two municipalities. 
Or in another words, the role of Hebei is not seen as important to Beijing and Tianjin 
as the YRD is to Shanghai and in particular the PRD to Hong Kong which are 
described as ‘back factory’ and ‘front shop’. In terms of mega city-regional 
networking, Hebei was seen by many as the water supplier, agricultural products 
supplier and security guard only for Beijing and Tianjin.  
Even further, there is one particular example, which is disclosed in Liu’s (2011) 
report, partly reflecting Hebei’s awkward position in the JJJ’s past development. 
Before the 2008 Beijing Olympic game period, according to the Beijing central 
government’s command, almost all of Hebei’s manufacturing enterprises’ daily 
operation which could cause potential damage to the regional environment had to be 
suspended for at least six months, not mentioning those new projects which 
remained in the planning process at that time. Relating to the command from the 
central government in Beijing, there is not much room for inter-government 
bargaining.  
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On the other hand, the central states’ comparatively neglectful attitude towards 
Hebei’s development can be partly shown by the slow regional planning process in 
comparison with PRD and YRD. The NDRC’s proposed regional plan for JJJ still 
remains with the central State Council. As a result, there is no clear indication about 
the future regional development. However, it was suggested that the Hebei provincial 
government proposed two different development foci (Liu, 2011). One is to improve 
the inter-provincial networking by focusing on the development of areas which are 
close to Beijing and Tianjin. Another recommendation is to boost the regional area’s 
economic output by enhancing the use of the deep-water wharfs in Hebei province.  
 
Table 8: JJJ component cities' attributes (2012) 
Cities Permanent 
Resident 
Population 
(2010, 
million) 
GDP 
(￥’billion) 
Industries’ proportion (%) 
 
Open-up 
Primary 
Industry 
Secondar
y Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
New 
Contracted 
Inward 
Investment 
($’ billion) 
 
Export 
Volume ($’ 
billion) 
Beijing 
 
19.612 1780.100 0.8 22.8 76.4 11.350 59.650 
Tianjin 
 
12.938 1288.518 1.3 51.7 47.0 18.585 48.314 
Hebei Province 
 
Shijiazhuang 
 
10.164 450.220 10.0 49.8 40.2 1.270 7.340 
Baoding 
 
11.194 272.09 13.90 54.98 31.12 - 4.77 
Qinhuangdao 
 
2.988 113.917 13.0 39.3 47.7 0.628 2.488 
Langfang 
 
4.359 179.380 11.0 54.0 35.0 1.308 2.880 
Cangzhou 
 
7.134 281.190 11.3 52.6 36.1 1.345 2.098 
Chengde 
 
3.473 118.090 15.7 52.9 31.4 0.210 0.141 
Zhangjiakou 
 
4.345 123.367 16.7 42.9 40.4 0.123 0.318 
Tangshan 
 
7.577 586.163 9.1 59.2 31.7 0.734 4.318 
Source: 2012 Statistical Communiqué of the National Economic and Social Development 
 
There is no indication of which particular proposal would be prioritised since the 
NDRC’s proposed regional plan has not been issued yet. By contrast, it has been 
quite a while since PRD and YRD were both handed over their regional plan by the 
NDRC. Thus it is not difficult to understand that the public is much more familiar with 
the geographical spatial form of the Jing – Jin – Ji than with the intra-regional 
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networking relationships of this area. In comparison with JJJ, PRD and YRD tell us a 
complete different story. 
 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 
In 1992, fourteen delta cities in the YRD, which included Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, 
Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, Yangzhou, Nantong, Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Huzhou, 
Jiaxing, Ningbo and Zhoushan, founded the YRD Economic Cooperation Joint 
Conference (later known as YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economies 
(Changsanjiao Chengshijingji XietiaoHui)) initially with the aim of supporting 
economic growth and coordination. Afterwards, Taizhou1 joined the association in 
1997, and Taizhou2 became a member in 2003. The official head-office is in 
Shanghai and the president of the association is Shanghai urban government. The 
association is responsible for holding the forum for official intercity interaction, which 
took place every two years before 2003, but has been meeting once every year 
since then. Now the forum is aiming for intercity coordination not only to boost the 
economy but also to improve many others aspects, such as environmental protection, 
regional innovation system and technology interaction. The association has currently 
30 members. 
After the 2000s, the YRD has become even more important since it is re-rising as 
China’s mid-eastern economic engine. Its significant role is positively reflected by the 
issue of the YRD regional plan from the central planning system in 2010. According 
to the YRD Regional Plan, the enlarged spatial scope of the YRD now consists of the 
core YRD which includes one municipality which is under the direct control of the 
central state, i.e. Shanghai, and fifteen other prefecture level cities, including Nanjing, 
Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Taizhou1, Nantong in Jiangsu 
province; and Hangzhou, Ningbo, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, Taizhou2 
in Zhejiang province and the rest peripheral provincial area. The current YRD’s area 
covers one municipality which is under the central government’s direct control and 
two entire provincial territories.  
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Figure 4: The broad sense of YRD 
 
 
The YRD accounts for almost one fifth of the national total GDP and contains more 
than six percent of China’s total population. As a high-ranked global city according to 
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GaWC’s work (e.g. Derudder et al., 2013), Shanghai is the main economic core of 
the YRD. Nanjing in the north of the delta, the capital of Jiangsu province, and 
Hangzhou in the south, the capital of Zhejiang province, are the sub-cores of the 
delta. Their position is reflected by their political representation and economic 
performance as table 5 shows. The YRD has been rising fast in terms of economic 
growth since the late 2000s. As the delta’s main core, Shanghai’s GDP is almost 
double Suzhou’s achievement, which is the second largest in 2012. Apart from 
Shaoxing and Zhoushan, all other fourteen delta members are ranked among 
China’s top 100 cities and towns in terms of economic output, and Shanghai is 
ranked top in 2012 (Elivecity.cn, 2013). Furthermore, the YRD is the largest export 
regional area and its delta members have a stronger capability for attracting foreign 
investments than PRD and JJJ (see tables 7 - 9). 
In terms of YRD’s physical geography, the Yangtze River crosses the delta area 
from the west to the east and then joins the East China Sea. This makes the YRD 
possess outstanding marine transportation. There are eight deep-water harbours 
and twenty-six river ports. In particular, Ningbo-Zhoushan harbour and Shanghai 
harbour are the top two largest deep-water harbours around the globe by 2003 in 
relation to both of cargo and TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) handling capacities 
(China Economic Net, 2014). Furthermore, on the land, several high-speed rail 
construction projects are working out. For example, the Ning-Hang and Hu-Hang 
high-speed rails would make the journey between Nanjing and Hangzhou, Shanghai 
and Hangzhou take no more than one hour and half an hour respectively. Thus, new 
infrastructure construction is significantly intensifying regional interaction.  
YRD will be the main location for the thesis and there will be more discussion about 
the YRD in section 3.3 and in the following empirical chapters. 
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Table 9: YRD component cities' attributes (2012) 
Cities Permanent 
Resident 
Population 
(2010, 
million) 
GDP 
(￥’billion) 
Industries’ proportion (%) 
 
Open-up 
Primary 
Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
New 
Contracted 
Foreign 
Investment 
($’ billion) 
 
Export 
Volume ($’ 
billion) 
Shanghai 
 
23.019 2010.133 0.64 39.36 60.00 22.338 206.807 
Jiangsu Province 
 
Nanjing 
 
8.005 720.157 2.60 44.00 53.40 6.115 31.901 
Suzhou 
 
10.466 1201.165 1.60 54.20 44.20 Not Sure 174.689 
Wuxi 
 
6.373 756.815 1.80 53.00 45.20 4.331 41.314 
Changzhou 
 
4.592 396.980 3.20 52.90 43.90 5.420 19.960 
Zhenjiang 
 
3.113 268.010 4.40 54.00 41.60 2.560 7.740 
Yangzhou 
 
4.460 293.320 7.00 53.00 40.00 4.264 8.172 
Taizhou 1 
 
4.619 270.167 7.10 53.10 39.80 4.014 6.947 
Nantong 
 
7.283 455.870 7.00 53.00 40.00 4.560 18.790 
Zhejiang Province 
 
Hangzhou 
 
8.700 780.398 3.30 46.50 50.20 8.265 41.262 
Ningbo 
 
7.606 652.470 4.10 53.90 42.00 5.310 61.440 
Huzhou 
 
2.894 166.197 7.42 53.44 39.14 1.687 7.396 
Jiaxing 
 
4.502 288.494 5.20 56.20 38.60 2.814 19.603 
Shaoxing 
 
4.912 100.877 3.50 58.20 38.30 0.206 9.739 
Zhoushan 
 
1.121 85.195 9.80 45.20 45.00 0.928 9.224 
Taizhou 2 
 
5.969 292.734 6.90 49.00 44.10 0.785 17.239 
Source: 2012 Statistical Communiqué of the National Economic and Social Development 
 
3.3. The strategic importance of the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 
The re-emergence of China’s megaregions has drawn significant academic attention 
(e.g. Hu, 2006; Luo and Shen, 2009; Vogel, 2010; Wu and Zhang, 2007; Xu, 2008; 
Xu and Yeh, 2011), in particular its three main economic engines – the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD); the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and the (Bei) Jing – (Tian) Jin – Ji (JJJ). 
There are three main reasons for explaining why the YRD is particularly worth 
undertaking further investigation.  
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Figure 5: The rise of Chinese mega city-regions 
 
 
Firstly, the YRD is a region around Shanghai, which is famous for being China’s 
mainland financial centre and in terms of global economic integration. Also Shanghai 
is China’s second highest ranked city according to GaWC’s 2012 classification of 
world cities, or in another word, Shanghai is China’s most connected city in the world 
city network after Hong Kong. Moreover, although Shanghai cannot be mentioned 
together with London and New York which currently are sitting on the very top of the 
rank, data show Shanghai is rising fast (Derudder et al., 2010; Hanssens et al., 
2011).  
Secondly, as one of China’s main economic engines, the YRD is experiencing the 
transforming of its industrial structure from manufacturing to high-technological and 
service economy. The YRD was titled as one of the most important ‘world factories’ 
in the earlier time. During the transformation stage, the YRD’s manufacturing 
industries , Shanghai’s in particular, has evolved into an advanced system which 
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focuses on high-tech industries since 1990s; moreover, tertiary industries, especially 
producer services, are expected to make up a major part of Shanghai’s industrial 
constitution (see more details in Gu et al., 2011; Social Sciences Academic Press, 
2011).  
And finally, the YRD is a newly rising area. It was not in the State Council’s priority 
development list which received strategic and financial resource support when the 
‘Open Door’ policy was first issued in the 1980s. On the contrary, the PRD was the 
first mega city-region rising at that time. After the PRD experienced huge economic 
growth, the YRD started being planned as a city-region and academic and policy 
elites’ attention started moving to the YRD. This thesis has seen a number of 
literatures emerge that discuss the PRD’s developing regional governance (e.g. Ma, 
2012; Vogel, 2010; Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011). However, the YRD is still under-
researched in comparison with the PRD; and there is significant scope to generate 
much new understandings of Chinese regional arrangements. 
But perhaps the most interesting motivation for the research is the YRD has been 
issued official strategic ‘mega city-regional’ planning guidance by the State Council 
in 2010. This is important because it is the first time the national level has issued a 
guide for YRD’s regional socio-economic development since the 1978 economic 
reform. This guide illustrates the most important issues existing within this region. 
One of the YRD Commission Members summarised that the regional economic 
integration itself is to address the division of administrative areas, but it is impossible 
to skip a few years of existence of the provincial units (Chinahourly, 2011). The 
administrative division of fifteen municipal units and a provincial-level unit in direct 
coordination is asymmetric. The result is not ideal, so more coordination is needed to 
maximise the benefits. In short, it highlights the problem of cities’ expansion into 
larger city-regions – the problem of how the institutional planning and governance 
shall be territorialised on the basis of continuous territorial politics.  
But what makes the YRD a particularly interesting case study is that unlike London 
(where the administrative boundary does not change to reflect the wider economic 
area), in the YRD governance mechanism is expanding to reflect the new mega city-
regional geography. Also, what makes the YRD an important case study is that this 
central ‘Guidance’ suggests the solution to the problem of regional integration should 
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mainly rely on market forces [the geoeconomics of mega city-regionalism] and 
Government coordination [the geopolitics of mega city-regionalism] (Chinahourly, 
2011). Or more specifically, one is deregulation, which is meant to build a platform 
for regional economic integration and greatly reduce the administrative barriers. 
Another is market driving force, which will bring trans-regional development 
institutions and inter-regional movement of people. It is important not to use the 
planned economy way to think of the current issues.  
At this moment the institutional planning process is still largely depending on the 
state-led strategic plan in accordance with the intention of adjusting the urban 
functions and alleviating the intraregional competition. However, the problematic 
implementation of many Chinese regional plans leads to the scholar’s criticism of the 
vertical planning arrangement which usually does not work well in dealing with the 
locational economic-political context in China (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 
2011). The reason for reaching such a pessimistic conclusion is related to the fact 
that the planning and governance of mega city-region is much likely to be centrally 
‘tooled’ to improve the top-down intervention over the local administrative agenda 
since the Chinese economic reform and decentralisation. Thus attention was over-
spent in the content of the arranged outcome instead of the ongoing territorial politics 
which shall constitute the governance outcome. Luo and Shen’s (2008) analysis of 
the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou city-regional planning raised the attention towards the 
political dynamics behind the construction of a strategic plan which is critical for 
improving the effectiveness of current Chinese mega city-regional planning. 
 
3.3.1. The comprehensive YRD regional plan 
The YRD regional plan was initiated by the NDRC in 2005, and finally approved and 
announced by the central State Council in 2010. The spatial planning scope consists 
of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The YRD regional plan focuses on 
providing developmental guidance for the sixteen main cities, which are Shanghai; 
Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Taizhou1, Nantong in 
Jiangsu province; and Hangzhou, Ningbo, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Zhoushan, 
Taizhou2 in Zhejiang province. In 2010, the YRD regional plan was approved by the 
central State Council. It was the first time since the 1978 economic reform for a 
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mega city-regional coordinated plan to be launched for the YRD which covers three 
entire provinces.  
The YRD regional plan contains twelve chapters, and covers coordinated guidance 
on spatial and functional distribution, urban and rural development, industrial 
distribution, infrastructural construction projects and regulatory arrangements. 
Chapter one states the strengths and conflicts within the YRD’s development; and 
also the opportunities and threats with which the delta is confronted. Chapter two 
states the strategic positioning and the overall aim for the delta’s future development. 
International financial centre and global urban agglomeration with strong competitive 
capability are proposed to be the potential positionings in the future global arena. 
The aims of a ‘well-off society’ and full modernisation are to be achieved by 2015 
and 2020 respectively. In order to reach this overall aim, there are specific 
expectations as discussed below.  
By 2015, the proportion of the service industries’ output in the total regional delta’s 
GDP was to achieve further improvement. The innovation ability was to make a large 
step forward so that the technological advancement would contribute notably to GDP 
growth. The aim of achieving functional complementary and systemic linkages is to 
be followed for further regional development. Environmental protection, improving 
social welfare and security system and governments’ public service capability shall 
become the index for measuring social improvement. The GDP per capita of the 
regional delta is expected to reach 82K Yuan (100K Yuan in core regional area) by 
2015. The service industries shall contribute to 48% (50% in core regional area) of 
the regional delta’s economic outputs. Referring to the growth of GDP per capita and 
the tertiary industry, the YRD is on the right track towards the expectation of the YRD 
regional plan. According to the 2014 published data from Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang’s Statistical Communiqués, 97.3k Yuan with 7.99% annual growth rate, 
81.9k Yuan with 9.74% annual growth rate, and 73.0k Yuan with 6.58% annual 
growth rate were reached respectively. Moreover, tertiary industries were separately 
contributing to 64.8%, 46.7% and 47.9% of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang’s GDP. 
By 2020, the service industries shall contribute 53% (55% in core regional area) of 
the regional delta’s economic outputs. Further improvement is important for 
technological development, coordinated planning and development of regional 
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industrial layout, environmental protection and other indexes of measuring social 
advancement. The GDP per capita of the regional delta is expected to reach 110K 
Yuan (130K Yuan in core regional area) by 2020. The remaining ten chapters specify 
and expand the overall developmental aim which is stated by chapter two.  
This is a national level mega city-regional plan; and the plan should be able to 
exercise some impact over the regional planning and administration within the delta. 
However, the extent of the YRD regional plan’s influence over local decision making 
is questionable since the enforcement and evaluation mechanism for implementing 
the mega city-regional plan remains unclear. To make this even more ambiguous, 
proper regulatory legislation barely exists for enforcing the implementation of the 
regional plan in China.  
Furthermore, the political scalar structure of the delta is complicated. The YRD 
consists of three provincial governments and twenty-four prefecture-level 
governments, not to mention the large number of county-level and rural governments. 
In the absence of a consolidated regulatory institution at the cross-provincial regional 
level, it is not hard to see the difficulty for monitoring and assessing the 
implementation of the plan in the YRD. The empirical chapter six on governmental 
arrangements will engage with the planning process and analysis of this plan. The 
next section is going to highlight the constitutive role of locational territorial politics in 
the construction of cross-territorial regional governance by looking at the earlier 
regional projects of the city network of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou (SWC). 
 
3.3.2. The city network construction for Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou (SWC) 
‘Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou (SWC) regional plan’ is the first city-regional plan which 
has obtained authorisation from the central State Council since 2000 (Luo and Shen, 
2008). As the first, the planning reveals the precious experience and deficiencies for 
following a regional plan in China. The structures and many planning provisions of 
the YRD regional plan are quite similar to this very early version.  
Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou are three prefecture level cities in Jiangsu province, 
which means they share the same administrative rank and power. According to 
Table 5, Suzhou and Wuxi are the two largest GDP generators in Jiangsu, and 
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Changzhou is an important GDP contributor which follows next to Wuxi. Individually, 
they deserve to be recognised as one of the core functional areas in the delta. The 
SWC regional construction project was initiated and has been led by Jiangsu 
provincial government since 2001. The main intentions behind the SWC planning 
arrangement are diversified (Wang and Chen, 2006). Firstly, it is for responding to 
the internal need of alleviating the serious urban competition and to improve the 
cooperation among these three cities.  
Secondly, it is for improving the relationship between the SWC region and Shanghai 
by enhancing the SWC region’s competitive capacity. It has been stated that 
Shanghai government has been engaged more in improving the manufacturing base 
within its suburban areas by implementing 173 projects since 2000 (Luo and Shen, 
2008). The coordinated city network is seen as the leverage to improve the 
relationship between SWC region and Shanghai by Jiangsu province. The SWC 
regional plan was initially proposed by the provincial government in 2001 and then 
formulated by a range of different planning groups which individually contained 
provincial level officers, local urban administrative officials and planning scholars 
from all three cities.  
However, the expectation of equal importance of all different planning groups was 
not reached during the planning stage. Specifically, the chief administrative leaders 
from provincial and prefectural governments were heavily influential in the 
formulation of planning and development strategies in comparison with the planners 
(Luo and Shen, 2008). This concern led to the issue of inter-city competition within 
the planning process and the regional plan proved difficult to be enforced due to 
ongoing locational inter-city conflicts. 
Therefore, after 2002, the enforcement of the SWC regional plan on regional 
administrative agenda experienced significant challenges. According to Luo and 
Shen’s (2008, 2009) report, six main reasons were raised to explain the challenging 
circumstance. Firstly, inter-city competition was underestimated by the planning 
institution. Secondly, the regional plan was either too general or too detailed to be 
followed by regional members. Luo and Shen then concluded that four of the five 
components of the plan, including industry planning, spatial planning, environment 
protection planning and tourism planning, were too general and hard to be followed 
91 
 
by the three cities; and the remaining part of infrastructural planning was too detailed 
and therefore infeasible to be followed.  
Thirdly, there was a lack of effective arrangements responsible for the enforcement, 
such as a consolidated specialised institution at the city-regional level. Fourthly, the 
implementation of the plan was heavily dependent on local fiscal resources. The 
Jiangsu provincial government as the initiator and primary organiser of this city-
regional plan was only little involved in funding the planned projects. Since the SWC 
regional plan is not statutory, it was hard to push the enforcement for the cross-
jurisdictional projects when this had to rely on each city’s funding.  
Fifthly, the regional plan chose to engage with planning for the industrial distribution 
which is highly market-oriented. Resistance was thus generated in the 
implementation process. From this perspective, the SWC regional plan carried the 
legacy of the top-down central-commanded plan during the socialist period. Finally 
and the most important point is that: 
“there was little information exchange and interaction among various 
governments, preventing cities from reaching consensus and building up 
mutual trust” (Luo and Shen, 2008: 210).  
Before Luo and Shen’s (2008, 2009) analysis, little attention had been paid to the 
locational territorial politics during the planning process in comparison with the 
analysis of planning organisation (e.g. Mao and Fang, 2002; Wu and Zhang, 2007; 
Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2010) and political approach for enforcing the planning 
provisions (e.g. Leaf, 1998; Hu, 2006; Ma, 2012). It is therefore unfair to state that it 
is the central and provincial planning institution’s sole responsibility to plan for the 
cross-territorial regional governance; more importantly, the geopolitical interaction 
among local governments shall constitute a key component within the planning 
process. Without effective horizontal communication among local governments, the 
planning provision could easily swing to one’s favour while at the expense of others. 
One specific example is the intercity competition for location of infrastructural 
construction projects, including airports and seaports. In the case of the SWC city-
regional plan in particular, Luo and Shen (2008, 2009) concluded that the Jiangsu 
provincial government shall invest more efforts, as a facilitator, in working on building 
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trust and consensus on planning provisions among the three prefecture level 
governments during the plan-making stage.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
In order to supplement the understanding of the geopolitical mega city-regionalism in 
distinct historical-geographical contexts, this chapter has aimed to investigate the 
transformation of Chinese state spatiality in its periodical continuity. To achieve this 
aim, it is crucial to explore the underlying characteristics embedded in the historical 
path of Chinese state rescaling process since the emergence of the current state 
scalar organisation along with the establishment of the P.R. China in 1949.  
The centrally-commanded economy and egalitarian-oriented national strategy were 
the primary characteristics of Chinese political-economic constitution at the pre-
reform stage. With regard to hierarchical control, mega cross-provincial 
administrative regions were constructed to ensure the central socio-economic 
command to be rigorously carried out through the vertical regulatory chain. Under 
this circumstance, even development was needed to be secured within each mega 
administrative territory on the basis of self-reliant socio-economic development. 
Meanwhile, the horizontal linkages among administrative jurisdictions were largely 
denied in the context of the top-down hierarchical dominance across the national 
territory. Therefore, the development of rural space was promoted at the expense of 
the city. The urbanisation process was restricted and a large number of urban 
populations were artificially transferred from cities to the countryside under the 
central command. The economic contribution and administrative significance of the 
city within regional development was significantly undermined. Consequently, the 
issues of poor production efficiency and fiscal deficit emerged and hence prompted 
central decision-makers to start the 1978 economic reform and decentralisation of 
economic decision-making rights between central and local governments.  
During the transitional period, urban space was mobilised by local authorities, 
prefecture level governments in particular, to replace the previous mega 
administrative regional jurisdiction as the primary territorial site for concentrating 
social-economic activities. Growth-oriented locational decision-making substantially 
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encouraged the competition between local authorities for attracting production 
resources towards each urban jurisdiction. Geopolitical boundaries became the 
invisible barriers able to fragment local contiguous functional spaces.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century we have witnessed a large number of state-
orchestrated vertical regional planning initiatives, aiming to shift local attention away 
from local prefecture level administrative territory towards developing a cross-
jurisdictional regional vision. Improving and sustaining regional comprehensive 
competitiveness is essential to the planning provision. Hence coordinated 
development and complementary functional connections were frequently mentioned 
by scholars (e.g. Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011; Xu and Yeh, 2011); and 
the YRD regional plan was identified as being crucial for managing important 
locational issues, including inter-locality competition, redundant infrastructure 
construction and increasing uneven development. However, it proved challenging for 
many of the top-down regional plans to be realised in the local political-economic 
agenda with few effective enforcement mechanisms in place.  
The historical path of Chinese changing state spatiality reveals an underlying 
consistency through the continuous political-economic transformation. Firstly, there 
has been strong and direct political intervention, either as top-down control or in form 
of locational regulatory decisions, in the functional development at all scales and at 
all times. Unlike the European relation-oriented megaregionalism in favour of 
accelerated economic integration and American form-oriented approaches based on 
accelerated urbanisation (Harrison and Hoyler 2015a), the change of state spatiality 
in China always prioritises the geopolitical purpose over geographical socio-
economic considerations, including the changing national interest from political 
concentration to economic efficiency by the end of pre-reform stage, and alleviating 
intense competition for production resources among local administrative jurisdictions 
around the turn of the century. The political administrative division has substantial 
influence over the functional development at local and regional scales. 
Therefore, socio-economic activities are usually operated and concentrated on the 
basis of local and regional political administrative jurisdictions in China. From the 
egalitarian-oriented mega-regional policy at the pre-reform stage to the functional 
fragmentation as a result of political administrative barriers at both local and 
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provincial scales after the 1978 economic reform, what we have seen is the largely 
entrenched functional activities in the geopolitical territory unlike the cross-territorial 
functional space or market in the western context.  
For this reason, researching territorial politics is fundamental for understanding the 
socio-economic transformation at subnational scale in relation to the Chinese 
historical-geographical context. Or in other words, it is crucial for us to explore how 
the socio-economic transformation has been politically territorialised before the 
researcher can understand mega city-regionalism in China. This will provide 
essential conceptions for us to research the state spatial change in the following 
empirical chapters.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to critically interpret the methodology which is mobilised for this 
research project. Given the need for understanding the emergence of the current 
Chinese city-regional governance framework in relation to the ‘new city-regionalism’ 
theory and the embedded Chinese context, semi-structured interviews were chosen 
as the main method for the qualitative research in the field. To be specific, interviews 
are employed to: firstly, investigate how networked state governance is rising as a 
governance arrangement across the YRD’s city-regional functional space; secondly, 
explore the structure and operation of contemporary city-regional governance in the 
YRD, and additionally examine the official consideration within the formulating 
process of the central-recommended YRD regional plan; and finally, identify 
contested issues in the current city-regional governance arrangement.  
The series of semi-structured interviews targets a range of elite participants who hold 
various backgrounds, such as governmental officials, university professors, local 
business leaders and other key stakeholders. This research follows Harvey’s (2011) 
suggestion to consider elites as people who used to or currently have significant 
influence over decision-making for either urban and regional policy or business 
development within and outside of their respective organisation. Much effort was 
initially planned to be invested in meeting a number of senior governmental officials 
who were working closely with or within the YRD’s regional planning and governance 
system, i.e. the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and its 
subordinated offices, and the Regional Cooperation and Exchange Office, etc. 
However, it was seriously challenging to secure interviews with many of these 
Chinese elites, in particular the government officials and business leaders. They are 
highly ranked in the political administrative framework and very close to the official 
strategic decision-making. Many of them decisively rejected the request for further 
engagement. This is a prominent issue for academic research in the Chinese 
governmental context (e.g. Li and Wu, 2013). Nevertheless, alternative options for 
potential participants were engaged. The majority of interviewees who have an 
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academic or other research background have the experience of being involved in 
either national or local government’s decision-making process of regional 
governance arrangement, such as the formulation process of the YRD regional plan 
in particular. This means some of them used to work for the governmental decision-
making in relation to the city-regional administrative agenda together with the above-
mentioned difficult to access officials. Moreover, online government reports and 
media interviews of these officials were also engaged with to reinforce the analysis 
of the primary data.  
Secondary statistical and documentary data were employed to support the analysis 
and the understanding of the primary data. Secondary data used include official 
social and economic statistics, official policy documents, online government reports, 
in particular on industrial development, and press releases. Secondary data were 
selected to provide the ‘‘extensive’ basis and context for a more ‘intensive’ 
investigation” (White, 2010: p75), and even more importantly, enable the researcher 
“access to subjects that may be difficult/impossible to research through direct, 
personal contact, perhaps because they relate to the past or to a geographically 
distant place” (Hoggart et al., 2002: p120). 
To provide a more explicit explanation and discussion of the fore-mentioned 
statements, this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 starts with brief 
comparative discussions between the thesis’ methodology and recent work on 
(mega) city-regions, and then clarifies the alignment between research objectives 
and selected methodology. Section 4.3 reviews the process of conducting semi-
structured interviews. Undertaking semi-structured interviews aims to “give the 
researcher deeper insight into respondents’ feelings and attitudes” rather than 
generating representative findings (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005: 76). There will be 
four sub-sections – recruiting interviewees, interview structure, conducting interviews 
and data analysis – explaining how deeper insights were generated through the 
entire process of conducting qualitative research. This section also discusses the 
specific challenges for doing qualitative research in a Chinese context while outlining 
how the researcher conducted elite interviews in the field. Following this part, 
sections 4.4 and 4.5 critically reflect on the interview process in relation to the issue 
of positionality, and discuss ethical considerations. Section 4.6 briefly justifies the 
sources and considers the appropriateness of secondary data collection, including 
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both quantitative and qualitative data, for reinforcing the analysis of primary 
qualitative data. At last, section 4.7 links the critical discussion of all five sections, 
and concludes that the qualitative research in the Chinese context enriches the 
research experience of the researcher and leads this project to valuable data. More 
importantly, together with secondary data, the interviews contribute well to 
investigate the appropriateness of applying western ‘new city-regionalism’ theory in 
the Chinese city-regional context. 
 
4.2 Researching (mega) city-regions 
First of all, the thesis determines that it is not easy to detect specifics about how 
other researchers conducted empirical research on the topic of (mega) city-regions. 
In some studies, there is no empirical research conducted to inform the authors’ 
contribution to debates around existing city-regional concepts and policies, and 
further growing the ‘new city-regionalism’ theory. For instance, little empirical 
evidence was provided to support John Harrison and Michael Hoyler’s (2015c) call 
for opening future city-regional research around the conceptual framework of ‘who 
(question of agency), how (process) and why (specific interests)’ in their new edited 
collection Megaregions: Globalization’s New Urban Form.  
For many others, the individual interview has been frequently stated as one of the 
primary qualitative methods, such as Harrison’s (2010) research about the project of 
the Northern Way in England, and Li and Wu’s (2013) critical reflections on the YRD 
regional plan. However, specific evaluations of the strengths and limitations of their 
respective research experiences were commonly not being generated in their 
publications. Apart from interviews, Peter Hall and Kathy Pain’s (2006) research 
teams recorded and mapped telephone and email traffic in selected firms for serving 
the POLYNET project’s aim of exploring the intra- and inter-regional functional 
relations in eight European city-regions. Such effort is going to need intensive 
cooperation from participants, which proves to be extremely challenging for the 
researcher who is new in the field.  
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1. Jiangsu DRC’s record of 
Task Groups for the YRD’s 
governmental three-level 
framework; 
2. NDRC’s record of YRD 
Economic Coordination 
Association’s administrative 
agenda; 
3. The YRD regional plan; 
IQ: 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24; 
1. The official record of central 
command of reducing energy 
consumption and emission; 
2. Yixing ES and TP’s 
Industrial Development 
Planning for 2011-2015; 
3. Gaosheng government’s 
‘Planning Scheme of 
Innovation and Specialised 
Development for Gaosheng’s 
Environmental Protection 
Industries’; 
IQ: 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26; 
Codes:  
1. Scale; 
2. YRD; 
3. Organisations; 
5. Economic; 
6. Political; 
7. Cultural; 
8. YRD CAUE; 
9. Industrial Planning; 
10. Governmental 
Connection; 
 
 
Codes:  
1. Scale; 
2. YRD; 
4. Define YRD; 
5. Economic; 
6. Political; 
9. Industrial Planning; 
10. Governmental 
Connection; 
11. Private Companies; 
 
 
 
Data Collection Data Analysis 
IQ: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10,11, 23, 25, 26, 27; 
1. 2012 Statistical 
Communique of the National 
Economic and Social 
Development; 
2. The YRD regional plan; 
3. Jiangsu NDRC’s statistical 
reports; 
Codes:  
1. Scale; 
2. YRD; 
3. Organisations; 
4. Define YRD; 
5. Economic; 
6. Political; 
7. Cultural; 
8. YRD CAUE; 
10. Governmental 
Connection; 
11. Private Companies; 
Methods 
Research 
Question 1 
1. Semi-
structured 
Interviews; 
 
2. Secondary 
Statistical 
Data; 
 
3. Official 
Documentary 
Records; 
 
Research 
Question 2 
Research 
Question 3 
Figure 6: Alignment between research objectives and methodology 
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Relating to this thesis, Figure 6 specifically explains how the overall aim and each 
research objective influenced this thesis’ research methods, data collection and data 
analysis. Column 2 explains that the thesis employed three different types of data, 
including interview transcripts, secondary statistical data and official documentary 
records. Column 3 has two boxes for each research question. In each case the top 
one mentions the number of interview questions (see Appendix 2) which are 
responsible for serving each specific research question. Similarly, the bottom one 
works for documentary/policy analysis. Column 4 extends the ‘interview’ information 
one step further. There is a full list of ‘codes’ which the thesis uses to analyse the 
interview transcripts in Appendix 3. Therefore, column 4 identifies which ‘code 
categories’ specifically help to address each research question. The following 
sections are going to review and justify all research methods which this thesis 
chooses to employ.  
 
4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
A small number of interviews which use open-ended questions are usually treated as 
examples of qualitative research and hence in some respects “doing an interview is 
the most natural thing in the world” (Silverman, 2010: 190). The term qualitative 
interview generally refers to “in-depth, loosely or semi-structured interviews”, and 
what this open-ended approach is trying to achieve is “extracting different forms of 
information from individuals and groups” (Byrne, 2004: 180-181). The previous 
prevailing path of the qualitative interview was filled with critical reflection, and 
therefore led to its contemporary prevailing role in primary research (Silverman, 1997; 
Byrne, 2004; Herzog, 2005; Hitchings, 2012). Representations of research findings 
become easily affected by feelings, emotions and a number of potential failings, and 
such is seen as one prevalent controversial debate in relation to the interview 
approach. As Hitchings (2012: 61), referring to Thrift and Dewsbury (2000) puts it, 
interviews “can only ever provide an unsatisfactorily washed out account of what 
previously took place” in order to illustrate the emerging critical debate over the 
appropriateness of utilising the research method of interview, before he engages 
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with the need for keeping interviews as an efficient means for generating meaningful 
research findings.  
However, as Kvale (1996) suggests, it is largely agreed that an interview shall be 
conducted, as its name suggests, as an ‘inter-view’, which means interchanging of 
views between interviewer and his/her participants around a research topic. Both 
parties are able to contribute to the outcome of the interview. Similarly, what should 
never be overlooked is: 
“whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings complete with all 
the usual assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of those things 
influence how we feel and understand what is going on. …Our consciousness 
is always the medium through which the research occurs; there is no method 
or technique of doing research other than through the medium of the 
researcher” (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 157; see Valentine, 2005: 112).  
What is hard to deny is that both interviewer and interviewee are ‘co-producers’ of 
the data (Byrne, 2004: 181). As a consequence, instead of contributing to eliminate 
the researchers’ role of distorting, either directly or indirectly, the research findings in 
the field, careful consideration was invested into minimising the researchers 
subjectivity through critically reflecting on the interview process, positionality and 
ethical issues.  
As one of the most important qualitative research methods, the semi-structured 
interview “offers the chance for the researcher and interviewee to have a far more 
wide-ranging discussion” than other qualitative methods which usually rely on 
structured and closed questions; and more importantly, each interview varies 
“according to the interest, experiences and views of the interviewees” (Valentine, 
2005: 111). Furthermore, Byrne (2004: 182) suggests that: 
“qualitative interviewing is particularly useful as a research method for 
accessing individuals’ attitudes and values – things that cannot necessarily be 
observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire. Open-ended and 
flexible questions are likely to get a more considered response than closed 
questions and therefore provide better access to interviewees’ views, 
interpretations of events, understandings, experiences and opinions”.  
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Byrne’s statement particularly reminds us that open-ended interviews are even more 
appropriate for social research when researchers aim to investigate the various 
rationales behind each statement by combining the participants’ past achievement 
and background with their words at the stage of data analysis. In short, qualitative 
interviews are able to function at a comparatively higher level of depth and 
complexity than other research methods. 
Although the researcher’s three core research objectives and a list of key questions 
were always prepared for the semi-structured interviews conducted, each interview 
was wide open for new questions to be raised during the specific conversation on the 
basis of varied statements from each particular interviewee. Relating to this 
perspective, Valentine (2005: 111) stresses that “the aim of an interview is not to be 
representative but to understand how individual people experience and make sense 
of their own lives.” Hence semi-structured interviews not only enable the interviewer 
to ask the same core questions in different ways when the researcher meets 
participants who hold various backgrounds, but also to dig deeper each time on the 
basis of each specific answer. The result is “allowing the discussion to unfold in a 
conversational manner [which] offers participants the chance to explore issues they 
feel are important” (Longhurst, 2010: 107). This is the primary benefit for the thesis 
to employ the research method of semi-structured interviews. This is also the reason 
for involving a group of participants who hold various biographies respectively. They 
could express mixed opinions on the basis of their unique specific experiences. 
Following the above-mentioned suggestions, the researcher aimed to collect mixed 
statements from a range of different interviewees, and discusses their backgrounds 
in order to indicate why their answers are diversified. This is critical for discussing 
the empirical findings and conclusions. 
In total the researcher conducted 32 face-to-face individual interviews with 
government officials, planners, university professors and other key stakeholders 
across different YRD’s cities over a period of more than three months between June 
and September 2013. The shortest interview lasted 1 hour with the longest lasting 2 
and a half hours on the basis of the agreement which was usually reached before 
the conversation happened. Interviews took place in a location arranged by the 
participant, either his/her office or conference room. These were easily arranged and 
reached by both the researcher and participants. More importantly, they were quiet 
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and private, which were both highlighted by Bryman (2008) as important for 
protecting the quality of audio recording from noise and the confidentiality of the 
conversation from being overheard.  
 
4.3.1 Recruiting interviewees 
The thesis primarily aims to investigate the role of the state in the governance of the 
YRD’s city-regional geography. In particular, it aims to explore how state governance 
reacts to cross-provincial functional activities. A range of stakeholders were identified 
before the start of the field research, which include five government officials, such as 
local economic policy makers, officials who directly deal with local enterprises and 
officials from YRD city-regional governance framework; twenty-one academic 
planners, including eight non-official members of the formulation team of YRD 
regional plan and thirteen other academic planners; and six local business leaders. 
For academic interviewees in particular, three different groups of academic planners 
were respectively recruited. The first group includes five of those who used to be 
involved in formulating the YRD regional plan, and are now officially tracking the 
implementation of the YRD regional plan or working as partner with the YRD’s city-
regional governance framework. The second group consists of four academic 
planners who used to be involved in formulating the YRD regional plan, but parted 
way from either relating to the implementation of the YRD regional plan or YRD’s 
city-regional governance framework. The third group includes thirteen academic 
planners who were not previously involved in the formulation of the YRD regional 
plan, but held rich experience of leading or participating in state-funded and -
organised regional and urban planning projects in the YRD. 
The YRD regional plan is the representation of the central orchestration over the city-
regionalism in YRD. Government officials and academic planners who were involved 
in the plan-making process were initially targeted to be interviewed. The entire plan-
making community can be grouped under three teams, i.e. the comprehensive team, 
expert team and local team. Names of core team members who used to lead and 
manage the comprehensive team and the expert team were taken from the NDRC’s 
published data on its official website. Three research or academic organisations 
were focused on since they provided key academics and planners to the plan-
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making community: Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology Chinese Academy 
of Sciences (NIGLAS), East China Normal University, and Urban and Demographic 
Studies of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Furthermore, Shanghai keeps 
the liaison office for the YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economy (YRD 
CAUE), named The Regional Cooperation and Exchange Office of Shanghai 
Municipal Government, as a part of the Shanghai government. Local Economic and 
Information Technology Commission (EITC) was the crucial participator of seven out 
of ten city-regional task groups within the YRD’s governance framework. Hence the 
Shanghai’s liaison office and local EITC were also added to the list of potential 
targets. Potential participants were then identified from official organisational 
websites on the basis of their role and past achievement.  
Furthermore, although other interviewed academics were not directly engaged with 
either the making of the YRD regional plan or the current city-regional administrative 
agenda, they all have rich experience of participating in research and discussion in 
relation to the official decision-making under local government’s request. For 
instance, Shanghai Academy of Development and Reform (SADR) which is 
subordinate to Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission (DRC) is 
providing consultancy service for Shanghai Municipal Government in relation to 
economic and social development and reform issues. Some of SADR’s committee 
members were university professors in Shanghai. More importantly, local DRCs are 
one of the crucial official institutional members of the local team within the plan-
making community for the YRD regional plan. 
In relation to the business sector, attention was paid to local key business 
enterprises that operate at the larger city-regional scale. Their significance in the 
local business community ensures that they are able to draw many insights from 
policy-makers of local government. They are all based in Wuxi and Changzhou 
because they are two of the greatest GDP contributors in the YRD, and more 
importantly, they are the core city-regional spaces from which traditional 
manufacturing industries are leaving while service and high-tech industries are 
moving into.  
According to Fobby (1993: 15) “the answer given by a particular respondent to a 
question in one social situation is often quite different to the answer given by the 
104 
 
same respondent in another situation”. Therefore, equal importance is given to each 
group because the researcher aims to collect mixed opinions for the same research 
questions from different fields. This should be able to generate diversified opinions 
which not only reinforce but also criticise each other in relation to the role of the state 
within the city-regional construction. The researcher expects direct comments from 
the government officials in relation to their role and function towards the integrated 
governance at the city-regional level. Academic planners and business leaders are 
expected to reflect on the state dynamics, in particular over the economic decision-
making, in the light of their specific knowledge and experience. Two different types of 
academic planners were selected to be the potential interviewees, those who were 
still involved in the operation of city-regional governance framework and others who 
either used to be involved or were not. The researcher was careful in highlighting the 
divergence of opinions towards the state decision-making. 
For the recruitment of interviewees, the invitation letter was specifically tailored and 
initially sent by email to the potential participant on the basis of their respective 
biography. Each invitation letter was composed of four main parts, which included: 
Firstly, a brief introduction to the researcher’s background, i.e. researcher’s 
university, research title and main objectives. Secondly, a list of potential meeting 
time options and the suggested length of the interview. There was usually a period of 
several weeks available for each potential interviewee, and they were able to choose 
a convenient date. The expected length of conversation was approximately 45 
minutes, and open to be extended or shortened according to the interviewee’s 
schedules. Mutual agreement about the potential duration was reached in the 
following email exchange after the first invitation. The third section explained how the 
researcher found the potential interviewee and why they were regarded as an ideal 
participant. Their working position and experience were usually stated to reinforce 
why they were relevant to the research objectives. For the academic planners in 
particular, their relevant publications or public statements were mentioned to show 
why the researcher thought they could make an important contribution to the 
research project. The last section inquired whether they could provide the names of 
other potentially available participants and forward the email to them no matter 
whether they themselves were available or not. Particular attention was paid to 
appropriate and polite use of language in addressing potential interviewees.  
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There were three attachments to the invitational email: Both English and Chinese 
versions of the research project overview, and a participant information sheet which 
highlighted the research background, contact information and relevant ethical 
considerations, such as, firstly, the interviewee can withdraw from the conversation 
at any time; secondly, the entire conversation will be kept confidential; and thirdly, 
the conversational data will be utilised for Ph.D. thesis and potential publications of 
book chapters and journals; and finally, who to complain to if they are not happy 
about the interview process.  
There was not always a positive response from the potential interviewees. As a 
result of much cold calling and emailing, instant rejection from government officials 
and business leaders, or their assistants or secretaries, often prevented further 
engagement. ‘Full schedule’ or ‘not expert in the field’ was usually seen in their 
response. Some of them recommended that the researcher should obtain all the 
data from their organisational website. Many of those who only provided an email 
address as contact on the organisation’s website did not respond at all. This is 
because the targeted government officials are highly ranked, and they are not willing 
to give away more information than has been published to a stranger. Even for those 
five interviewed officials, none of them accepted audio recording of the meeting. 
Although the researcher already learnt that ‘off the record’ without a recording device 
may encourage the interviewee to talk in more depth (see, for example, Byron, 1993; 
Peabody et al., 1990), it was still surprising to see no government official willing to be 
recorded. On the other hand, the invitation was declined by the entrepreneurs 
usually due to poor time schedule. It was normal to witness that unexpected guest 
visits and incoming phone calls disrupted the interview process for a while amid all 
six business interviews.  
Furthermore, there is another important consideration for explaining the almost 90% 
rejection rate from both governmental officers and business elites. Jiong Tu used to 
express a similar dilemma in LSE’s (the London School of Economics and Political 
Science) 2013 workshop of ‘Addressing Field Research Constraint in China’. Tu 
(2014) interviewed junior Chinese officials for her PhD project of health care 
transformation over the past decades in a county in eastern Sichuan, and struggled 
to gain access to Chinese administrative officials in the absence of the introduction 
of an intermediary acquaintance. In the researcher’s case, most potential 
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participants from a political and business background simply declined the request for 
a meeting without a proper acquaintance to mediate the contact between the 
researcher and potential interviewees. However, there was one alumna of the 
researcher’s university who holds very good inter-personal friendship with the 
researcher agreeing to invite her father, Mr C who is a private business leader in 
Yixing of Wuxi province, to be met. Under Mr C’s introduction, the researcher 
successfully met a number of business leaders and government officials. Before his 
favour, there were only two government officials and no local business leaders 
formally accepting the researcher’s invitation for interview.  
At the end of the field trip, Mr C told the researcher that it had been difficult for him 
as a young student researcher to meet all these local political and business elites in 
China because they had no knowledge about the researcher and there was nothing 
the researcher could provide in return. Many potential interviewees have neither 
interest nor trust in the researcher’s university letter and project overview. The word 
of ‘Renqing’ was then highlighted in his subsequent words. This was not the first time 
for the researcher to hear this ‘Renqing’. Wang et al. (2008) and Wang (2014) both 
mentioned the significance of ‘Renqing’ in conducting interviews with business elites. 
Wang et al. (2008: 819) refers ‘Renqing’ to “one’s obligation of repaying favours and 
showing empathy to partners involved in their business network”. According to Mr 
C’s statement, the main reason for these introduced interviewees to accept to be 
interviewed was that based on Mr C’s assurance and their close personal or 
business connection, they either now repaid private or business favours to him or did 
him a favour which would be repaid with a proper cost at some point in the future 
after the interview. Although the researcher promised that a finalised and approved 
version of the PhD thesis would be posted to Mr C as a thank-you present, the 
researcher still felt that it was highly likely that he would never have the opportunity 
or capability to repay his favour in the future. 
On the contrary, academic planners were more welcome to the invitation of 
exchanging views around the city-regionalism topics. Their interest in exchanging 
opinions was easily caught from their initial response to the invitation. Only few were 
not able to accept the meeting because they were taking annual leave or academic 
trips at the time when the researcher was staying around the YRD. 
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‘Snowballing’ technique was mobilised to diversify the interviewees’ portfolio and 
ease the concern for high rejection or no response rate from potential participants. 
Many of the interviewees forwarded my invitational email to other contacts, or 
provided me with the names and contact details for potential meetings. Thus several 
initial contact points were employed to avoid “recruiting all informants from a very 
narrow circle of like-minded people” (Valentine, 2005: 117). There was one particular 
senior planner who was not available to meet due to the timetable clash introducing 
his primary assistant to the researcher for the conversation.  
The ‘snowballing’ technique firstly helps “to overcome one of the main obstacles to 
recruiting interviewees, gaining their trust” (Valentine, 2005: 117). Building trust is 
critical for facilitating the conversation with government officials and business leaders 
because some research questions are seeking to discuss state governance which 
could be sensitive. Furthermore and as Mr C mentioned, even the university letter 
and project overview could hardly contribute to establish potential political and 
business interviewees’ sufficient assurance. Secondly, snowballing “allows the 
researcher to seek out more easily interviewees with particular experiences or 
backgrounds” (Valentine, 2005: 117). It was sometimes challenging to realise who 
the most appropriate informant in one particular organisation was. Some of them 
only have either a brief personal biography or no information in the public data base. 
There was no fixed target set for the number of interviews. The result is ‘snowballing’ 
earned a few more positive responses for all three interviewee groups which have 
been examined in section 4.2.1, and the qualitative research was continued until the 
researcher felt that sufficient data had been captured to serve the research 
objectives. 
 
4.3.2 Interview structure 
Before each interview started, the researcher sought for the signature in the 
informed consent form which proves the informant understands all their rights 
associated with the interview, such as they can withdraw from the interview at any 
stage for any reason, and highlighted that the conversation would be kept 
anonymous and confidential. After all of these, the researcher would ask for 
permission for audio recording of the conversation. Each interview was only 
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recorded after the permission was orally granted by the interviewee. An audio 
recording should “produce a more accurate and detailed record of the conversation” 
and thus enable the researcher to “pick up on ideas and inferences which they may 
have missed or which did not seem important when the conversation first took place” 
(Valentine, 2005: 123-124). 
The main part of each conversation began with introductory questions of how the 
YRD could be defined and based on what measurement. After this ‘warm-up’ stage, 
specific tailored questions would be brought up according to the interviewee’s 
background. The reason to carefully tailor the question list for each interviewee was 
they were not all standing in the appropriate position for answering all the questions. 
For instance, business leaders were in most cases not familiar with the YRD regional 
plan and related questions. 
The question list was composed of key questions which were worded beforehand in 
relation to the cross-jurisdictional governance and state’s economic decision-making, 
and new follow-up questions which allowed the information to be captured by 
following the interviewee’s mind-set. For the former, a list of key questions were 
always prepared beforehand because the researcher did not want to lose the train of 
thought in the middle of the conversation, or see any key question missing after the 
meeting. Referring to the latter follow-up questions, the key words, phrases and 
sentences were “picked up on things said by interviewees” and led to more in depth 
discussions (Bryman, 2008: 438).  
The order of key questions did not remain fixed for each semi-structured interview. 
This is because, firstly, conversation continued by following the key words and topics 
in each informant’s answers. Therefore, the coherence of the interviewee’s train of 
thought could be secured in order to keep digging along their insight in depth. The 
researcher did not intend to keep throwing in fresh and distinct questions in a 
haphazard way which could easily interrupt the interviewee’s mind-set. Secondly, 
government officials and academic planners usually had a clear logic and affluent 
information to express their opinion, thus it was usual for their answer to cover 
several of the following key questions in one stage. They had comparatively richer 
experience of being involved in the interview before the meeting of the researcher. In 
short, semi-structured interview secures the nature of flexibility which enables the 
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researcher for “varying the order of questions, following up leads, and clearing up 
inconsistencies in answers” (Bryman, 2008: 456). 
According to Valentine (2005: 124), “one of the perverse laws of interviewing is that 
in any research project at least one tape will turn out blank because of a technical 
mishap”. By learning this, in addition to the recording file in the digital device, a copy 
was stored on a laptop which was accessible by password only once the researcher 
reached the laptop after the meeting. Extra battery was carried all the time with the 
recording device just in case the used battery went out amid the interview.  
 
4.3.3 Conducting elite interviews in Chinese context 
The researcher gave the greatest effort to express questions neutrally in order to 
ensure interviewees’ answers could be developed in their own terms and mind-set. 
Or in other words, it was not the researcher’s wish to gather the statements which 
the interviewees possibly thought the researcher might want to hear. For this reason, 
most of the interview questions start with the words ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ instead of 
‘do you think’ which could indicate the potential answer in the question. Key 
questions were carefully constructed and possibly evolved between interviews so 
that both of the main themes and fresh concerns and questions which were realised 
in the previous interview were covered in the following interviews. For instance, the 
historical case of 1983 Shanghai Economic Zone Planning Office (Shanghai EZPO) 
which was little studied by the publications during the past two decades was 
mentioned to examine the relationship between market push force and state control 
power during one early interview. Afterwards, why such organisation was abandoned 
became one of the key questions for government officials and academic planners. 
The evolvement and expansion of key considerations ensured that ideas and 
concerns which were previously overlooked and more importantly potential 
knowledge gaps could be included in the following interview process. 
Due to the powerful position that most interviewees hold, such as senior academic 
planner, highly ranked government officials and business leaders, it was highly likely 
for many of them to explore the researcher’s understanding of the particular subject 
and its relevance in either gentle indirection or outright antagonism (Zuckerman, 
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1972). In this researcher’s case, their interest highly compromised the neutral role of 
the interviewer. Some questions they frequently raised included: why there were 
inter-city competitions over the newly fast-growing, in particular high-tech 
manufacturing, industries; what the researcher thinks of the implementation of the 
YRD regional plan; and what the researcher thinks of networked governance over 
the YRD’s territory? In order to ensure the minimisation of direct influence over the 
potential answers for the following questions, the researcher tried the best to recall 
and then quote other scholars’ opinions from previously reviewed literatures as the 
response and avoid presenting a straightforward individual viewpoint. This was a 
critical stage because “if interviewees sense an interviewer is not knowledgeable 
about a subject, the chances of gaining in-depth insight are much reduced” (Hoggart 
et al., 2002: 207).  
However, the researcher’s words apparently did not satisfy some interviewees. 
There was one academic professor who was bearing a role of senior policy advisor 
for urban government who became annoyed saying that my interview questions were 
‘too general’ and ‘inappropriate’ even during the first fifteen minutes. Although this 
particular interview hampered my confidence in the field and caused anxiety in a few 
following interviews, there were several positive points extracted from this case. 
Firstly, the interview process must be varied on the basis of the interviewee’s attitude, 
tone or even facial expression. Not every interviewee has the patience to answer all 
the easy questions during the early stage of the interviews. Secondly, the researcher 
shall prepare more thoroughly for each interview, such as remembering more 
quotations from reviewed literatures, in order to better defend his research subject. 
However and here is the third point, the researcher shall not over-emphasise his own 
opinions when replying to elite interviewees’ questions on the research subjects. The 
researcher’s statement could easily generate disagreement and then lead to a long 
debate amid the interview which the scheduled interview could usually not afford. 
This is particularly the case when the researcher was facing several senior academic 
experts. The researcher therefore shall act more carefully and thoughtfully on the 
basis of interviewees’, either facial or verbal, reaction. In short, it is critical for the 
researcher to continuously reflect on the previous research process and conduct 
subsequent interviews while carrying learnt experiences and confidence.  
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Moreover, it was common to see many of the interviewed government officials over-
present their knowledge and information, no matter whether their statement was 
relevant to the interview question or not; such like the statement easily expands to 
what the individual official had done or spoken in relation to the department’s historic 
achievement in many different aspects. It was time-consuming and leading the 
longest interview to reach two and a half hours. What became even more important 
was that it was easy for the researcher to get lost, such as picking up the important 
points and coming back to them for more details, and raising a question which may 
already have been unconsciously answered in the previous response during the past 
one to two hours. Because none of the political officials accepted audio recording, 
full concentration was necessary for extracting important data from the interviewees’ 
long answers during the entire interview. The researcher was aware of such issues 
in the field and tried to prevent the interviewees’ non-related and extremely long 
presentation by expressing an apology and asking new questions. However, a clear 
signal of not wishing to be interrupted, such like ‘Please let me finish this’ or ‘This is 
important’, was usually sent to the researcher. What worried the researcher was too 
many interruptions may upset the interviewee and hence jeopardise the rest of the 
interview. What was learnt from interviewing the officials was to always bring a 
notebook and pen to the interview to remind the researcher of subsequent interview 
questions while recording valuable data, and more crucially not planning another 
interview after meeting officials on the same day. It was possible for an interview to 
run for a surprisingly longer period than originally scheduled.  
For business leaders, institutional customers’ unarranged visits usually meant 
substantial trading orders. Although most of them could return to continue the 
interview after they had to leave for their VIP customers, there was one exception. It 
was one interview with the CEO of a private mineral powder material manufacturing 
company, who left abruptly for a customer’s visit and never returned. At last one of 
his secretaries showed to apologise for his disappearance and announced the end of 
the interview. The researcher never obtained a second opportunity to continue the 
interview afterwards. There was not much that the researcher could do to affect the 
interviewee’s decision of leaving permanently or suspending the interview for a while. 
What the researcher could do was search for a key statement which may have been 
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overlooked and/or review the notes to remind him which question or key points to re-
engage with after the interviewee returned.  
 
4.3.4 Reading between the lines in the interviews 
Many elite interviewees are experienced at interviewing and being interviewed. They 
are fully aware of “how to subvert interviews, control them or deny interviewer 
access to key information” (Valentine, 2005: 212). Relating to the researcher’s case, 
business elites would rather provide irrelevant or inaccurate answers to deal with the 
researcher’s question, instead of stating they do not have a proper answer. It has 
been largely noted that we need to read between the lines or ‘recognise the 
boundaries of claims’ in the interview in order to reveal the underlying feelings and 
perceptions and then draw our inferences (see Hoggart et al., 2002). Such 
realisation is prevalent for research in human geography inside and outside of the 
Chinese context. However, the researcher must admit that it is more difficult for a 
‘new’ researcher in the field to consistently read between the lines throughout the 
entire research. Although these lines can become clearer as the interviews progress, 
it also shows how experience is key to research in the field, or in the Chinese context 
for this thesis.  
 
4.3.5 Data analysis 
Eleven out of thirty-two semi-structured interviewees were digitally recorded, either 
partially or entirely, on the basis of participants’ willingness; and therefore generated 
audio data which lasted twelve hours sixteen minutes and nineteen seconds. They 
were fully transcribed afterwards. Although it was time-consuming to generate full 
transcripts for all of the digital recordings, the transcripts allow re-familiarisation 
which pays off in the long run (Crang, 2005). Full transcripts enabled the researcher 
to easily access any part of the conversation with full details during the data analysis, 
in particular when the researcher was seeking for accurate quotations.  
Meanwhile, notes were taken with or without recording during every interview. 
Taking notes ensured that the researcher would not miss any of the key words and 
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ideas which appeared in the interview. Furthermore, rich notes were particularly 
valuable when digital recording was not accepted, partially or entirely, by the 
participant. In these cases, notes were further supplemented within one or two hours 
after each interview ended based on fresh memories of the conversation.  
All interviews were undertaken in Chinese. Hence in order to ensure each 
interviewee’s statement remains original and not biased by the researcher, both 
transcripts and notes were generated and remained in Chinese for coding and 
analysis. Coding is a fundamental way of evaluating and organising data within a 
rational code framework for making sense of meanings which hide in fragmented 
textual data (Cope, 2010). The method of ‘open coding’ was employed to construct 
the framework of codes (cf. Cope, 2010). A list of important codes was initially picked 
up by reviewing notes and transcripts, such as Crang (2005: 223) recommended, 
“each time people refer to a particular event, it is given the same code; each time 
they use a particular explanation of an event it might be given another”. But that list 
was open for revising during the following coding process. Hence codes are basically 
abbreviations for similar textual statements which can be of any length. Following 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) recommendation, there are different kinds of codes 
such as ‘concept’ for the lower level of coding and ‘category’ for a combination of 
several concepts. Here, interview transcripts were coded into eleven categories (see 
Appendix 7). 
Afterwards, what becomes challenging for the researcher is how these coded data 
shall be analysed and reported. The framework of codes itself does not generate 
explanations for research questions. What the researcher sought from the coding 
task was “not so much the codes as the text they denote, not how often they occur 
but what is in them” (Crang, 2005: 224). The researcher was looking for opinions in 
relation to the operation of the YRD’s city-regional governance framework. It was 
important to bear in mind that answers shall be diversified based on each 
interviewee’s unique and specific working background and experience. It was not the 
researcher’s intention to count the frequency of the appearance of any particular kind 
of opinion as conducting qualitative analysis, rather, constructing comparisons 
among diversified viewpoints towards the same code and then investigating further 
why the divergence appeared remained the main aim. In short, the researcher was 
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looking for the rationale behind the statements by relating these to events and how 
each interviewee interpreted these. 
Thematic analysis is a widely used and fundamental qualitative method due to its 
flexibility (Braun and Clarke, 2006). According to Braun and Clark (2006: 78), 
thematic analysis “is the first qualitative method of analysis that researchers should 
learn, as it provides core skills that will be useful for conducting many other forms of 
qualitative analysis”. However, it must be admitted that flexibility also leads the data 
analysis and interpretation to face the potential issue of ‘anything goes’ (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006: 95). Themes are constructed by grouping codes to identify a pattern of 
elements based on massive disjointed data (Bazeley, 2009). Theory and contribution 
are then expected to derive from analysing a variety of themes. Since there is no 
clear agreement about how themes shall be constructed, they can lead the 
researcher to anywhere without careful and rigorous consideration about the 
analysis method. In the researcher’s case, Bazeley’s (2009) three-step formula of 
‘describe, compare and relate’ was employed to reinforce the approach of thematic 
analysis. The combination of the thematic analysis and Bazeley’s (2009) formula 
ensures that selected themes and their contained coded data were carefully thought 
through both in terms of the demographic features of the interviewed sample and the 
city-regional theoretical context. In particular divergent views which appeared with 
less frequency cannot be simply ignored. Investigation of divergent or alternative 
explanations is inevitable for challenging and enriching the report of themes for data 
analysis.  
While reporting themes in the thesis, quotes will be employed for linking and 
supporting the researcher’s debate. Relating to this perspective, there is a concern in 
relation to the selection of the quotations. Although qualitative research usually does 
not justify ideas by counting the frequency of their occurrence across the sampling, it 
cannot be denied that one or two quotes do not convey how widely this theme might 
have applied (Bazeley, 2009). Quotes are provided together with the explanation of 
the interviewee’s partial biographies which have potential links with their statements; 
and frequencies are sometimes reported. 
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4.4 Positionality 
Undertaking intensive research frequently leads to the criticism of generating 
researcher bias during collecting and analysing qualitative data (Hoggart et al., 2002: 
p223). Hence it is important to be reflexive over the diversified positionality and the 
resulting power dynamics between the researcher and each different participant 
during the entire intensive research process. Bryman (2008: 698) defines reflexivity 
as  
“a reflectiveness among social researchers about the implications for the 
knowledge of the social world they generate of their methods, values, biases, 
decisions, and mere presence in the very situations they investigate”. 
For achieving this, first of all it is essential to recognise that the researcher’s own 
identity has direct or indirect influence over the outcome of the interaction between 
the researcher and participants. As Valentine (2005: 113) stressed, “it is important to 
reflect on who you are and how your own identity will shape the interactions that you 
have with others”. Despite being an ethnic Chinese, the researcher, as a 
Loughborough postgraduate researcher, was aware of still being an ‘outsider’ when 
meeting with interviewees who hold rich knowledge and career experience of being 
engaged with city-regional political or economic activities within the Chinese context. 
Relating to this context, the researcher had to admit that maintaining the balance of 
power was challenging, and power sometimes swings towards the participant in the 
field. Therefore and here is the second point, how the researcher behaved in the 
conversation is critical for shaping the power relations, and hence generate direct 
influence in participants’ responses. Thus besides the mental preparation 
beforehand, it is critical to remain alert and then carefully react to the changing 
context and power relations when undertaking a series of semi-structured interviews.  
The researcher was aware that he was seen as unfamiliar by each interviewee. 
There had not been any face-to-face contact between the researcher and any of the 
interviewees before the interviews, which were all conducted in the summer of 2013. 
The only communication between the researcher and each participant before the 
conversation was an email exchange sending out the invitation and organising the 
meeting. Relating to such circumstances, Hoggart et al. (2002: 209) warn that:  
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“since most intensive interviews involve people who either were not 
acquainted before the interview or are only slightly familiar, despite the claims 
to ‘depth of insight’, analysts should be aware that they only touch the surface 
of an interviewee’s views”.  
The researcher therefore realised that it was critical to encourage participants to 
open up their minds by establishing rapport between the researcher and each 
participant.  
For doing this, the researcher firstly attached a self-introduction and research 
background to the invitational email. This shall allow the participant to have a clear 
idea about who they are dealing with and what kind of data the researcher expected 
to acquire from them before they accepted further contact. Secondly, the researcher 
conducted an investigation into their career background and experience, and 
explained why the particular participant was valuable for the researcher’s project in 
the invitational email. For instance, before meeting any academic professor, the 
researcher looked into many of the state-led regional and urban planning projects 
which he/she was involved in, and sought for their main viewpoints about city-
regionalism through reviewing the abstracts of their publications. Hence these were 
included in the email as evidence for explaining why he/she was important. The 
researcher expected to create the impression that each of the participants was paid 
full attention instead of being chosen randomly.  
My aim was to ‘warm up’ an interview and to develop a rapport with the participant 
(Valentine, 2005: 119) in the initial stage of each interview. For some of them who 
used to study or work in UK universities, the researcher shared the experience of 
international research and conferences. For others who used to translate English 
versions of western publications in relation to the discourse of ‘new regionalism’ to 
Chinese, the researcher expressed that the publication was prominent and attracted 
the researcher’s attention in the literature review stage of the research. This worked 
particularly well for some academic professors because the researcher received six 
published books from six participants as gifts at the end of the interview.  
The researcher recognised that most of the interviewees, such as many academics 
and government officials, were much more powerful than the researcher due to their 
deep knowledge and experience of being involved in city-regional planning and 
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administration. As section 4.3.2 of interview structure mentioned, many powerful 
interviewees were interested in challenging the research objectives and interview 
questions. The researcher did not intend to upset them with his own opinion and 
mind-set which may be determined as flawed by the interviewee. Hence their 
questions were carefully answered with reference to published literature statements 
instead of the researcher’s own opinion.  
By doing this, firstly the researcher did not expect the potential debate to take over a 
large proportion of limited meeting time by intensifying the debate. Secondly and as 
Hoggart et al. recommend (2002: 207), “if interviewees sense an interviewer is not 
knowledgeable about a subject, the chances of gaining in-depth insight are much 
reduced”. There was hardly a general criterion which is commonly agreed for 
defining ‘knowledgeable’, particularly when the researcher needed to deal with a 
diversified portfolio of interviewees. The researcher thus prepared to be familiar with 
academic terms, author names and practical events as much as possible before 
each interview. A copy of the YRD regional plan was brought to each conversation to 
illustrate the quotations within some of the interview questions.  
Interviewing business people generated a different problem. They are themselves 
“experienced at interviewing and being interviewed and consequently know how to 
subvert interviews” (Valentine, 2005: 121). They sometimes provided irrelevant or 
inaccurate answers to deal with the researcher’s question. In this case, they may not 
have had the appropriate answer for the question and they guessed what the 
researcher was expecting. It was rare to hear them say that they had no idea how to 
answer any particular question. Hence, it was important for the researcher to be 
neutral about wordings when he explained and clarified the question, rather than 
revealing the key words of the potential answers. Moreover, several phone calls 
were received and picked up by each business leader amid the conversation, and 
thus interrupted the interview. Hand-written notes thus became important for guiding 
both the interviewer and interviewee back to the interrupted point. 
In short, the researcher paid much attention to reflect on firstly the positioning of both 
of him and participants, and secondly on the interview process. The researcher then 
tried hard to be responsive to any concerns in order to ensure the data collection 
was not tainted by the implication of “methods, values, biases, and decisions” 
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(Bryman 2008: 698). In retrospect, the research framework was filled with challenge 
and uncertainty just as Bryman (2008: 683) complained that “reflexivity is a 
notoriously slippery concept”.   
Although the importance of being reflexive has been often highlighted for conducting 
primary intensive research, every research project is so unique and different that 
there is hardly a general agreed framework which could be learned and then inform 
the researcher how to make the most appropriate reaction towards every single 
different scenario within any particular research project. Even the same positionality 
issue could be represented differently when various interviewees were dealt with. 
Even if the researcher knew many of the interviewees were going to challenge some 
of the interview questions, he had to deal with a variety of diversified questions. 
What the researcher accomplished was to be reflexive, learn from the past 
experience and deal with recognised issues more appropriately in the future.  
 
4.5 Research ethics  
According to Hoggart et al. (2002: 245), “ethical issues are relevant to research 
design, implementation and presentation”. It is fundamental for the researcher to 
remain thoughtful of the ethical consideration throughout the entire research process 
which includes methodological preparation, data collection and analysis. Ethical 
research in geography is defined by Hay (2010: 35) as to “behave with integrity” and 
“act in ways that are just, beneficent and respectful”, and last, be able to “yield 
satisfactory approaches for all parties involved”. The research project was carefully 
planned with the guidance for ethical clearance checklist and approved by 
Loughborough University Ethical Approval Sub-committee (see Appendix 1).  
In order to ensure that every interviewee was able to participate and provide a range 
of rich data during a long and sophisticated conversation on the basis of careful and 
thoughtful consideration, a series of cautious approaches were undertaken as below, 
based on Hay’s (2010: 39-40) advice. Firstly there was a reasonable amount of 
information provided to participants on matters such as nature and purpose of the 
research, what kind of information the researcher was expecting, expected time 
duration of the interview, their right to withdraw at any point of the meeting without 
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providing reasons, and contact detail of the Ethical Approval Sub-committee for 
complaints if they were not happy with the conversation.  
Secondly, participants were informed that their consent would be required for the 
expected length of interview duration and digital recording. Particular elites “may not 
want their comments on the record. It is therefore important to be sensitive to the 
interviewees’ wishes” (Valentine, 2005: 124). For example, recording was shut down 
amid one interview under the interviewee’s request while she felt her following 
statement could be sensitive.  
Finally, it was essential to let the participant know that confidentiality and anonymity 
are two primary principles in the course of research and in the release of results 
(Longhurst, 2010). Participants were assured that all collected data would remain 
secure on a laptop accessible by password only; that information supplied would 
remain confidential and participants would remain anonymous (Longhurst, 2010: 
111). Their names would not appear to anyone else but the researcher himself all 
the time. For those whose statements were digitally recorded, the recording would 
be assessed by the researcher only in the future. There were several times different 
interviewees were trying to find out who other participants were and what they 
presented in response to several interview questions. The researcher gently denied 
their wondering for the reasons of firstly complying with the principles of 
confidentiality and anonymity; and secondly not expecting others’ statement to 
influence the interviewee’s expressions.  
There are two other arrangements in relation to ethical considerations. Invitational 
emails for meetings were always sent two to four weeks before the expected 
meeting date in order to ensure that each potential interviewee had a fair length of 
time to consider whether or not they would like to be involved in the research (Hay, 
2010: 38). Furthermore and before each interview started, the Informed Consent 
Form (see Appendix 2) was explained by the researcher, and then signed by both 
the interviewee and the researcher after the interviewee was able to guarantee that 
he/she fully understood their rights and the researcher’s responsibilities.  
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4.6 Secondary data collection 
This thesis employed government statistics and documentary records for conducting 
secondary analysis. The principal source for both data is government publications. 
Although the researcher was fully aware that such secondary data may not be 
generated for the researcher’s specific purpose (White, 2010), they are valuable 
because they are extremely difficult for the primary method to generate, and more 
importantly these data can help the understanding and analysis of the primary 
empirical evidence. For instance, statistical data consists of population data, 
economic indexes which cover YRD, PRD and JJJ as mega city-regions; and 
chemical industrial indexes. A range of different government documentary records, 
such as a serial of national ‘Five-Year plans’, local government reports and 
conference summaries, were collected to explain how the YRD’s city-regional 
governance framework works. This section is going to explain the rationale for 
utilising quantitative statistics and qualitative documentary records. 
 
4.6.1 Making use of statistical data 
A quantitative analysis of government statistical data relating to the YRD, PRD and 
JJJ’s respective mixed economic indicators was undertaken prior to the primary 
research. The data was firstly utilised to highlight the significance of the selective 
research location in comparison with other Chinese city-regions. On the basis of the 
analysis of quantitative data, chapter three explains why the YRD was selected as 
the research target for this thesis. Then the respective economic contribution of 
Shanghai and other municipalities illustrate the comparative economic importance of 
regional individual city members within the YRD. Such data should be able to portray 
the YRD’s wider economic context and then facilitate the understanding of the 
structural and spatial transformation of manufacturing industries within the YRD’s 
jurisdictions. Moreover, statistical data relating to the number of chemical 
manufacturing enterprises across the YRD provide a context for the qualitative 
analysis of the industrial transformation process within the following empirical 
chapters. This was gathered to supplement the primary data during the period of 
conducting individual interviews because it was challenging for interviewees to 
provide accurate statistics from their memories. Both of the above mentioned types 
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of data were collected from each municipal government’s 2012 Statistical 
Communiqué of the National Economic and Social Development and other relevant 
local government reports. Secondary quantitative data was therefore “providing the 
‘extensive’ basis and context for a more ‘intensive’ investigation” (White, 2010: 75).  
 
4.6.2 Utilising documentary records 
Reviewing the written records of national government policy documents and YRD 
governance framework’s operating agenda were essential for studying the historic 
process of Chinese political city-regionalism before conducting the primary research. 
They were recorded to cover a large number of historical political decision-makings 
and events. According to Hoggart et al. (2002: 120), “such records allow access to 
subjects that may be difficult/impossible to research through direct, personal contact, 
perhaps because they relate to the past”.  
A series of national ‘Five-Year Plans’ and the YRD regional plan were collected from 
central government’s website in full version. Moreover, a series of conference 
agendas and events within the YRD’s city-regional governance framework was 
gathered from local governments and regional association’s website. Therefore, key 
written records of past events and city-regional regulatory policies were secured for 
the following intensive research and analysis. By borrowing Hoggart et al.’s (2002: 
122) words again, “the information they contain does not alter because it is used in a 
research project”. Following the secondary data collection, primary research was 
then engaged in by conducting individual face-to-face interview in the YRD. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This research project employs both primary and secondary research approaches for 
investigating how the YRD’s city-regional governance framework has emerged and 
how it operates. Interviews, as a qualitative method, constituted the entire agenda of 
primary research. The reason for concentrating on undertaking interviews was that 
the thesis aimed to make sense of each interviewee’s opinion by seeking for the 
rationale behind their answer instead of a representative idea which was potentially 
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based on counting the frequency of appearance. Secondary data were mainly 
collected for explaining the selection of research topic and location, and 
supplementing the information which lacked from the primary research.  
This chapter then critically reflects on the research challenges in the Chinese context. 
Interviewing elites poses a variety of challenges because the power relation 
sometimes swings to favour the interviewees. The researcher put significant efforts 
in keeping the conversation in a favourable climate while trying to avoid influencing 
the knowledge and information collected from the interviewee. Therefore, it was 
important for the researcher to constantly pay attention to the changing positionality 
and ethical issues as well as data collection in the field. It was fundamental to learn 
and prepare for how to conduct primary intensive research by looking at others’ 
experience and recommendations. Nevertheless, the researcher sometimes found 
the situation difficult to deal with because the issue which was drawn particular 
attention to beforehand could appear in the conversation by taking a variety of forms. 
For instance, powerful interviewees could challenge the interviewer from different 
and unexpected perspectives of which there are no way to prepare for in advance. 
What became even more challenging was the researcher needed to be very careful 
when he intended to clarify the meaning of his question or statement because his 
statement could easily lead the following conversation to any unanticipated 
discussion around any particular research subject which the scheduled interview’s 
length could usually not afford. Although the researcher kept alert to many of such 
concerns, it may not always have been possible to reduce the influence to a 
satisfactory extent. It enhanced the need for the researcher to keep reflecting on 
previous interviews, and constantly change the strategy of how to deal with similar 
situations in the subsequent interviews.  
Evolving challenges did not only raise uncertainty, difficulty and frustration, they also 
assisted the researcher to think through the undertaken research strategy, such as 
how to approach participants, and how to interpret interview questions as well as 
improving research questions on the basis of interviewees’ inquiry and interpretation. 
This research generates valuable experience which is closely related to the Chinese 
context from the field for conducting future potential research. 
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On the other hand, it must be admitted that the research was limited by several 
elements. YRD is one of the most developed mega city-regions in China and still 
experiencing spectacular growth. A number of historic records of statistical and 
documentary data may be seen as outdated by the time of this thesis being 
published. In particular, the YRD regional plan was initiated by the central NDRC in 
2005 and then issued by the central State Council in 2010 and may be no longer 
appropriate, from some perspectives, for guiding the city-regional integration of the 
YRD in 2015. This may have impacted the researcher’s conclusion around the 
function and role of states within the city-regional integration of the YRD at this 
moment. 
The consideration of ‘Renqing’ in Chinese society led to difficulties for the researcher 
to access a number of potential participants who hold senior political backgrounds. In 
particular, the lack of direct or indirect, i.e. intermediary acquaintance, personal 
linkages which could make ‘Renqing’ work was the major concern when several 
officials from central NDRC were approached by the researcher. This means that 
findings may not be representative of senior officials’ voice in the central government 
as a whole. There is a need for future research to extend the field research to the 
currently inaccessible organisations and participants in order to discuss and interpret 
based on a larger and more rational sampling. 
Despite the challenges and limitations explored in this concluding section, careful 
design and implementation of the methodology ensured that data was collected from 
a variety of participants who held diversified experiences and knowledge for 
comparing and reporting. The following chapters (5, 6, 7 and 8) present the analysis 
and interpretation of the collected data.  
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Chapter 5: Rethinking Mega City-Regionalism as a Geopolitical 
Outcome: The Transformation of the YRD as a State Space 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter approaches the construction of city-regional space and dynamic 
territorial politics by investigating the integration process of the Yangtze River Delta 
(YRD) as a state space. The YRD is concentrating a significant amount of functional 
activities mainly around Shanghai and is seen as one of China’s major contemporary 
economic engines. It is this large scale of functional agglomeration which crosses a 
variety of continuous jurisdictions attracting much attention from both Asian and 
western regional studies for recognising the YRD’s identity as a mega city-region 
(e.g. Scott, 2001; Hall and Pain, 2006; Luo, 2011; Xu and Yeh, 2011). Specifically, 
such recognition is usually referred to a group of cities and their adjacent regions 
around the global city of Shanghai in accordance with their socio-economic relations 
and flows. Enhancing the intra-regional socio-economic integration and political 
coherence becomes a primary aim for the YRD’s governance task in order to 
improve its mega city-regional competitiveness in the national and global economy. 
Responding to my first research objective of accounting for the transformation of the 
YRD as a state space, this chapter investigates how the YRD has been expanded to 
correspond with extant administrative jurisdictions on the basis of extending socio-
economic activities. In particular, this chapter explains the role of locational territorial 
interests as constitutive characteristics of the mega city-regionalism in order to 
enforce the implementation of cross-territorial collective governance in the local 
administrative agenda.  
This chapter aims to concentrate on the enlarging process between the narrow 
sense and the broad sense of the YRD, relating to socio-economic relations and 
territorial politics. In comparison with either ‘invisible’ spatial boundary of city-regional 
functional space or stubborn city-regional administrative jurisdictions which usually 
lags behind the accelerated urbanisation scale or extended socio-economic 
connection in western European and north American context, the spatial expansion 
of the YRD’s officially defined scope is apparent and then able to, more or less, 
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capture peripheral and other interlinked functional areas. Therefore, comparing with 
the difficult situation which chapter 2 mentioned, or ‘compromised city-regionalism’ 
(Harrison, 2010) in western context, the emerging city-regionalism process seems 
much simpler in China.  
Following this introduction, three main sections are produced: Section 5.2 introduces 
the historic event of centrally-orchestrated city-regionalism in the YRD for the 
comparative study with more recent geopolitical bottom-up city-regionalism. Section 
5.3 presents the transformation process between two recent but various official 
recognitions of YRD while focusing on the dynamic territorial politics. The second 
half of this section explores how the mega city-regional functional space has been 
reinforced and enlarged by researching the spatial shifting of traditional labour-
intensive manufacturing industries towards peripheral less-developed areas in the 
same provincial jurisdictions from the core YRD around Shanghai. The case study of 
chemical manufacturing industries’ withdrawal in Wuxi will be focused on. Finally, 
section 5.4 concludes for this chapter by stressing the constitutive role of geopolitical 
actors in matching the enlarging functional space with administrative jurisdictions at 
mega city-regional scale. 
 
5.2 Historic realisation of YRD’s mega city-regionalism 
The term ‘Yangtze River Delta’ was traditionally used to define a triangular alluvial 
plain at the end of the Lower Yangtze River in terms of Chinese physical geography 
(A chief member of the comprehensive team, interview, 23rd July, 2013). According 
to this definition, the scope of the YRD is no more than fifty square kilometres. The 
furthest eastern part of the triangular plain is the end of Yangtze River. The northern 
end would reach the Tongyang Canal which is sitting between the Nantong and 
Yangzhou. The northern land of the Hangzhou Bay would be seen as the southern 
boundary of the plain. At last, the furthest western end of the plain is Zhenjiang. This 
particular YRD experienced the shape force during the Chinese thousand year’s 
history. This definition is currently little referenced in the social science literatures 
since only few would like to pay attention to the YRD’s physical unity. But the term of 
YRD has survived until now. What the term of YRD stands for now is varied, and the 
different meanings will be individually discussed in this chapter. 
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Figure 7: The physical YRD 
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To begin with the 1978 Chinese economic reform, the earliest state-led effort of 
constructing city-regional tier governance around Shanghai can be traced back to 
the early 1980s. Before this arrangement, accelerating drawdown of decision-making 
rights from the central to the local and growth-oriented policies accentuated the inter-
city competition for external capital investments. Overall,  
“there is also the potential for a reduction of regional economic links as local 
officials place a greater priority on deriving the highest value added from their 
own local resources, rather than working to develop complementarities with 
other localities” (Leaf, 1998: 147).  
Meanwhile and in 1983, Shanghai was accounting for approximately 6% of national 
GDP and almost 2% of national population with no more than 0.1% of Chinese land 
area.  
Under this circumstance and aiming for boosting economic relations between 
Shanghai and adjacent administrative jurisdictions, in December 1982 the central 
State Council issued the announcement of establishing the Shanghai Economic 
Zone Planning Office (EZPO). The planning office was constructed to cover 
Shanghai; Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou and Nantong in Jiangsu; and Hangzhou, 
Jiaxing, Huzhou, Ningbo and Shaoxing in Zhejiang, ten municipalities in its 
jurisdiction; and Shanghai was nominated by the central State Council as the centre 
of this state-constructed economic zone. The Shanghai EZPO was branded as the 
central State Council’s branch organisation in the YRD, and only took personnel 
appointment decision from the central State Council. The institution was first headed 
by the former vice-director of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power 
(Shuili Dianli Bu). However, the Shanghai EZPO only remained for five years’ time 
until it was disbanded under the central command in 1988. This shall not turn out to 
be a surprise outcome if we could look at this project more closely. 
The Shanghai EZPO was one of the few ‘centrally-orchestrated’ projects after the 
1978 Chinese economic reform. It was the central state’s initial command to 
establish a governmental institution at the trans-provincial scale with the intention of 
breaking the regulatory shackle within the trans-jurisdictional socio-economic 
activities. From another perspective, it was a middle arrangement between the 
operation of centrally-controlled mega administrative regions prior to 1978 and the 
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decentralisation of decision-making rights after the ‘Open Door’ policy amid the 
drawdown process of regulatory power towards provincial and municipal jurisdictions 
since 1978. It was a top-down force attempt for improving the functional relations 
among municipal jurisdictions, and specifically, Shanghai and its surrounding urban 
and countryside.  
In this case, there was a lack of careful consideration relating to the role of Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang provincial governments in the city-centric regional governance scale. 
According to the State Council’s Circular of Establishing Planning Offices for 
Shanghai Economic Zone and Shanxi Energy Source Base [NO. 152] 
(Guowuyuanguanyuchengli Shanghaijingjiquhe Shanxinengyuanjidi 
Guihuabangongshidetongzhi ) in 1982, the office was run for promoting inter-city 
functional cooperation around Shanghai by formulating the city-regional social and 
economic plan, and facilitating interaction among local authorities. For achieving this 
aim, it was the planning office’s responsibility for working out the coordinated city-
regional plan and then ensuring the planning provisions to be reflected in the 
individual local city states’ strategic and operational decisions, however with no 
means to enforce the implementation in the local administrative agenda. Specifically, 
the central authority did not state clearly how the administrative responsibilities 
relating to the local economic decision-making would be re-distributed between the 
planning office and local provincial governments.  
The Shanghai EZPO only covered part of the territories of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. It 
was challenging for local municipal governments to operate within provincial 
governments’ agendas while considering the Shanghai EZPO’s decisions 
(people.com.cn, 2003; Li, 2009). Therefore, trans-jurisdictional matters easily fell into 
abeyance once there were evident conflicts between the Shanghai EZPO and local 
authorities. Political divergence increased when GDP growth and competition 
became the primary benchmarks for the local authorities’ political achievement 
appraisal. There was insufficient consideration for long-existing territorial politics by 
the ‘centrally-orchestrated’ city-regional arrangement. The central State Council set 
this ambitious institutional mechanism in the belief that this would facilitate horizontal 
economic relations above the hierarchical territorial politics without interrupting or 
altering the long existence of hierarchical belongings between the local provincial 
and municipal states.  
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Furthermore, local provincial and municipal governments were holding major 
financial resources for organising and financing local administration, i.e. tax 
collection, and constructing activities. It means the Shanghai EZPO had to rely on 
local authorities to enforce their decision-making in the city-regional administrative 
agenda. Therefore, the Shanghai EZPO’s decision-making was easily compromised 
on the basis of local territorial politics. According to Li’s (2009) report on the official 
website of the history of People’s Republic of China, there was one particular 
example reflecting the dilemma which was faced by the Shanghai EZPO. The term 
‘regional integration’ was initially included in the draft strategic constitution, but soon 
removed according to local authorities’ objections. The opinion against the term was 
that constructing the Shanghai-centric economic region shall not be seen as an 
approach to consolidate local administrative jurisdictions. Referring to such political 
context, the Shanghai EZPO was not able to reach the central State Council’s initial 
expectation of actively promoting the horizontal functional relations above the local 
territorial political division in this Shanghai-centric region. 
Finally, a number of crucial points can be concluded from this case. Firstly, ‘centrally-
orchestrated’ governance arrangements, in our case appending one new middle-
level administrative institution to the hierarchical state organisation, needs to 
carefully consider how this is going to fit and avoid conflicts in the top-down chain of 
administrative responsibility. The Shanghai EZPO was struggling for five years amid 
territorial politics between administrative divisions. Relating to this perspective, there 
is no way overlooking the dominating role of local governments within the local 
operating agenda while spatially rescaling state power. Secondly, the top-down 
‘orchestration’ may not function effectively when central state’s command contradicts 
the local specific context. The regionalisation around Shanghai was initiated by the 
central state to pursue its political wish of facilitating the trans-jurisdictional 
coordination in local economic agenda. However and apparently, local governments 
invested more attention in inter-city competition for concentrating economic activities 
in their own administrative jurisdictions, or the so-called ‘Administrative Region 
Economy’ (Xingzhengqu Jingji) (Liu et al., 2002; Liu, 2006), than city-regional scale 
at that stage which was right after the economic reform.  
This case may provide us some clues for why we have seen so little central state-led 
construction of inter-jurisdictional governmental institutional arrangements after the 
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Shanghai EZPO was abandoned. Nonetheless, it is too early to exclude the nation 
state from the construction of the governance framework at the city-regional scale by 
solely relying on this historical case. The next section is going to investigate the 
more recent mega city-regionalism around Shanghai while relating back to the 
Shanghai EZPO in order to explicate the respective role of various political forces in 
the ‘new city-regionalism’. 
 
5.3 Expanding mega city-regional space by considering territorial politics 
This section concentrates on the transformation between two distinct versions of the 
YRD, i.e. the narrow sense of YRD and the broad sense of YRD, which both 
frequently appear in the interviews, city-regionalism literatures and governments’ 
announcements. Each of these two versions is tailored to fit unique and specific 
expectations, either economic or political, rather than a general requirement. What 
we have witnessed is the expanding process of the mega city-regional scale in the 
YRD, and more importantly, a better match between the YRD’s spatial scope and 
local provincial-level territories.   
 
5.3.1 The Narrow sense of YRD 
In terms of Chinese economic geography, the initial scope of the YRD consists of 
fifteen cities. They are Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, Yangzhou, 
Taishou1, Nantong in Jiangsu, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing, Ningbo, 
Zhoushan in Zhejiang and Shanghai. The size of this delta area is approximately ten 
square kilometres. According to a researcher from the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences (SASS), these fifteen cities are “interconnecting on the map, and sharing 
identical local culture and consistent resources endowment; and together they are 
termed as the Wu(Jiangsu) and Yue(Zhejiang) culture (Wu-Yue wenhua) during their 
thousand years’ history” (A researcher from SASS, interview, 25th July, 2013). Hence 
the definition of the narrow sense of YRD was initially raised due to this deep 
historical heritage. This was the early YRD in terms of geoeconomic recognition until 
Taishou2 made its seat in the YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economies 
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(YRD CAUE) in 2003. The ‘14+1’ (1 means Shanghai) was then replaced by the 
concept of ‘15+1’ for defining the YRD.  
The concept of ‘15+1’ became the basis for many scholarly studies and research 
projects relating to the geoeconomic YRD, such as the Contemporary Shanghai 
Research Institution’s (2005) ‘The YRD’s Development Report – Economic Growth 
and Urbanisation Process’, Luo’s (2011) ‘Inter-City Cooperation and Governance in 
Yangtze River Delta’, IEAS, UN-Habitat’s (2012) ‘The state of China’s Cities 
2012/2013’ and Xu and Zhu’s (2013) edited collection ‘A Research on Transition and 
Development in Yangtze River Delta’s Urban Agglomeration’; and the basis for much 
official statistical work, such as the data of YRD’s total population and income per 
capita, etc. in Jiangsu, Zhejiang or Shanghai Statistical Bureaus’ reports. The above 
mentioned statistical work illustrates that the concept of YRD in terms of ‘15+1’ has 
been officially accepted by local authorities. The ‘15+1’ is also termed as the narrow 
sense of YRD, and this is the YRD which has been frequently referenced by both 
eastern and western city-regional literatures (e.g. Luo 2011; Xu and Yeh, 2011; 
Harrison 2014; Hall and Pain 2006).  
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Figure 8: The narrow sense of YRD 
 
 
Moreover and more importantly, the YRD’s internal functional connection among the 
delta cities was already recognised by local municipal governments as early as 1992. 
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The framework of YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference, (later known as 
YRD CAUE), was established under the delta component municipal governments’ 
agreed wish of reinforcing the horizontal functional linkages. This was a strong sign 
for local governments recognising the regional identity in favour of geoeconomic 
regionalisation. The regional integration process was significantly accelerated after 
the YRD CAUE was founded in 1997. Tourism, transportation and human resource 
used to be focused on by the association members to promote the integration 
process across the narrow sense of YRD as initial tasks (see Luo, 2011). There will 
be more discussions relating to this new city-regional governance framework in 
chapter 6. 
According to Luo’s (2011) work, the narrow sense of YRD consistently produced a 
substantial proportion of China’s total GDP while holding only one percent of the 
entire national land and no more than ten percent of the national population since 
1978. By the time the NDRC started the YRD regional plan in 2005, the narrow 
sense of YRD contributed almost one fifth of the national total GDP (see table 1). 
This mega city-regional space also produced more than one third of the national 
entire export; and attracted forty percent of the total national incoming foreign 
investments. The capability of agglomerating substantial economic activities in this 
area contributes significantly to the recognition of the narrow sense of YRD.  
 
Table 10: Key economic indicators in 2005 
Indicators 
 
The Narrow Sense of YRD 
 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang (%) 
 
China (%) 
Population (thousand) 82654 
 
62.54 6.32 
Area (km2) 109960 
 
52.18 1.15 
GDP (million yuan) 3396315 
 
83.04 18.63 
Export (million dollar) 275969 
 
94.99 36.22 
Utilised Foreign Capital 
(million dollar) 
 
26333 77.51 41.27 
Source: Compiled from Luo (2011, 7) 
 
Another important fact which shall make the YRD distinct from its adjacent cities and 
regions is the construction of its intra-regional transportation network as the 
134 
 
response to enhancing demand. The Hu-Ning (Shanghai-Nanjing), Hu-Hang 
(Shanghai-Hangzhou) and Ning-Hang (Nanjing-Hangzhou) highways, and many 
other highway lines together constitute one of the most complex intra-regional 
highway networks in China. Hu-Ning and Hu-Hang experienced continuous widening 
after their first utilisation and hence became the first two highways which had eight 
lanes in mainland China. Furthermore and more importantly, they are now two of the 
busiest highways in the whole country.  
The idea of a ‘one-hour economic circle’ emerged as a result of the construction of 
the intra-regional high-speed rail network (top speed over 200 km/h), centred on 
Shanghai and connecting Nanjing and Hangzhou. The concept of ‘one-hour 
economic circle’ implies the regional area which is covered by the one-hour traveling 
distance from Shanghai. As a consequence, the narrow sense of YRD possesses 
strong transportation capacity in comparison with the rest of mainland China. The 
highway and high-speed rail network formed the basis for much research relating to 
population mobility in the YRD, such as Luo, Johnston and Chen’s (2008) research, 
who analysed the scalar structure within the YRD and delimited the YRD’s functional 
boundaries by measuring the people’s flow between functional spaces and their 
surrounding less important cities. Their work is a reflection on Christaller’s (1933) 
central place theory and contemporary relational approaches (e.g. Allen et al., 1998; 
Amin, 2004; Massey, 2007; Taylor et al., 2010). 
It is not difficult to see local governments’ intention of actively upgrading the existing 
trans-provincial highway network to cope with the growing traffic demand rather than 
be forced to follow the nation state’s orchestration by looking at the historic event of 
inter-territorial highway disconnection. There was a long-established history of poor 
performance of inter-jurisdiction transportations within the entire China, including 
both railways and highways. Between the late 20th century and early 21st century, all 
of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai provincial-level governments consistently refused 
to modify their original plan of highway routes in order to find connections across 
provincial boundaries. Local governments had the main responsibility of leading and 
financing the construction of highways within their respective jurisdictions as well as 
the modification of their constructing plans. Changing original routes for connection 
around the administrative boundary may have meant to skip some urban and rural 
places in their own jurisdictions which could possibly have jeopardised their own 
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interest. The inter-jurisdictional highways disconnection clearly evidences existing 
inter-locality conflicts (see Li et al., 2014 and Luo and Shen (2008)).  
But as one interviewee recalled, “after the mid-2000s, much more efforts have been 
invested in completing the construction of transportation projects around the 
provincial boundaries because of the accelerated enhancement of economic 
relations among cities” (A researcher from the SASS, interview, 12th July 2013). Her 
statement was further supported by another famous case of the highway of 
Hu(Shanghai) – Su(Jiangsu) – Zhe(Zhejiang) – Wan(Anhui) which goes through 
Shanghai, Suzhou in Jiangsu, Huzhou in Zhejiang and Xuancheng in Anhui. The 
involvement of all four provincial governments significantly delayed the constructing 
schedule. The Hu-Su-Zhe-Wan highway which was approximately two hundred and 
sixty kilometres long took almost five years to be entirely completed between 2003 
and 2008. This used to be one of the central-orchestrated key projects according to 
the national tenth ‘Five-Year Plan (2001-2005)’. Zhejiang and Anhui’s tasks were 
completed by 2006 and then waiting for Jiangsu and Shanghai’s connection until 
2008. The demand for this highway to be completed was increased by the second 
half of the constructing timetable.  
This section explains that the narrow sense of the YRD is defined on the basis of a 
geoeconomic logic in terms of functional agglomeration and enhancing economic 
relations among selected local urban jurisdictions. It is apparent that this version 
distinguishes the comparatively more developed functional spaces, i.e. Shanghai, 
Southern Jiangsu and Northern Zhejiang, from the rest of the provincial jurisdictions, 
i.e. Northern Jiangsu and Southern Zhejiang. But this is only a part of the current 
mega city-regionalism in the YRD. The next section is going to explain the expanding 
process of the YRD. 
 
5.3.2 The broad sense of YRD 
The YRD Regional Plan expands the YRD to cover three entire provincial 
jurisdictions, i.e. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The YRD regional plan was 
formulated by three different teams, i.e. comprehensive team, expert team and local 
team, under the lead of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
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in 2005 and then launched under the approval of the central State Council in 2010. 
The YRD regional plan is important since this is the first time for the central authority 
to issue official strategic guidance for the YRD’s mega city-regional formation. 
Consequently, the YRD regional plan shows that the broad sense of YRD is the 
definition which is able to obtain the central authority’s recognition for the YRD, 
instead of the narrow sense of YRD which considers little about the provincial-level 
politics. It was stated, by one of the comprehensive team members, as: 
“The YRD regional plan was initially formulated for the ‘15+1’ by the NDRC 
between 2005 and 2006, but afterwards modified to cover three entire 
provinces under the State Council’s indication. This is also one of the main 
reasons for explaining why it took five years, such a long period, to complete 
before it was finally issued in 2010” (A member of the comprehensive team, 
interview, 15th July, 2013).  
According to the senior members who were involved in drafting the YRD regional 
plan, there were two primary intentions behind the expanding process toward the 
broad sense of YRD. Firstly,  
 “it is challenging for a group of local municipal governments to participate in 
the horizontal interaction while each is holding various political ranks, for 
instance the provincial level, vice-provincial level and municipal level. Their 
voices would not be heard equally in the horizontal interaction. Even more 
challenging, it is sometimes not possible for municipal governments to make 
direct contact with others across the provincial boundaries. Considering this 
issue, the broad sense of YRD is able to include all three provincial 
governments [Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang] in the governance of the YRD” 
(A chief member of the comprehensive team, interview, 23rd July, 2013). 
The second point is that “the YRD’s expansion reflects both the central and 
provincial governments’ expectation of extending the [functional] development over 
the rest of the provincial area” (A researcher from Nanjing Institute of Geography and 
Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences (NIGLAS), interview, 1st August, 2013). 
Relating to the cities’ political rank in the first statement and amongst all of the YRD’s 
‘15+1’ component cities: firstly, Shanghai is the municipality under the direct control 
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of the central state, and hence belongs to the provincial-level; secondly, Nanjing, 
Hangzhou and Ningbo are vice-provincial level of prefecture cities; and finally, the 
rest of city members are prefecture level. All of the delta’s component members are 
operating under direct commands from their respective provincial government, apart 
from Shanghai. It means their activities shall not collide with their superior authorities 
within the hierarchical political system while participating in the operation of the 
mega city-regional governance. Consequently, the YRD regional plan and the 
concept of the broad sense of YRD prompt provincial governments to be much 
involved in constructing the mega city-regional scale of governance. It is much easier 
to organise the horizontal interaction among local authorities which hold the same 
political level.  
The preface of the YRD regional plan explains the central state’s overall aim of 
enlarging the YRD as improving the competitiveness and sustaining the economic 
growth at the mega city-regional level. Based on this aim and according to the 
regional plan, the YRD is expanded to include northern Jiangsu and southern 
Zhejiang in order to employ the former’s spare land and labour resources and the 
latter’s abundant natural physical resources and prosperous local private capital. All 
of the above-mentioned resources are stated by the regional plan as crucial 
elements for transforming the YRD’s industrial structures from current manufacturing 
to high-technology and service industries. The content of the YRD regional plan will 
be focused on in chapter 6. The key point here is the expanded version of YRD 
reflects the central state’s strategic aim of promoting the cross-jurisdictional 
economic integration and sustainable growth at a larger city-regional space. 
However, it is important to notice that this is not a centrally-commanded expansion 
process.  
The comparatively under-developed prefecture cities within Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
have had a few years’ experience of frequently sending signals of being eager to be 
included in the YRD through a variety of methods, for instance applying for being a 
part of the YRD CAUE, and expressing their wish of underpinning the functional 
connections with the narrow sense of YRD by receiving the manufacturing 
enterprises which shift away from them in the governmental officials’ oral 
presentation and media interviews etc. since the mid-2000s. The former example will 
be included in the introduction of YRD CAUE and the latter case will be explained in 
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the discussion of the manufacturing industries’ relocation within the YRD for section 
5.3. What can be stated here is before the enlargement of YRD CAUE’s membership, 
all of the municipalities in Northern Jiangsu and Southern Zhejiang have been 
constantly seeking for opportunities to be involved in functional relations with YRD’s 
members. Therefore, the conceptualisation of the broad sense of YRD fits for both of 
the central and local governments’ political demand for enlarging city-regionalising 
process across entire Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai.  
In short, the broad sense of YRD is replacing the narrow sense of YRD as a mega 
city-regional space which is supported by the Chinese hierarchical state organisation 
based on the consideration of local territorial politics. The broad sense of YRD 
represents both the central and local authorities’ expectation of achieving local 
political effectiveness and economic efficiency by driving local administrative 
attention to the mega city-regional level. However, the central state’s favour in the 
broad sense of YRD was merely transmitted by the YRD regional plan, which was 
seen by many as guidance without enforcement power. By contrast, the enlargement 
of the spatial scale in the YRD has been largely driven by local political force. The 
following sections are going to investigate the enlarging process by relating to both 
intra-regional economic relations and local territorial politics. 
 
5.3.3 The dynamic territorial politics within the YRD’s mega city-regionalism 
There have been continuous state-led attempts for constructing and improving 
functional relations in the YRD around Shanghai despite inter-city competition for 
GDP growth since the 1978 economic reform. This section is going to explain how 
the interaction among local governments has prompted city-regionalising processes 
in the YRD. 
The inter-city networked governance was engaged with as early as 1992. In 1992, 
fourteen cities from the current narrow sense of YRD, apart from Zhejiang’s 
Taishou2, voluntarily started the YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference. The 
conference was attended by each city’s Planning and Economy Committee. In 1997, 
Taizhou1 was split from Yangzhou and then established as a new municipality under 
the direct control of Jiangsu government. Then the number of municipalities which 
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agreed to attend the joint conference increased to fifteen. The YRD Economic 
Cooperation Joint Conference was principally serving to enhance the horizontal 
inter-city interaction through economic data and functional experience exchange 
among the local states. There was a lack of a specific topic as well as regularity for 
each conference. Due to its informal and aperiodic nature, the meeting did not 
generate much achievement other than act as a platform for casual inter-
governmental communication in relation to data exchange (Luo, 2011: 132). 
However, the YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference was an important sign 
that local governance started to extend beyond each urban jurisdiction to become 
networked at a larger scale. It was the early stage for local governments starting to 
shift their attention to the mega city-regional level. 
In 1997, based on the agreement of all fifteen member cities, the YRD Coordination 
Association of Urban Economy (CAUE) was established to replace the framework of 
the joint conference, and Shanghai became the permanent president of the 
association. Each city’s Planning and Economy Committee, who used to represent 
each municipal government in previous conferences, was replaced by all the fifteen 
city mayors. The constitution of the association was constructed and stated that the 
mayor conference and another following meeting for discussing details should be 
conducted once every two years. This was the initial step for the networked 
governance mechanism becoming institutionalised at the mega city-regional level in 
terms of regular frequency and establishing a clear aim for each conference.  
After Zhejiang’s Taizhou2 joined in 2003, the YRD CAUE experienced continuous 
recruitment in the following decade, and included 30 cities by 2013. As a researcher 
from SASS mentioned in the interview,  
“the Urban and Demographic Studies of the SASS was always invited to 
make an official assessment whether the potential applicants were qualified 
for becoming a part of the association based on their existing or potential 
economic connections with existing association members” (A researcher from 
SASS, interview, 12th July 2013).  
During 2003 and 2004, the YRD CAUE’s constitution doubled the frequency of the 
mayor conference and working meeting to once every year. For understanding the 
YRD CAUE, it is important to realise that it is a voluntary trans-provincial institution 
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without a superior regulatory unit and it is currently registered in the Department of 
Civil Affairs. Or in other words, the association emerged as a result of local 
governments’ wish of intensifying horizontal connections in order to sustain 
economic growth in the future rather than through a top-down commanded 
institutional arrangement. Before the 2003 expansion, the association reflected 
municipal governments’ recognition of the ‘15+1’ YRD in terms of economic relations. 
Therefore, the establishment of the YRD CAUE was the local official recognition that 
the context of local activities was no longer much bound in the cities’ jurisdictions, 
and thus networked governance became necessary for regulating and promoting 
such cross-jurisdictional activities.  
Furthermore, three provincial level governments, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 
started to engage with YRD’s networked governance in 2003. It was the initial stage 
for provincial governments shifting their attention to the YRD’s mega city-regionalism. 
In March 2003, the governor of Zhejiang province at that time, Jinping Xi, headed a 
visiting delegation to Shanghai, and stated that intensifying the provincial level 
connections between Shanghai and Zhejiang would become one of the prioritised 
tasks in the future agenda. His statement was then formalised and included into the 
Zhejiang provincial government’s official strategic documents. By following Xi’s visit, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang’s provincial delegation groups completed mutual 
visits of each other by the end of 2003. There were a number of bilateral contractual 
agreements for intensifying the trans-provincial economic connections reached by 
following each tour, such as ‘The Agreement on Further Improving the Economic 
Cooperation and Growth between Shanghai and Zhejiang (Guanyu Jinyibutuijin 
Huzhe Jingjihezuoyufazhande Xieyishu)’ and ‘Further Strengthening the Exchange 
and Cooperation of Economic Technology between Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
(Jinyibujiaqiang Jingjijishujiaoliuyuhezuo Xieyi)’ after Xi’s visits to Shanghai and 
Jiangsu respectively.  
All three provincial governments expressed the same consideration as integrating 
the cross-jurisdictional socio-economic connections was becoming critical and urgent 
for sustaining the economic growth of the entire YRD in the future. This is saying that 
the identical interests and strategic aim sharing by all three provincial governments 
was one of the main forces to push forward the YRD’s geopolitical city-regionalising 
process. Following the meetings among provincial governments, the YRD’s 
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governance framework, which consists of the decision making level, coordination 
level and execution level from top to bottom was completed by 2008. We will come 
back to this governance framework with more details about its structure and 
operation in chapter 6. 
 
5.3.4 The expanding YRD in accordance with the spatial restructuring of 
manufacturing industries  
“According to Scott and his acolytes, city-regions represent a new scale of 
urbanization and city-regionalism a new phase in capitalist territorial 
development - a belief fuelled by recognition that while accelerating 
processes of global economic integration and rapid urbanization are 
resulting in the resurgence of cities in globalization, substantive 
expressions of urbanization result in metropolitan landscapes stretching 
far beyond their traditional territorial boundaries. One only has to look at 
the exceptional rate of city expansion into larger city-regions comprising 
multiple functionally interlinked urban settlements in China, for example, 
to appreciate how “the city” as traditionally conceived no longer 
adequately reflects the underlying structure of how urban life is being 
organized in globalization” (Harrison, 2015b: 20-21). 
Accelerated economic integration and urbanisation have substantially improved the 
economic relations among cities and therefore resulted in the emergence of 
functionally interlinked urban clusters in the YRD. Meanwhile what we have also 
witnessed in the YRD is that the operation of functional activities continuously 
expands the inter-connected city-regional space to cover even more cities and the 
countryside at its periphery. The spatial restructuring of traditional manufacturing 
industries during the past decade is a part of such functional activities. Both market 
forces and government intervention are playing a crucial role in the manufacturing 
businesses’ decision-making relating to spatial relocation in the YRD. Section 5.3.4.1 
argues that the spatial movement trend of the YRD’s manufacturers is improving 
functional linkages between the narrow sense of YRD and its outer area; and section 
5.3.4.2 focuses on the role of local politics in the case study of Wuxi’s chemical 
manufacturing industries.  
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5.3.4.1 The spatial shifting of the manufacturing industries  
During the past decades, YRD’s cities kept focusing on enhancing their own 
industrial structures and maximising the jurisdictional GDP volume while paying less 
attention to achieve functional complementary at the mega city-regional level. This 
resulted in “similar structures located in neighbouring cities, and implicitly, a 
relationship dominated by competition instead of cooperation and harmony” (Gu et 
al., 2011: 240). According to Social Sciences Academic Press’ (2011: 11) Blue Book 
of Yangtze River Delta: The Yangtze River Delta Stepping towards the World-Class 
City Group 2011, amongst all sixteen cities in the narrow sense of YRD, twelve 
chose to focus on electronic and informational manufacturing; eleven concentrated 
on the automobile manufacturing; and nine grew their petrochemical industries. Even 
more challenging, along with China’s transformation into a world factory, YRD’s 
external constraints began to emerge such as “the export-oriented development of 
labour-intensive products caused trade friction” (Wu and Zhang, 2010: 62). 
According to the YRD regional plan, it is now a critical moment for the YRD to 
accelerate its industrial transformation relating to traditional labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries and structural upgrading towards high-technological and 
service industries in order to improve mega city-regional competitiveness. Or in other 
words, facilitating and achieving industrial specialisation and labour division within a 
larger spatial scale is to become a fundamental part of mega city-regional planning 
and development.  
This is because: Firstly, Shanghai has become one of the cities with the slowest 
growth rates in terms of urban GDP in China. Furthermore, other top global cities, 
such as London, New York and Tokyo, are still significantly ahead of Shanghai 
based on economic statistics. For instance, in 2007 the average GDP per capita for 
Shanghai was $8,500, in comparison with London and New York’s $30,000 and 
Tokyo’s $50,000 (Gu et al., 2011: 239). Secondly, YRD’s labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries are vulnerable to the up-down trend of the world economy. 
Export-oriented industries are currently contributing a substantial part of their annual 
economic volume. Table 10 illustrates that the core YRD accounted for more than 
one third of China’s exports in 2005; and furthermore, table 9 discloses that, in 2012, 
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the sixteen delta cities’ exports still represented a very large proportion of their GDP, 
in particular, Shanghai’s export value was more than one tenth of its annual GDP, 
and Suzhou’s annual export value was almost fifteen percent of its annual GDP. 
Third, the growth of labour, land and other production costs in the core YRD greatly 
undermines the local enterprises’ profitability and competitiveness. For these 
reasons, the YRD needed to confront the demand for accelerated restructuration of 
spatial functions. 
Consequently, the YRD is currently facing the tasks of upgrading the current 
industrial structure and preserving the existing agglomeration of manufacturing 
industries. Improving economic relations among the narrow sense of YRD and its 
surrounding areas has become important and urgent. According to the YRD regional 
plan, while following Shanghai’s lead, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hangzhou and Ningbo 
shall shift their attention to improve their Research-and-Development capability and 
increase the proportion of the high-technology industries and advanced producer 
services’ outputs of their entire GDP generation; and Shanghai is to focus on 
improving its national and global influence by concentrating financial functions and 
other service industries. The rest of the YRD’ cities, in particular northern Jiangsu 
and south-western Zhejiang, shall focus on receiving labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries which are to move from the core YRD to take advantage of the outer areas’ 
spare land and labour resources as well as their abundant natural physical resources 
and prosperous local private capital. As a consequence, the spatial restructuring 
process city-regionalised the YRD at the larger scale by increasing its agglomerated 
economic volume and enhancing internal functional linkages. 
 
Table 11: The relocation of core YRD's investments to northern Jiangsu 
 2004 
 
2007 2009 
The Number of Relocated 
Investments* 
 
 
1893 
 
2026 
 
2051 
Valuation of proposed 
Investments* (billion￥) 
 
 
64.1 
 
99.38 
 
145.4 
Valuation of Completed 
Within the Year* (billion￥) 
 
 
25.7 
 
49.79 
 
77.81 
* Valuation of Single Investment is no less than five million Yuan 
Source: Compiled from Jiangsu NDRC’s statistical Reports 
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Table 11 shows that the value of projects relocating from the core YRD to northern 
Jiangsu more than doubled between 2004 and 2009. The increase in both the 
number and value of relocated projects means that the spatial restructuring process 
has become even more intensive in recent years. If we take a closer look at the YRD 
industries’ relocating process, it is reflected by the following.  
In general, there are three main categories of manufacturing businesses which are 
likely to shift away from the core YRD toward the outer area. Firstly, labour-intensive 
manufacturing businesses which have a comparatively high demand for production 
resources of labour and land are likely to move out of the core YRD. There has been 
a long recognition of the trend for labour-intensive manufacturing industries to shift 
away from core YRD around Shanghai to the developing northern Jiangsu and 
south-western Zhejiang (e.g. Chen and Ye, 2002; Fan, 2004; Song, 2010). The 
major concern here is that the sustained economic boom of core YRD, in particular 
Shanghai, has driven up local land and labour costs and created shortages in spare 
developable land, which has become expensive for potential investors (Chen, 2007). 
For example,  
“667 square metres of industrial land shall value at between thirty thousand 
and forty thousand Chinese Yuan in Southern Jiangsu in comparison with 
between only ten thousand and twenty thousand Chinese Yuan in Northern 
Jiangsu” (A business leader in Wuxi, interview, 8th July 2013).  
There is a three to four times difference for industrial land cost. Moreover, there is a 
significant gap in labour cost between northern and southern Jiangsu. According to 
National and Jiangsu’s Statistical Bureaus’ 2005 data, the annual income per-capita 
for the narrow sense of YRD’s sixteen members was 15255 Chinese Yuan in 
comparison with 12319 Chinese Yuan for the entire Jiangsu province which included 
eight municipalities from the narrow sense of YRD and another five in Northern 
Jiangsu.  
Secondly, “businesses which consume large amounts of water, electricity and other 
physical resources […] are likely to be required to move away from the developed 
area by local authorities” (A researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 1st August 2013). 
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This relates to the aim of achieving sustainable economic and social development by 
reducing the industries’ energy consumption. Thirdly, industries which might create 
significant damage to the physical environment would be required to shift away to 
less developed areas. For the latter two categories, it is important to realise that the 
requirement for spatial relocation of targeted industries is not an easy decision for 
local governments to make in the face of the GDP-led political performance appraisal 
system. Why this spatial shift is accelerating in the YRD at this moment cannot be 
understood without reference to changing market forces and the role of state politics. 
According to the statement of a researcher from NIGLAS,  
“large number of meetings, forums and conferences among local 
governments in the YRD, which are organised by the mega city-regional 
governance framework, are able to quickly build close relationship for 
negotiation about guiding local businesses’ decision relating to the spatial 
transformation” (A researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 1st August 2013).  
His opinion partly interprets why some of Anhui’s municipal authorities had 
constantly expressed, directly and indirectly, their interests in joining the YRD CAUE. 
By 2015, five of Anhui’s municipal authorities, including Hefei, Wuhu, Huainan, 
Maanshan and Chuzhou, have become official members of YRD CAUE. His 
statement highlights the importance of maintaining the circle of the YRD’s 
component members as being closely networked through face-to-face meeting. In 
comparison with a variety of telecommunication methods, face-to-face conversation 
is still an effective method for conducting communication in depth. By taking 
advantage of the shorter physical distance, face-to-face meetings which are 
organised by government officers, business leaders and other key stakeholders can 
be achieved regularly at comparative higher frequency every year than those with 
people from more remote areas, such as inland China. Thus intra-regional horizontal 
communication easily facilitates the information exchange about potential locations 
and the policy environment for the industries which are required to relocate within the 
YRD.  
Moreover, the networked transporting capacity is one of the most significant 
considerations involved in the manufacturing industries’ decision relating to the 
factories’ location. Transportation has been one of the YRD CAUE’s focused tasks 
146 
 
since its early stage (see Luo, 2011). As section 5.3.1 already mentioned, much of 
local governments’ efforts had been invested in completing the construction of 
transportation projects around the provincial boundaries. The end of the issue of 
inter-jurisdictional highways disconnection and following rapid improvement of the 
combined highways and high-speed rail network over the last decade has earned the 
nearby northern Jiangsu and south-western Zhejiang’s component municipalities the 
advantage of more efficient transportation over mainland regions further away for 
receiving relocated investments. An interview with a private chemical enterprise in 
Wuxi revealed that  
“the upgrade of the existing transportation infrastructures enables the same 
quantity of input resources and output products to spend less time on the road 
but at even lower cost in comparison with previous time” (A business leader in 
Wuxi, interview, 19th July 2013). 
According to Social Sciences Academic Press’ (2011: 5) Blue Book of Yangtze River 
Delta: The Yangtze River Delta Stepping towards the World-Class City Group 2011, 
the total length of highways within the entire broad sense of YRD had almost 
reached 7000 kilometres when it was published. Together with the normal and high-
speed railways, the cross-territorial ground transportation network within the YRD 
ensures that the industries located in the peripheral areas can operate relatively 
cheaper and make use of faster physical connections with the core YRD around 
Shanghai.  
As well as the ground transportation network, cross-territorial flows are also reliant 
on water transportation. The Pacific Ocean faces the YRD in its east and connected 
to Shanghai, southern Jiangsu and Anhui via the Yangtze River. According to the 
Contemporary Shanghai Research Institute’s (2005: 7) The Progress Report of 
Yangtze River Delta 2005: Economic Growth and Urbanising Process, the intra-
regional shipping lanes reach 36,800 kilometres in total, which accounts for 34% of 
the national figure. Shanghai’s Yangshan port and Zhejiang’s Beilun port are able to 
fit the fifth and six generation of container ships which can carry 4800 and 10000 
Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU) respectively. In addition, a few other river ports 
along the lower Yangtze River are able to fit the third and fourth generation container 
ships which could carry 3000 and 4400 TEUs respectively. This is the YRD’s unique 
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transportation advantage over other eastern coastal and inland regions. These water 
transporting facilities make significant contribution to the narrow sense of YRD’s 
export value which accounts for more than one third of the national total outputs 
according to table 10. All of the above-mentioned improvements to YRD’s 
transportation network shall not be stated without mentioning the constitutive role of 
local authorities as construction organisers and fundraisers. The following section 
will reinforce the need to consider the role of local politics in the functional 
transformation of the YRD. 
 
5.3.4.2 The spatial shifting of Wuxi’s chemical industries 
According to Jiangsu Government Information Centre data, textiles, 
electromechanical and chemical manufacturing enterprises are three of the main 
inclusions in the relocation trend towards northern Jiangsu by 2006. The data 
illustrates that the withdrawal of chemical manufacturing industries from the core 
YRD already happened before 2007. For the YRD, Wuxi is one of its greatest GDP 
contributors and the chemical manufacturing industry plays a significant role in this 
contribution. There was an important decision to be made by Wuxi government in 
2007 as they chose to accelerate the withdrawal process of its own chemical 
manufacturing industries as a result of the algae blooming in Taihu Lake. 
As table 9 discloses, Wuxi is the second strongest GDP generator in Jiangsu 
province, following only Suzhou. According to the Wuxi government’s document of 
‘chemical industries’ control planning for 2010-2012’, chemical manufacturing is one 
of the giant industries by focusing on fine chemicals and new materials in Wuxi. 
Wuxi’s chemical industry generated approximately 100 billion Yuan output annually 
by 2007, as 13.6% and 1.6% of Jiangsu and China’s whole chemical industries’ 
outputs respectively. Since Wuxi’s yearly GDP for 2007 was no more than 400 billion 
Yuan, the chemical industry was making up almost one quarter of its entire economic 
output.  
However, between May and June 2007, as a result of the blue algae blooming in 
Jiangsu Taihu Lake, the water was no longer drinkable for a certain period of time. 
Although there is still much disagreement about the primary cause of the blue algae 
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blooming, the industrial sewage which comes from surrounding cities, Wuxi in 
particular, has been recognised by Wuxi government as one of the important 
pollution sources. This critical event triggered one of the largest withdrawals of the 
chemical manufacturing industries in Wuxi. During 2007, the algae blooming in 
Jiangsu Taihu Lake drew particular attention not only from local provincial and 
municipal governments, but also the central authority. The former premier of the 
central State Council, Jiabao Wen, made a special visit to Taihu Lake and Wuxi’s 
chemical enterprises after the event happened. An emergency meeting was called 
and organised by Jiabao Wen for discussing with local political officers about how to 
handle this particular event. The central State Council’s visit left Wuxi government a 
strong sign of the need to prevent the event from generating more potential harm to 
the local environment. As a result, apart from sending specialists to fish the blue 
algae out of Taihu Lake, Wuxi government paid serious attention to their own 
chemical industries.  
 
Table 12: Wuxi's GDP for the year 2007, 2009 and 2012 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Wuxi Chemical 
Industries’ 
Output 
(￥’billion) 
 
About 100 / About 100 / / About 110 
Number of 
chemical 
enterprises 
 
2955 / 1654 / / Less than 
1500 
Wuxi GDP 
(￥’billion) 
 
385.800 441.950 499.172 575.800 688.015 756.815 
Primary 
Industry 
 
5.500 6.300 9.362 10.494 12.298 13.722 
Secondary 
Industry 
 
225.600 254.657 283.638 320.879 372.812 401.203 
Tertiary 
Industry 
 
154.700 180.993 206.172 244.427 302.905 341.890 
Source: Compiled from Wuxi Government’s Statistical Reports 
 
Moreover, as a local government officer mentioned in the interview, “the Energy 
Consumption for Every Ten Thousand Yuan GDP (WanyuanGDP Nenghao) would 
become a part of the political assessment system soon in this year or next” (Chief 
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Officer of Yixing Economic and Information Technology Commission (EITC), 
interview, 6th July 2013). Such modification of the existing political assessment 
system means even more challenges for the operation of manufacturing industries 
which consume significant amounts of water, electricity and other physical resources 
in the YRD’s core area around Shanghai, which is seen as the manufacturing base.  
According to the Wuxi government’s document of ‘Chemical Industries’ Control 
Planning for 2010-2012’, by the end of 2009, 1301 of 2955 chemical enterprises in 
Wuxi had either been shut down or sent away to Northern Jiangsu or Anhui, which 
were still operating sloppy environment provisions. The Wuxi government 
compensates those enterprises that choose to shut the operation or move the 
production base out of Wuxi by employing several different approaches. According to 
the statement of a business leader in Wuxi, such compensations include,  
“firstly, purchasing their chemical business operating licences back at a 
variable rate on the basis of their business scale and annual output; secondly, 
buying the industrial land which their factory occupies; and thirdly returning 
the business tax charged for the last three to five years” (A business leader in 
Wuxi, interview, 7 August 2013).  
Within the local political intervention, it is interesting to see that “the Wuxi 
government sent away or shut down the comparatively smaller companies but chose 
to retain the chemical giants, such as Sanmu Group which not only supply to 
consumers in mainland China but also export to the global market” (A business 
leader in Wuxi, interview, 7 August 2013).  
This is the local government’s reaction towards the pressure that resulted from the 
remaining GDP-led political assessment. For the relatively larger scale chemical 
companies, in particular those which have the capability of upgrading their R&D 
capacity, environment protection devices and production lines, what they need to 
change is paying more attention to reduce their harm to the local environment, i.e. 
reduction of industrial inflow to Taihu Lake in particular, and shift their output focus to 
the high-technological production from the low value chain in exchange for their stay 
in Wuxi. At the same time, Northern Jiangsu and Anhui cities actively engaged in 
order to attract chemical investments by promising preferential provisions, such as 
firstly, corporate tax free for the first three years and half corporate tax for the next 
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three years; and secondly, VAT free for the first year and half VAT for another year, 
etc. These preferential treatments may vary depending on each local government’s 
extent of interest in attracting such investment.  
Overall, what is emerging from the recent spatially shifting trend relating to traditional 
manufacturing industries in the larger version of YRD is what Scott (2001b: 818) 
explains at the beginning of this century as “dense urban agglomerations continue to 
increase in size and importance” on the basis of “the network arrangements and 
relational interdependencies that constitute the basic structure of organized 
economic and social life”. Interviews with local business leaders disclose that their 
relocation decisions are closely tied their commercial considerations, for instance, 
the comparative level of production costs of the core YRD around Shanghai and its 
contiguous less-developed area and business operation context in terms of local 
communities’ requirement for reducing environmental footprints and local 
environmental regulations. Therefore, market forces are essential for triggering the 
shifting process which then results in the changing relations among cities in the 
broad sense of YRD.  
However, what makes the study of Wuxi’s chemical industries important here is that 
this case discloses the fact that local jurisdictional authorities, such as provincial and 
municipal governments, are actively involved in the operation of local functional 
activities. Firstly, local governments, which in our case include both the Wuxi 
government and peripheral municipal governments, accelerate the existing market-
triggered trend of relocating manufacturing industries which otherwise would take a 
longer period to complete. Even more importantly, the involvement of provincial and 
municipal governments in the YRD’s networked governance relating to both the 
improvement of mega city-regional transportation and regular interactive events, 
such as face-to-face meetings, forums and conferences, ensures the economic 
relations are formulated among cities which belong to the YRD’s provincial 
jurisdictions, i.e. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, rather than other peripheral 
administrative areas. Such important ‘discursive processes’ (McGuirk, 2004) 
facilitate the information exchange among YRD’s cities and then highlight the 
attractiveness of potential destinations for labour-intensive manufacturing industries. 
Hence, just as Jonas and Ward (2007: 173) argued, “city-regions ought to be 
conceptualised as contingent products of practical acts of political construction and, 
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therefore, as necessarily variable according to political interests and thus 
indeterminate territorial formations”. Consequently, it is crucial to recognise the 
constitutive role of territorial politics out of the state-controlled scalar origination in 
constructing the contingent outcome of the YRD’s mega city-regionalism.  
Secondly, the nation state is, more or less, retaining its superior influence over local 
affairs. The central State Council’s signal of implementing stricter environmental 
regulation over local functional activities after the 2007 blue algae blooming in Taihu 
Lake, assessment of local political performance in terms of GDP and the Energy 
Consumption for Every Ten Thousand Yuan GDP (WanyuanGDP Nenghao) are all 
making an impact on local governments’ decisions relating to the local economic 
development in the YRD. From this perspective, indeed, “city-regions are not the 
quasi-autonomous political-economic spaces many proponents of the new city-
regionalism would have us believe” (Harrison, 2015b: 36). Nevertheless, we shall 
also not overlook that it is local governments’ choice about how to react towards the 
above-mentioned central policies in the middle of the YRD’s mega city-regionalism.  
For instance, Wuxi government sent away or shut down the comparatively smaller 
companies but chose to retain the chemical giants. It is local government’s decision 
about how to shape the mega city-regionalism in the context of local economic and 
political circumstances, and central policies. Constructing mega city-regional 
governance is therefore a process that has involved hierarchical relations within the 
state scalar organisation, discursive rendering of horizontal relations, and “active 
mobilisation by a range of actors pursuing strategic spatial interests” (Jonas and 
Ward, 2007: 173; Jonas, 2013; McGuirk, 2004). 
 
5.4 Conclusion: Enlarged mega city-region as a contingent geopolitical 
outcome  
Cities expansion into mega city-regions under the supervision of political authorities 
is evident in the case of the YRD’s recent spatial transformation. This chapter has 
examined the spatially enlarging process from the narrow sense to the broad sense 
of the YRD through exploring the spatial transformation of traditional manufacturing 
enterprises. In contrast to the previous ‘centrally orchestrated’ commanded 
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arrangement of the Shanghai EZPO, two more recent attempts at conceptualising 
the YRD relating to intra-regional socio-economic linkages and cross-territorial 
political interests are both ‘bottom-up’ reactions to the changing economic-political 
contexts on a voluntary basis. By focusing on the YRD’s spatially enlarging process, 
this chapter illustrates the political contribution in expanding the mega city-regional 
functional spaces to cover three entire provincial jurisdictions.  
This chapter has justified that extending socio-economic linkages and cross-
territorial political consensus associated with both provincial and prefectural 
governments constitute two crucial characteristics of the YRD’s enlarged mega city-
regionalism. Institutional interaction has been built and operated by local authorities 
as a ‘tool’ for exchanging locational political interests and then reinforcing inter-city 
functional relations on the basis of cross-territorial consensus. In specific, the YRD 
CAUE, as an essential part of the mega city-regional governance framework, is able 
to act as a platform for involved local governments to conduct continuous interaction 
in the form of regular face-to-face meetings, forums and conferences.  
What becomes important about this institutional arrangement is that such geopolitical 
connections firstly facilitate the economic transition towards high technological 
manufacturing and service industries in the core YRD around Shanghai, and 
secondly ensure traditional labour-intensive manufacturing industries can relocate 
from the core YRD into the surrounding less-developed peripheral area and more 
importantly remain in the same provincial territories, including Northern Jiangsu and 
Southern Zhejiang. To achieve this, the YRD’s collective governance is able to, firstly 
promote the infrastructural construction projects relating to cross-jurisdictional 
transportation which is crucial for labour-intensive manufacturing industries; and 
secondly highlight the attractiveness of the potential destination over other peripheral 
administrative areas for traditional labour-intensive manufacturing industries through 
improving the information exchange among YRD’s cities. This is the advantage of 
being part of constant cross-jurisdictional interaction which local governments are 
able to take from engaging with the institutional arrangement at the mega city-
regional scale. 
According to Cheshire and Magrini (2009), “there is general recognition that the best 
performing cities are those where local government boundaries are most closely 
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matched to the functional geography of the local economy” (cited in Harrison, 2010: 
313). Following this perspective, what becomes interesting about the YRD’s mega 
city-regionalism is the YRD’s functional space has been expanded to cover three 
entire provincial jurisdictions under the lead of local and provincial political authorities. 
The wish of three provincial governments to extend the existing functional relations 
from the ‘15+1’ version of the YRD into the less-developed areas of provincial 
jurisdiction is evidently in accordance with the mega city-regional governmental 
agenda. The political participation not only accelerates the existing functional 
transformation, but also organises the agglomeration of socio-economic activities, in 
our case traditional labour-intensive manufacturing industries, in the provincial 
jurisdictions, which matches the enlarged mega city-regional space with extant 
political jurisdictions. 
In the case of the YRD, it is not enough to solely rely on socio-economic relations to 
shape and extend a mega city-regional space. Rather, we shall pay more attention to 
the political contribution in delimiting a visible spatial scope for our mental concept of 
the mega city-region. Institutional interaction among locational political authorities 
ensures various territorial interests to be exchanged and then reflected in the 
collective decision-making across a group of different political territories. The 
reflection of various territorial interests in the mega city-regional governmental 
agenda is fundamental for encouraging local political authorities to enforce collective 
decisions in the local territorial administration as volunteers in the absence of 
statutory support. Therefore, reflecting on Jonas’ (2012: 268) recommendation of 
“perhaps the problem hitherto with relational thinking around regions has been a 
tendency to overemphasise territorial politics as a response to external flows and 
mobility and, correspondingly, to underemphasise internal territorial interests, 
constraints and problems of immobility”, we emphasise the dynamic territorial politics 
which largely follow their own political interests as one of constitutive actors in 
shaping and re-shaping mega city-regional space.  
Furthermore and according to Brenner (2009: 134),  
“the rescaling of state power never entails the creation of a ‘blank slate’ on 
which totally new scalar arrangements could be established, but occurs 
through a conflictual ‘layering’ process in which emergent rescaling strategies 
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collide with, and only partially rework inherited landscapes of state scalar 
organisation”.  
It shall be noted that the collective governance at the mega city-regional level still 
needs to react to the national interest. For instance, this chapter illustrates that local 
governments are currently accelerating traditional labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries’ spatial shifting process by following the central State Council’s advice 
relating to emerging environmental issues. It is also their local decision to retain the 
chemical giants in their prefectural jurisdiction while sending away or shutting down 
the comparatively smaller companies. One of their fundamental challenges is to deal 
with a centrally-controlled assessment system for local political achievements, which 
contains combined elements of GDP growth and energy consumption (measured per 
every ten thousand Yuan GDP).  
More importantly, both provincial and prefectural governments hold the primary 
responsibility to organise and regulate socio-economic activities in their political 
territories amid the YRD’s mega city-regionalism. It is always their decision how to 
flexibly respond to the national state’s interests and supervision based on local 
socio-economic and political contexts. The key point here is the strategic relation 
among different scales of governments within the state scalar organisation. 
Therefore, it is crucial for mega city-regional research to collect detailed empirical 
evidence about how “territorial politics inside the competition state shape city-
regional institutions and politics ‘from below’” (Jonas, 2013: 287).  
Overall, geopolitics is a constitutive actor for shaping and reshaping a mega city-
regional space through assembling a number of various cities and their regions 
based on socio-economic connections. It is essential for locational territorial interests 
and national impacts to be engaged and reflected in the cross-territorial collective 
decision-making. The research into the spatial transformation of long-existing labour-
intensive manufacturing industries across the enlarged YRD’s spatial scope provided 
empirical evidence for explaining why it has been a contingent geopolitical outcome 
to match the functional space with administrative jurisdictions at a new spatial scale. 
The result is we have been delivered a ‘visible’ mega city-regional space for 
conducting collective governance. The next chapter is going to provide more details 
about how this outcome has been achieved through establishing political consensus, 
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and more importantly how the operation of cross-territorial governance has improved 
the YRD’s wealth and well-being at a sustainable path.  
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Chapter 6: Ongoing Geopolitical Dynamics: A Case Study of the 
YRD’s Collective Governance and Sustained Competitiveness  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Competitiveness has been highlighted as “the means by which regional economies 
are externally validated in an era of globalization” (Bristow, 2005: 285).  But how to 
improve city-regional competitiveness is such a complex discourse resulting in much 
research and debate amongst scholars and regulatory institutions (e.g. Bristow, 2005; 
Huggins and Davies, 2006; Gardiner, 2003; European Commission, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014; IEAS, China Association of Mayors and UN-Habitat, 2012). While 
it is not this chapter’s aim to explore the meaning of regional competitiveness, it is 
critical to understand that the competitiveness of a region, such as the Yangtze River 
Delta, depends on its “ability to anticipate and successfully adapt to internal and 
external economic and social challenges, by providing new economic opportunities” 
(Huggins and Davies, 2006: 1). 
In this way, mega city-regional governance has long been claimed to “promote those 
local levels of efficiency, productivity and competitiveness that markets alone can 
never fully secure” (Scott, 2001b: 822). Indeed, Chinese mega city-regional 
networked governance and institutional arrangements have been an important focus 
in contemporary urban and regional debates (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2008, 2009; Lin, 
2014; Wang, 2008; Wang, 2009; Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011; Zhang and Wu, 2006; 
Zhang, 2006). We have seen a variety of focuses in favour of administrative 
annexation around the main urban authority (Zhang and Wu, 2006), regional 
collaboration (Zhang, 2006; Lin, 2014), the centrally or provincially orchestrated 
mega city-regional plan (e.g. Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2011), and institutional 
interaction among prefectural governments (Luo and Shen, 2008, 2009). Much of 
this work focuses on the final product of the emerging rescaling process of state 
governance and then examines whether such an arrangement is able to facilitate 
socio-economic integration across political boundaries. In contrast, Luo and Shen 
(2008) stress that investigating the geopolitical bargaining process before the cross-
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territorial consensus and their finalised arrangement shall be key for understanding 
why many regional plans cannot be enforced in the local agenda.  
Relating this to my second research objective, the structure of the YRD’s current 
mega city-regional governance framework has experienced two decades of evolution 
since 1992. According to the 2010 YRD regional plan, the primary aim of organising 
this cross-territorial collective governance is to enhance the YRD’s competitiveness 
as one integrated entity. The framework enables the interactions among provincial 
and prefectural governments to be advocated and institutionalised in favour of 
improving cross-jurisdictional functional connections, after 2003 in particular. Zhang 
(2006) explains why it is becoming more urgent than ever for promoting inter-city 
cooperation, and coordinated planning and governance at the mega city-regional 
level since 2003: firstly, the eastern coastal region around Shanghai is largely losing 
the previous central support, including funds and favoured policies, for promoting 
economic growth in the eastern coastal area. Following the change of Chinese 
presidential leadership in 2003, there has been an apparent transformation of central 
interest from economic efficiency to national equality across the national space. In 
terms of improving economic efficiency, “the policy of letting the capable get rich 
faster was a typical example” (Zhang, 2006: 48). Previous focus on economic 
efficiency was then quickly replaced by seeking national equality among the 
developed eastern, developing middle and underdeveloped western China. As a 
consequence, centrally orchestrated programmes of ‘Rising mid-China’ and 
‘Developing the West’ became prominent during the transformation.  
Secondly, the threat of external competition for attracting capital investments has 
become more serious than ever for the YRD’s cities, and hence has started to shift 
local governments’ attention away from the intra-regional competition. The rise of 
other Asian developing countries, such as Vietnam, is challenging the attractiveness 
of the YRD for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a traditional manufacturing base. 
Therefore, the YRD is facing the need to “improve their productivity and marketing 
skill and make smarter investments in infrastructure, because low-cost labour alone 
is not enough to enable them to compete internationally” (Zhang, 2006: 50). Under 
this circumstance, Shanghai is in the right position for leading and assisting YRD’s 
economic upgrade towards high-technological manufacturing and service industries 
as a regional service centre.  
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Finally, even at the stage of largely losing central support, Shanghai is still one of the 
centralities of Chinese socio-economic development within the global economic 
network. It was crucial for surrounding cities to remain in interaction with Shanghai. 
For example, Shanghai hosting World Expo 2010 generated a huge incentive for 
regional cooperation about the development of tourism across the entire YRD, and 
successfully accelerated the evolving process of the mega city-regional governance 
framework including the increased frequency of inter-local government meetings and 
the announcement of regional agreement (‘Guidance about Accelerating the 
Integration of YRD’s Urban Network by Using the World Expo Event as a Starting 
Point’ (Guanyuyichengban shibohui weiqiji, jiakuai changsanjiao 
chengshiliandongfazhan deyijian).  
Hence, the establishment of the YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference in 
1992, which later became known as YRD Coordination Association of Urban 
Economies (YRD CAUE), became the initial step of institutionalising the cross-
territorial interaction and subsequent collective governance among provincial and 
prefectural authorities for the YRD’s three-level framework. After two decades of 
institutional evolution, a three-level governance framework exists in the YRD at the 
mega city-regional level. To centrally reinforce the cross-territorial integration, the 
YRD regional plan has been issued by the central State Council as a comprehensive 
guidance. It is then crucial for this chapter to analyse this regional plan because its 
planning provisions, more or less, reflect the political consensus among provincial 
and prefectural governments in relation to the spatially coordinated development 
across three provincial territories.  
The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine how the YRD’s three-level framework 
has united as many aspects of territorial interests as possible, step-by-step, during 
the past decades through looking at its institutional transformation. Detailed empirical 
data are provided in relation to all scales of the governance framework and cross-
territorial collective decision-making. Following this perspective, I argue that the 
current three-level framework has the capability to identify and adapt to emerging 
challenges in accordance with changing economic-political contexts. Responding to 
our second research objective, this chapter concludes that the contemporary mega 
city-regional governance and relevant institutional arrangement is able to enhance 
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the YRD’s socio-economic competitiveness as an integrated entity at a sustainable 
path.  
After this introductory part, this chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 6.2 
introduces the structure of the YRD’s current three-level governance model with 
details about the main responsibilities at each level. For this section, the importance 
of the YRD’s governance framework will be illustrated by firstly exploring its ongoing 
construction process and secondly explaining the differences between the past 
Shanghai EZPO and this contemporary arrangement. Section 6.3 investigates the 
centrally-recommended primary challenge facing the YRD’s city-regionalism by 
reviewing the YRD regional plan, and how a substantial part of planning provisions 
have been engaged or achieved by city-regional coordinated governance. Section 
6.4 discusses the YRD’s current capability of identifying and reacting to the realised 
challenges. Finally, section 6.5 will integrate all the findings into a conclusion which 
argues geopolitical mega city-regionalism as an ongoing but conflicted process. 
 
6.2 The emergence of the YRD’s mega city-regional governance framework  
The establishment of the YRD’s mega city-regional governance framework is not a 
task to be completed in one-day. On the contrary, to begin with the founding of the 
YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference in 1992, the current structure of the 
framework has experienced constant expansion and restructuration during the last 
two decades until the framework became comprised of the constitution which we are 
looking at today in 2009. At this moment, the framework consisted of three scalar 
compositions including the decision-making level, coordination level and execution 
level in the top-down hierarchical order. All three levels were organised to become 
integrated into the hierarchical governance framework following the lead of three 
provincial governments, i.e. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, by the end of 2008. 
Two constitutional documents include ‘The Framework of YRD Regional Cooperation 
and Development Joint Conference’ (Changsanjiaodiqu hezuoyufazhan 
lianxihuiyizhidu) and ‘The Framework of YRD Key Cooperative Task Groups’ 
(Changsanjiaodiqu zhongdianhezuozhuantizu gongzuozhidu) were issued by the 
coordination level to institutionalise the three-level framework for the YRD’s mega 
city-regional governance in 2009.  
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6.2.1 The decision-making level (Juececeng) 
The decision-making level is the arrangement for the networked governance among 
the provincial officials, which is also termed as ‘YRD Chief Officials’ Meeting’. Hence 
it was operated by provincial governors, provincial party committee secretaries and 
deputy secretaries from each of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The decision-
making level is responsible for setting the major cooperative direction, overall aim 
and principles for the YRD’s annual networked development. The first meeting was 
scheduled in 2004. It signals that the networked governance started stepping into the 
trans-provincial vision. Anhui’s chief officials acquired the acceptance of being a part 
of the decision-making level from the original YRD leading group in 2008.  
 
6.2.2 The coordination level (Xietiaoceng) 
The coordination level is the vice-provincial officials’ alliance mechanism. It is also 
termed ‘YRD Cooperation and Development Joint Conference’. The vice-provincial 
governors of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are involved in this level. The 
coordination level was born in 2001 with the original aim to promote trans-territorial 
economic activities and to formalise the structure of the entire mega city-regional 
governance model. It looked for the transition from conversational to institutional 
connections among Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang before the framework was 
formally constructed. Now its main task is formulating the overall aims for the trans-
jurisdictional cooperation in order to answer for the decision-level’s annual strategic 
aim. Anhui’s vice-provincial governor joined the coordination level meeting in 2008.  
 
6.2.3 The execution level (Zhixingceng) 
Finally, the execution level is responsible for working out the plans to meet the 
targets set by the upper two levels mentioned above. In short, the execution level 
could be summarised as the ‘N+1’, where N means a variety of specific task groups 
and 1 stands for the YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economies (YRD 
CAUE).  
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The number of task groups continuously change on the basis of the three-level 
framework’s consideration of mega city-regional integration. According to the 2008 
YRD Chief Officials’ Meeting in Zhejiang’s Ningbo, the number of task groups was 
expanded to ten, which include transportation, energy, information, science and 
technology, environment protection, credit system, social security, finance, external 
service, business administration; and 1 means the YRD CAUE. Each task group 
chairs the cooperation and trans-municipal activities in its specific thematic area. 
They are the units taking the responsibility for making the actions happen in the YRD. 
The members of each task group include the local corresponding and other related 
departments. The head of each provincial corresponding department takes the 
position of the task group leader (see (L) in table 1), and other involved departmental 
officials fill the role of other group members.   
 
Table 13: The State Department Members of Each Task Group (2009) 
Task Groups Group Members of State Bureaus and 
Commission Members 
 
Tasks 
Transportation Transport Authority (L); Civil Aviation 
Administration; 
1. Railway and Highway transporting 
network construction; 
2. Regional ports’ Coordinative Planning; 
3. Airlines management; 
4. Regional transportation planning; 
 
Energy Development and Reform Commission (DRC) 
(L); Economic and Information Technology 
Commission (EITC); Science and Technology; 
Land and Resource; Environmental Protection; 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development; 
Transport; Electricity Regulatory Commission; 
Electricity; 
 
1. Development of green and renewable 
energy; 
2. Regional transportation and storage of 
petrol, natural gas and coal; 
3. Electricity transporting, nuclear wind 
power development; 
Information EITC (L); DRC; Science and Technology; 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development; 
Transport; Radio Film and Television; 
1. Establishing YRD information regional 
standard and data share system; 
2. Improving network infrastructure, i.e. 
telecommunication, radio and TV, 
Internet; 
3. Regional information infrastructure 
Construction; 
4. A number of specific programs, i.e. 
enterprises information system, public 
information service and traffic 
information service, etc.; 
 
Science and 
Technology 
Science and Technology Authority (L); DRC; 
EITC; Education; Finance; Human Resource and 
Social Security; State Administration of Taxation; 
Local Tax Bureau; Financial Service Office; 
Trade Union; 
 
1. Regional technology innovation; 
2. Construction of regional technology and 
knowledge share system; 
3. Improvement of intellectual property 
right protection; 
Environmental 
Protection 
Environmental Protection Authority (L); DRC; 
EITC; Finance; Land and Resource; Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development; Water Resource; 
Agriculture; Forestry; Ocean and Fishery; 
1. Controlling river and Lake pollution; 
2. Controlling regional industrial pollution; 
3. Treatment for household garbage; 
4. Controlling non-point source pollution in 
rural areas; 
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5. Drinking water protection; 
6. Preventing soil and water loss at the 
regional level; 
7. Forest development; 
8. Reducing the maritime environment 
pollution; 
 
Credit Credit Authority (L), DRC, Public Security, State 
Administration of Taxation, Local Tax Bureau, 
Industry and Commerce, Quality and 
Technology Supervision, Financial Service 
Office, The People’s Bank of China, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission; 
 
1. Establishing the regional standard of 
Entrepreneurial and individual credibility; 
2. Establishing the regional economic and 
financial data share system; 
Social Security Social Security Authority (L), DRC, Civil Affairs, 
Health; 
1. Establishing the regional employment 
standard, i.e. equal pay and relevant 
other treatments, and access to jobs; 
2. Improving both of rural and urban social 
welfare system; 
3. Protecting the migrant workers’ rights; 
4. Regulating the regional social insurance; 
 
Finance Provincial Financial Authority (L), DRC, EITC, 
Education, Human Resource and Social 
Security, Agriculture, Commerce, The People’s 
Bank of China, State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission; 
 
1. Improving and regulating the financial 
service industry; 
2. Improving the financial reform; 
3. Encouraging the expansion of 
commercial banks’ overseas business 
activities; 
4. Improving the rural financial service; 
5. Establishing the rural financial system; 
External 
Service 
Commercial Authority (L), DRC, EITC, Finance, 
Land and Resource, Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development, State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, Financial 
Service Office, State Administration of Taxation, 
Local Tax Bureau, Industry and Commerce, 
Quality and Technology Supervision, State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, Custom 
Administration, Inspection and Quarantine; 
 
1. Upgrading the structure of importing and 
exporting sectors, i.e. changing from low 
value to high value products; 
2. Establishing the regional standard 
investment environment for foreign 
investment; 
3. Promoting the Chinese enterprises’ 
oversea investment; 
Business 
Administration 
Industry and Commerce Authority (L), DRC, 
EITC, Science and Technology, Finance, Human 
Resource and Social Security, State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, State Administration of Taxation, 
Local Tax Bureau, Quality and Technology 
Supervision, Legislative Affairs Office, Financial 
Service Office; 
 
1. Establishing the regional common 
market; 
2. Cancelling the government policy barrier 
for the regional common market; 
3. Establishing the regional standard for 
market access and technical norms, i.e. 
regional quality certification standard; 
4. Regional tax management 
Source: Jiangsu Development and Reform Commission (2013) 
 
Another half of the execution level is the YRD CAUE which is considered to be the 
eldest component of the framework. As chapter 5 mentioned, the YRD CAUE was 
formerly known as the YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference which was led 
by fourteen YRD cities since 1992. It was a communication-focused arrangement 
which involved each city’s Planning and Economy Committee concentrating on the 
exchange of economic data and regulatory experience among the city states.  
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Table 14: YRD Economic Coordination Association (YRD CAUE) 
 Time Location Focus Task at Mega City-Regional 
Vision 
 
Published Statement 
1. 28th-30th April 
1997 
Yangzhou 1. Tourism; 
2. Commerce; 
 
YRD CAUE constitution 
2. 6th – 7th May 
1999 
Hangzhou 1. Science and Technology; 
2. Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises and Asset 
Reorganisation; 
3. Building Online Information 
Exchange System; 
4. Tourism; 
5. Commerce; 
/ 
3. 26th – 28th April 
2001 
Shaoxing 1. Formalising the Task Group 
Framework; 
2. Tourism; 
 
/ 
4. 15th – 16th 
August 2003 
Nanjing 1. The 2010 World Expo in 
Shanghai; 
2. Intra-Regional Integration in 
YRD; 
3. Taizhou2 joins the YRD CAUE; 
 
By Using the World Expo Event as 
a Start Point, Further Pushing the 
YRD’s Coordinated Development 
5. 2nd November 
2004 
Shanghai 1. Regional Governance 
Framework; 
2. Regional Cooperation; 
 
YRD City Cooperation Agreement 
6. 22nd October 
2005 
Nantong 1. The YRD Logistic Integration; 
2. Enhancing the YRD 
Competitiveness; 
 
1. The Amendment of 
YRD Constitution; 
2. YRD Inter-City 
Cooperation Agreement 
(Nantong) 
 
7. 24th November 
2006 
Taizhou 1. The YRD Regional Plan; 
2. Enhancing the YRD’s 
Competitiveness in the Global 
Economy; 
 
YRD Inter-City Cooperation 
Agreement (Taizhou) 
8. 11th December 
2007 
Changzhou 1. Promoting Intra-Regional 
Integration; 
2. Improving and Formalising the 
YRD Governance Model; 
 
YRD Inter-City Cooperation 
Agreement (Changzhou) 
9. 27th March 
2009 
Huzhou 1. State Council’s ‘The Guidance 
on Further Pushing the Reform 
and Open Process and the 
Development of Society and 
Economy in YRD’; 
2. Facing the Economic Crisis; 
3. Pushing the Regional 
Cooperation; 
 
YRD Inter-City Cooperation 
Agreement (Huzhou) 
10. 26th March 
2010 
Jiaxing 1. Six new members for the YRD 
CAUE; 
2. Medical Insurance Cooperation; 
3. Financial Cooperation; 
4. Exhibition Cooperation; 
5. Establishment of Trans-
Regional Industrial Park; 
6. Intra-regional Off-site Pension 
System; 
7. The integration and Upgrade of 
Modern Logistics; 
 
YRD Inter-City Cooperation 
Agreement (Jiaxing) 
Source: Compiled from Luo (2011) and NDRC’s data 
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In responding to the concern of not being able to contribute much to the formal inter-
states functional cooperation, the comparative low level committee network was 
upgraded in terms of regulation and participants. In 1997, after acquiring the 
acceptance of institutional change from all of the city members, the YRD CAUE was 
founded to replace the previous informal arrangement in order to promote the trans-
jurisdictional functional linkages while keeping all fourteen city members in the 
administrative network.  
After the more recent 2013 expansion, the number of YRD CAUE’s city members 
has reached thirty to include three entire provincial territories, i.e. Shanghai, Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang, and five municipalities in Anhui. This is a mega city-regional institution 
which is responsible for formulating networked governance under the control of the 
mayors of all of the member cities. Shanghai has been chosen for filling the role of 
the permanent supervisory president and operating the association’s liaison office, 
named The Regional Cooperation and Exchange Office of Shanghai Municipal 
Government, as a part of the Shanghai government. In addition, there is an 
executive president rotating among all the association members and bearing the 
main duty of chairing the institutional regular meeting. By contrast with the previous 
informal arrangement, the YRD CAUE has been institutionalised by its own 
constitution. At the moment, the major responsibility of the YRD CAUE is covering 
the particular trans-municipal cooperative concern which is not covered by any task 
group or engages with a mixed range of task groups.  
 
6.2.4 The ongoing geopolitical mega city-regionalism 
The three-level governance framework is tailored by a group of local governments to 
collectively manage functional relations across the three provincial territories in the 
YRD. Before the framework, the circumstance of YRD covering three provincial 
jurisdictions generated significant concerns about the emerging impact of 
administrative division on local economic activities. The administrative separation 
challenged the geopolitical coherence of the YRD. According to a researcher who 
was involved in the formulation stage for the YRD regional plan,  
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“the PRD wholly remains within Guangdong province, so the provincial 
government could simply take the role of supervisor for facilitating the trans-
municipal activities, which is not going to happen to the YRD” (A researcher 
from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), interview, 12th July 
2013).  
For our case of the YRD, only the central government is able to facilitate the 
cooperation among a group of local governments which are not locating in one single 
provincial territory.  
Additionally, there has been a long tradition for Chinese economic activities 
operating in the context of geopolitical ‘localism’. Liu Junde’s (2006) definition of 
‘Administrative Region Economy’ recognised that the boundaries of local political 
jurisdictions were delimiting the scale of local functional activities at the expense of 
trans-jurisdictional economic coherence after the Chinese 1978 economic reform. 
Based on his research, the administrative boundary, in particular the provincial 
boundary, used to become a visible barrier for local functional activities within each 
administrative jurisdiction. Although urban economic growth continued at a 
comparatively rapid rate in China after the 1978 economic reform, the existence of 
‘localism’ raised issues of economic fragmentation and inefficiency. According to Xu 
and Yeh (2011: 216), such evident issues resulted in  
“increasing subsidies and giveaways to investors, inefficient and 
uncoordinated duplication and oversupply of infrastructure, facilities, and 
services, overriding diversion of scare public resources away from 
environmental and social concerns to economic growth”. 
In the 1990s local governments in the YRD started to pay more attention to shifting 
their managerial behaviour from building ‘localism’ to improving functional 
connections with surrounding jurisdictions as a result of the incoming global 
investments through Shanghai and improving economic connections among different 
local administrative areas. Hence the initial arrangement of networked governance 
across Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang emerged, which was prompted by local 
governments for enhancing horizontal functional relations; for instance, the 
emergence of YRD Economic Cooperation Joint Conference in 1992.  
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The early horizontal interaction among the YRD’s component municipal governments 
at that moment remained limited, for example, to exchanges of economic information 
and regulatory experiences relating to the management of local functional activities; 
and there was little further in depth cooperation (Luo, 2011; Yu, 2011). Moreover, it 
was each city’s Planning and Economy Committee sending their officials to operate 
this conference framework every year. This was a relatively much lower level of 
official meeting in comparison with the later mayors and provincial governors’ 
conference. The conference which was organised by the committee from each local 
urban government had neither the intention nor sufficient authority to continuously 
push the trans-municipal coordination in depth for many specific tasks.  
By the end of the 1990s, single administrative jurisdictions were no longer an 
appropriate basis for attracting and containing the emerging functional activities. 
Local governments’ past experience of actively restricting economic activities within 
their own administrative boundaries became an obstacle to sustaining the previous 
spectacular economic growth in the face of accelerating urbanisation and economic 
integration. Therefore, the expansion of economic activities at the larger territorial 
scale increased considerations of coordinated governance among local governments 
and required local authorities to pay even more attention to the city-centric regional 
affairs which were difficult for the previous inter-committees communication and 
information exchange to cover. Specifically, the need for relieving the impact of 
political territorial division over economic coherence within YRD’s scope significantly 
increased. Both external and internal challenges generated increased demand for a 
more formal, regular and effective framework of city-centric regional governance 
replacing the previous informal arrangement. Consequently, the change of 
governance model became a crucial and urgent task for local governments in the 
YRD. This resulted in the continuous expansion and re-structuration of the three-
level governance framework for more than one decade, which began with the 
establishment of YRD CAUE in 1997.  
The re-emergence of the cross-jurisdictional governance arrangement in the YRD 
shall not be seen as repeating its historical path of ‘centrally orchestrated’ Shanghai 
EZPO. There are significant differences between the past Shanghai EZPO and the 
current three-level governance framework. The first perspective is rather similar to 
Harrison and Hoyler’s (2014) recommendation as,  
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“It is important to distinguish between coalitions of the willing vis-à-vis 
coalitions of the obliged. The former identifies those urban-regional spaces 
where actors, recognising the need to consolidate fragmented planning and 
governance arrangements, set about forming a loose development coalition 
without prescription. By contrast the latter refers to those spaces where actors 
have never sought, … but who have been compelled to act as a direct 
response to the growing orthodoxy surrounding city-region governance, itself 
manifest in more formalised policy prescription and new state spatial 
strategies” (Harrison and Hoyler, 2014: 6). 
In comparison with the Shanghai EZPO which was engaged and operated under the 
command of central State Council, the current three-level governance framework in 
the YRD is voluntarily prompted by local authorities to collectively manage cross-
jurisdictional activities. This is critical for ensuring the governance mechanism to be 
constructed uniquely as meeting most needs and thus be able to function effectively 
in the long term. 
Therefore and here is the second point, which is similar to the distinction drawn by 
Harrison (2008) between ‘centrally orchestrated regionalism’ and ‘regionally 
orchestrated centralism’: The Shanghai EZPO was constructed by the central State 
Council as its regional representation which was able to receive the devolution of 
central power in the YRD. It was the Shanghai EZPO’s responsibility to embed 
central political interests and tasks into the YRD’s mega city-regionalism. For the 
stage at which both local provincial and municipal governments chose to concentrate 
on growing each jurisdiction’s economic growth by attracting and retaining economic 
investments within their political boundaries, it was not surprising to witness that the 
divergence between central and local governments’ respective understandings of 
local economic context and political administration was driving the Shanghai EZPO 
in a struggling position for planning and achieving cross-jurisdictional integration.  
On the other hand, it is important to understand that it is this time local governments, 
municipal authorities in particular, who initially took into consideration the need of 
leading and running networked governance across three provincial territories. The 
three-level governance framework was then upgraded to involve higher-level 
provincial governments. Such an arrangement was specifically structured by a group 
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of different local governments to produce collective provisions for managing trans-
provincial activities based on cross-territorial political-economic contexts. 
Finally, local territorial politics are embedded in the YRD’s current three-level 
governance framework, which was not the case for the Shanghai EZPO. One of the 
framework’s major responsibilities now is decreasing the administrative barrier and 
reducing the cross-territorial policy differences in the mega city-regional integration 
(Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011: 193). To achieve this aim, the three-level 
governance framework is generating a political platform for local provincial and 
municipal governments to reach consensus about how to overcome emerging intra-
regional conflicts through conducting regular and institutionalised interaction. The 
bargaining process among local provincial and municipal governments has proven to 
be an essential component of reaching agreements for any potential collective 
provisions.  
Currently it has effectively worked out for a large number of previously conflictual 
items, but there has been comparatively little evident progress for some others. For 
instance, we can barely discover any sign of progress for the YRD’s household 
registration reform in the three-level governance framework’s agenda. However, this 
may not be sufficient to become a breakpoint for incurring criticisms about the 
progress of current geopolitical city-regionalism. On the contrary, what we have 
witnessed is ongoing engagement and even accelerating consensus among local 
authorities over an enlarging amount of previously conflictual items. Referring to this 
perspective, what becomes even more important out of the understandings of the 
current geopolitical city-regionalism is the ongoing constructing process rather than 
its temporary products. 
 
6.2.5 The institutionalised interaction for collectively adapting to various 
challenges 
“...the political and social constitution of the city-region [is] an integral 
component in the wider re-scaling of states: not an input, nor an output, 
but part of the process and politics of state re-territorialisation” (Jonas and 
Ward, 2007: 172). 
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The YRD’s three-level governance framework has been engaged by local 
governments for facilitating cross-jurisdictional integration through prompting regular 
and institutionalised interaction across various provincial territories. The framework 
has never been a quick and fixed strategic orchestration for the mega city-regional 
governance; on the contrary, it has experienced more than one decade of 
evolvement before the framework was able to grow to cover a large number of 
different aspects. The range of items which have obtained or are obtaining 
consensus among local territorial authorities is still expanding.  
Luo’s (2011) research in the book Inter-City Cooperation and Governance in 
Yangtze River Delta specifically traces the historical path of expanding the YRD 
CAUE’s operating agenda since the establishment of the YRD Economic 
Cooperation Joint Conference in 1992. He proposes three different but continuous 
development stages which had been passed through by the YRD’s city-centric 
regional governance, including information exchange, task-focused cooperation and 
establishing the regional common market. His research is important because his 
data reveal that the YRD’s governance framework was able to gather a group of 
local governments around the principle of “recognising the common while reserving 
the differences” (qiutongcunyi) (Luo, 2011: 151) and then continuously push them 
towards consensus for collectively managing even more intra-regional conflicts 
through prompting regular and institutionalised bargaining. 
Furthermore, according to Jiangsu Development and Reform Committee’s 2013 
annual report, the number of task groups within the execution level increased from 
five in the beginning to ten by the report’s date. The more recent change is 
composed of the addition of a new task group for industrial relocation in 2011 and 
the withdrawal of the task group for business administration from the framework in 
2012. The report explains that the new task group is constructed by following the 
official collective recognition of the need for more cross-territorial cooperation on the 
newly emerging issue in the YRD; and the latter withdrawal happened because there 
was general agreement that the cooperation on this task was able to continue more 
effectively without the three-level governance framework’s supervision. It is this 
adapting trend that makes us believe that although the current three-level 
governance framework is not yet a perfect orchestration able to relieve all the 
geopolitical differences, the YRD’s three-level governance framework is functioning 
170 
 
as a platform which enables the political bargaining process to carry on and produce 
collective consensus for an increasing number of issues. More importantly, the 
framework is well-situated to continuously reflect on emerging economic, political 
and social challenges and then generate opportunities for adaption and further 
political integration and economic development. 
What is certain for now is more coordination is needed to enhance the mega city-
regional integration. Relating to this concern, the YRD was issued the official 
strategic ‘city-region’ planning guidance by the central State Council in 2010. The 
YRD regional plan is a collective achievement which reflects both central and local 
governments’ understanding of local political-economic contexts and their political 
interests. The next section will analyse to what extent the YRD regional plan is able 
to guide the YRD’s mega city-regional governance to confront and adapt both 
internal and external challenges at the current stage.  
 
6.3 The YRD regional plan reflects the political consensus among local 
authorities 
The YRD regional plan is the first comprehensive regional plan for all three 
provincial-level jurisdictions, including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang (Li and Wu, 
2013). The regional plan illustrates the central government’s guidance for improving 
the cross-jurisdictional coordinated development and functional competitiveness in 
the YRD around Shanghai. The regional plan was initially instigated in 2005 by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and then approved and 
issued by the central State Council in 2010. It is the supplement to the chapter 
nineteen regional constructions of the eleventh national ‘Five-Year Plan (2006-2010)’. 
According to a chief member in the formulation team for the YRD regional plan,  
“in 2005, it was the State Council’s indication which was originally for guiding 
the national plan requiring the formulation of both of the YRD regional plan 
and the eleventh national ‘Five-Year Plan’ to be worked on at the same year” 
(A chief member of the expert team, interview, 23rd July 2013). 
Although the YRD has been frequently mentioned to be the focus of regional 
construction projects by a series of national ‘Five-Year Plans’, beginning with the 
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ninth version, it is this time the State Council’s instruction’ which is principally serving 
the national political interest’ stating that the regional plan for the YRD would be 
engaged from the central level.  
NDRC was previously known as National Planning Commission and for its role as 
the planner of the Chinese planned economy (Li and Wu, 2012a). The NDRC is an 
important part of the central State Council; and it is responsible for studying and 
formulating strategic plans for the macro-economic and social development. Drafting 
the national ‘Five-Year Plan’ is one of their responsibilities. The national ‘Five-Year 
Plan’ is a powerful instrument for central strategic arrangements because local 
governments are expected to make their own local version of each ‘Five-Year Plan’ 
by combining the national plan with their specific context (Li and Wu, 2012a). The 
eleventh national ‘Five-Year Plan’ is the central economic and social orchestration 
for the five-year period between 2006 and 2010, which includes rural construction, 
industrial development, service industries, regional construction, environmental 
protection, education, opening-up, institutional reform, military affairs and many other 
aspects. It was formulated by the NDRC in accordance with the central State 
Council’s indication. Therefore, the planning provisions reflect the central authorities’ 
interest in local governance. 
Part four of chapter nineteen, titled ‘regional development’, states that it is important 
to firstly promote the leading development of eastern China regions, in particular the 
mega city-regions around Shanghai, Tianjin and other special economic zones. As 
one participant in the formulating process of YRD regional plan mentioned in the 
interview,   
“the central state considers the decision on the eastern city-regions’ leading 
development to be critical; … as a result of the YRD’s trans-provincial 
attribute, it is challenging for the Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang states to 
organize the city-regional coordinated development in some aspects when 
they put their own considerations ahead, thus it becomes important for the 
nation state to issue the guidance for coordinating the trans-provincial 
activities from the upper level state” (The researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 
1st August 2013).  
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The central intention of reducing the role of local political barriers in mega city-
regional economic development is clearly reflected in the national plan and the YRD 
regional plan. This section will investigate the guiding role of the regional plan for the 
YRD’s mega city-regionalism through looking at the formulating process and the 
planning provisions. The central State Council’s instructions, documents of the YRD 
regional plan and national ‘Five-Year Plan’, and other relevant official news are all 
found on the government website.  
 
6.3.1 The mixed participants in the regional plan’s formulation process 
The formulating process of YRD regional plan was entirely funded by the China 
Development Bank which is wholly owned and controlled by the national State 
Council, and headed by the vice-director of NDRC. Under the vice-director’s lead, 
the NDRC’s Local Economic Development Department (Diqu jingji fazhansi) was 
responsible for organising and supervising the plan making process. Apart from the 
central official departments, other participants included three provincial development 
and reform commissions (DRC) from Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, sixteen 
municipal DRCs from the narrow sense of YRD’s component cities, Nanjing Institute 
of Geography and Limnology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (NIGLAS), 
individual planning experts from Shanghai East China Normal University, Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang Provincial Development 
Planning and Research Institute and many other research and planning institutions. 
The entire plan-making community were grouped around three distinct teams, i.e. 
the comprehensive team, expert team and local team.  
The comprehensive team is the organiser who put the entire formulating community 
together. Its responsibilities include organising the research task in local fields, 
supervising the drafting process of the planning content and finalising the YRD 
regional plan under the consideration of economic context and political interests. 
Both the NDRC and SASS are crucial parts of the comprehensive team. The expert 
team and local team are responsible for drafting provisions for the regional plan 
while ensuring that the local economic-political context has been reflected by the 
planning content. The former is consisting of the local academic researchers and 
planning specialists, and the latter team is filled by local DRCs and other relevant 
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official institutions. The combination of governmental officials and academic 
specialists is of great importance to the effectiveness of the YRD regional plan. As a 
chief member of the comprehensive team stated in the interview,  
“Both central and local DRCs are the government agencies which have 
carried the planning function for the local development since their inception, 
thus it is rational for them to be involved in the formulating process of YRD 
regional plan. However, the current regional plan collects, more or less, each 
city’s different interests. For these local interests, some of them can be simply 
coordinated combined, but the rest of them easily generate local conflicts. For 
example, it is very difficult for local authorities themselves to reach agreement 
on the allocation of certain industries within the current city-regional scope. 
Thus this is where the academic specialists who are seen as relatively 
independent could step up to provide objective, fair and rational opinions” (A 
chief member of expert team, interview, 23rd July 2013). 
Moreover and as disclosed by a participant researcher, “the initial draft of the YRD 
regional plan was formulated to cover the ‘15+1’ version of YRD and completed as 
early as 2006; however, we received the central State Council’s guidance on 
planning provisions of the YRD regional plan in 2008, which delayed the issue of the 
regional plan to the year 2010” (A member of the comprehensive team, interview, 
15th July 2013).  
The central State Council’s guidance is titled as ‘The national State Council on the 
Yangtze River Delta region to further advance reform and opening up and economic 
and social development of guidance (later referred to as ‘guidance’)’. The central 
State Council’s guidance explicitly expands the YRD from the scope of ‘15+1’ to 
cover three entire provincial territories, including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
The importance attached to the expansion of the YRD’s regional space relates to 
concerns about the asymmetric political coordination between fifteen municipalities 
and one provincial administrative space. There are already discussions about this 
consideration by relating to the national and provincial political interests in chapter 
five. For this chapter, we borrow the explanation from Chen Jianjun, an academic 
professor from Zhejiang University and more importantly a chief member of the 
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comprehensive team, in his public presentation to indicate the political motivation 
behind the above-mentioned territorial expansion. His statement includes that, 
“Regional economic integration itself is to address the issue raised by 
administrative division, but it is impossible to skip a few decades’ existence of 
the provincial jurisdictions at once. The direct coordination among fifteen 
municipalities and one provincial unit is asymmetric. The result is unfair 
bargaining among the local state, and no way to generate ideal achievement. 
After the expansion, interactions among the three provincial units will be done 
at the same level. It is a better way to achieve the benefit maximization from 
the coordination” (Caijing.com.cn, 2008).  
What is emerging from such a centrally-led attempt to modify the YRD regional plan 
is the central consideration of local territorial politics and their political-economic 
interests within central supervision of local development. Therefore, although the 
central State Council has become a part of the formulating process of the YRD 
regional plan, the indication from the central authority shall not be solely understood 
as a top-down command in accordance with central political interest. 
Finally, formulating the YRD regional plan was a collective task involving central 
indication, local political-economic territorial context and interest, and regional 
academic specialists’ understandings about city-centric regionalism. The regional 
plan is hence expected to be used to coordinate the trans-jurisdictional functional 
development while considering the impact of local territorial politics in order to 
maximise the YRD’s mega city-regional economic advantages. One of the YRD 
regional plan’s responsibilities is reducing the concern of administrative barriers 
within the improvement of intra-regional functional linkages.  
 
6.3.2 The coordinated planning provisions  
The YRD regional plan, in general, provides guidance for coordinated development 
of mixed aspects which range from each city’s positionality, industrial allocation, 
urban and rural development, innovative capability, infrastructural construction, 
physical resource utilisation, environmental protection, social welfare system, 
regulatory reform and regional open economy, etc. at the mega city-regional level, 
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which consists of three entire provincial units, i.e. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
The text is divided into one introduction and twelve chapters. The introduction states 
that the YRD needs to improve its comprehensive competitiveness and growth 
sustainability on the basis of the nation state’s strategy of a focus on regional vision 
and facing the global financial crisis.  
Chapter one explains firstly the YRD’s strength of possessing a comparatively 
developed urban agglomeration around the regional core of Shanghai; secondly 
opportunities for promoting mega city-regional integration; and thirdly other internal 
and external challenges. Chapter two provides the overall aim for the YRD’s 
economic and social development. The plan aims to improve the city-regional 
comprehensive competitiveness in the global economy and build a world class urban 
agglomeration around Shanghai. To achieve this aim, growing objectives include 
improving GDP per capita and strengthening the contribution of the service sector in 
the YRD’s economy and urbanisation and such like. For the structure of the urban 
agglomeration, chapter three brings the definition of ‘one core and six belts’ which 
means Shanghai and six conceptual trans-provincial economic corridors. Explicitly, 
chapters three, four and five state the role of every YRD component city in the 
industrial development for achieving the complementary economy at the mega city-
regional level.  
Furthermore and relating to the geopolitical integration, chapter ten presents the 
need for promoting local political reform in order to reduce the administrative barriers 
amid the YRD’s mega city-regional integration. For reaching this purpose, the 
regional plan suggests local administrative authorities to firstly re-identify the share 
of responsibilities between political and economic stakeholders. Specifically, chapter 
ten recommends local governments to reduce their participation in local economic 
activities for market forces to become more decisive in the distribution of capital 
investments within the mega city-region. Meanwhile local governments shall pay 
more attention to improving and integrating the regulatory standards across three 
provincial territories as supervisors. Moreover, the chapter encourages other non-
governmental stakeholders to improve their participation in the governance of cross-
jurisdictional functional activities, such as establishing the regional industrial 
association.  
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Secondly, to accelerate the emergence of a mega city-regional common market, the 
term ‘common’ is reflected on, encouraging the flow of human resources, capital and 
technical resources. For the people resource, the household registration system, 
housing, education, personnel administration and social insurance all need to be 
managed in accordance with the unified regulatory policy. For the latter assets, 
examples include facilitating trans-jurisdictional transactions among financial 
institutions, and establishing mega city-regional technical standards. Finally, a 
number of administrative reform experiments were proposed, such as constituting a 
mega city-regional development and promotion fund, collectively financed by local 
provincial and municipal governments for funding the construction of trans-
jurisdictional infrastructure projects in the YRD. 
Overall, a substantial proportion of the YRD regional plan is produced to promote the 
coordinated development relating to a large range of different aspects at the mega 
city-regional level. The underlying intention of the guidance is trying to call for the 
realisation from all the YRD regional members that it is important and urgent to think 
and act as one coherent entity. This is not an easy task since the collective benefit 
cannot always be distributed at an equal share among local administrative territories. 
Relating back to the YRD’s governance framework, this is why the framework has 
been utilised as an interacting platform for bargaining and achieving consensus 
among the local states.  
Amongst all planning content, there is one attempt asking for redefining the 
respective role of the state and market forces in the YRD’s mega city-regionalism. 
According to this particular provision, local governments are recommended to 
collectively withdraw, more or less, from their current strong participation in local 
functional activities. This requirement reveals the central anticipation of reducing the 
impact of local administrative division over enhancing the YRD’s internal economic 
relations by promoting market-oriented development. From another perspective, 
administrative fragmentation has been seen as an internal challenge facing the 
YRD’s mega city-regionalism. Coordinated governance is therefore highlighted as 
essential for improving the integration of the YRD. The next section which is relating 
to the relevance of the centrally orchestrated YRD regional plan in the mega city-
regional governance shall explain how the challenges have been considered and 
engaged by local administrative authorities.  
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6.3.3 The role of the YRD regional plan 
A number of points can be expanded for explaining the role of the YRD regional plan. 
Firstly, the YRD regional plan is the national level planning arrangement which is 
expected to shed light on the local potential planning tasks. The YRD regional plan is 
the expansion of the regional development chapter of the national eleventh ‘Five-
Year Plan’. As the introduction to the NDRC above (section 6.3) mentioned, local 
DRCs need to formulate their local version of the five-year plan on the basis of their 
specific context while considering the NDRC’s national ‘Five-Year Plan’ (also see Li 
and Wu, 2012a). Hence the YRD regional plan has been anticipated to act as a 
general guidance for local provincial and municipal DRCs for formulating their local 
plans.  
From this perspective, the YRD regional plan can be seen as a bridge between the 
national strategy and local planning tasks (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011: 
202). If we look at each of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang’s twelfth provincial ‘Five-
Year Plan’ for 2011-2015, it appears that both the terms ‘YRD’ and ‘YRD regional 
plan’ are frequently mentioned. It is not hard to figure out that the YRD regional 
plan’s primary aim of enhancing the city-regional synergy is carried by a substantial 
section of their local planning content. For example, there is evident overlap about 
the proposed general function of each city between the YRD regional plan and each 
of the three provincial-level ‘Five-Year Plans’. Specifically, the respective proposed 
function of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou as comprehensive service centre; high-
technological manufacturing and modern service base, and regional financial, 
cultural and creative centre remains the same amid the transformation from the YRD 
regional plan to each provincial ‘Five-Year Plan’. The local plan shall provide us a 
starting point for explaining how local governments are shaping their administration 
in their respective jurisdictions and making them relevant to the mega city-regional 
scale in the YRD. 
The second point is that the YRD regional plan is a general guidance for the mega 
city-regional comprehensive development across Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
rather than a ‘box ticking’ plan. The lack of detailed instruction in each chapter 
leaves much room for the local state to actively fit in while considering their own 
requirements. For example and firstly, referring to the chapter for industrial spatial 
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distribution which may require comparatively high specification for each component 
city, the planning provisions are stated briefly in short paragraphs. The available 
options for each city are wide-ranging. Secondly, in terms of the YRD’s political 
administrative reform, the regional plan aims to reduce local governments’ 
responsibilities and enhance the role of market forces and other social actors in 
cross-jurisdictional functional development. Thirdly, details are also missing for the 
suggested establishment of region-wide unified standards of indicators, norms and 
regulations and the reduction of the existing policy differences.  
The result is we do not see which particular item or policy the central authority would 
like local governments to focus on. Consequently, it becomes local governments’ 
decision to make. Their decision shall depend on what they consider to be critical 
based on the local specific context. Thus general guidance would only earn the 
support from the local stakeholders, in particular the local states, when the match 
between the central and local interests can be realised. For instance, two years after 
the issue of the YRD regional plan, the YRD Cooperation and Development Joint 
Promotion Fund was born in 2012. It was one of the YRD regional plan’s required 
experimental programmes for achieving regulatory innovations. The fund was raised 
by four provincial governments, including Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. 
The primary responsibility of the fund is financing the trans-provincial infrastructure 
construction projects, ecological construction and environmental protection, and 
many other cross-jurisdictional projects. During the past decade, these were realised 
as the essential aspects for accelerating city-regional integration by local 
governments in the YRD. The transportation and environmental protection had 
already become focused tasks since the birth of the execution level. However, in 
terms of another proposal which is relating to the reform of the YRD’s household 
registration system, there has not been much progress to date. Concerns about the 
inequality in treatment remain strong, due to the locational division of the household 
registration system.  
Thirdly, a large part of the regional plan consists of the concerns which municipal 
governments are working or have worked on. Or in other words, a large part of the 
planning content covers local political-economic interests and the targets which the 
geopolitical city-regionalism is currently aiming for. Although it is the centrally-
organised planning teams formulating the planning content and stating the guidance 
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and targets for the YRD’s coordinated development, the regional plan still reflects on 
the local developmental context. For example and relating to the industrial planning 
chapter, a researcher from NIGLAS emphasised the importance of field research 
stage before drafting the plan text: 
“We did significant research in each city to understand their existing industrial 
elements and potential demands for new kinds. We compared all regional 
cities’ unique data after all the research was done and stepped in when we 
found quite a few cities were trying to focus on developing the same kind of 
industry, which could quickly lead to the inter-states’ inefficiency competition. 
Based on our expertise and analyses, we concluded which one or several 
cities are in the best position to develop certain popular industries and we 
drafted the YRD regional plan this way” (A researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 
1st August 2013). 
 
Table 15: The Important Achievements by the YRD’s Governance Framework 
Year Event 
 
Achievements 2010 YRD Regional Plan 
1997 Keep focusing on mega city-
regional tourism task since the 
first meeting of the YRD CAUE; 
Trans-jurisdictional cooperation on 
the regional tourism integration; 
Joint development of all regional 
components on the tourism 
market; building the mega city-
regional brand as one; 
 
2004 The mutual recognition of 
provincial quality inspection report 
mechanism for Shanghai, Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang 
The cancellation of repeat 
inspection of products quality in the 
YRD’s trans-provincial market; 
Establishing the regional common 
technical standard and mutual 
recognition of high technology and 
achievement; 
 
2004 YRD Talent Development 
Unification Joint Declaration 
Aiming for establishing the regional 
common personnel standard, 
market and service system; and 
finally achieving free flow of talents 
in the YRD; 
 
Establishing the region-wide 
human resources market in the 
YRD; 
2006 Establishment of the coordinated 
team for ‘YRD One Card Pass’ 
Aiming for ‘One Card Pass’ for all 
‘15+1’ YRD cities’ transportation; 
the result is ‘Bus Pass’ for six cities 
in 2012; 
 
Achieving the ‘One Card Pass’ for 
the YRD; 
2007 Pushing the YRD Financial 
Coordinated Development and 
Supporting Regional Economic 
Integration Agreement 
 
Encouraging the trans-territorial 
operation of financial institutions; 
Policy incentives to encourage the 
trans-territorial operation of 
financial institutions, i.e. banks, 
etc. 
Source: Compiled from Luo (2011), People.com.cn and Xinhuanet.com 
 
Furthermore, five particular events are listed in table 15 to explain that several 
sections of the regional plan were made to include aspects which YRD’s member 
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cities had already engaged with even before or during the formulation stage of the 
YRD regional plan.  
 
To summarise this section, although the YRD regional plan is a central attempt to 
draw the local states’ attention to the mega city-regional level in terms of a large 
range of aspects, the planning chapters are the combination of central 
recommendations and local context. In this way, it ensures that the regional plan is 
not going to diverge from the local specific political-economic context. Hence, it 
becomes the local provincial and municipal governments’ decision how to enforce 
the implementation of the planning provisions in the YRD regional plan. 
Subsequently, what we have seen is a variety of achievements which have been 
highlighted as fundamental for reducing the administrative barriers by the YRD 
regional plan under the administration of the YRD’s governance framework. The 
current three-level governance framework has been continuously functioning as an 
interacting platform for promoting coordinated governance to cover even more 
administrative divisions which constantly challenge the mega city-regional integration 
in the YRD. 
 
6.4 The three-level governance framework: confronting the regional challenges 
under the changing territorial politics 
The YRD’s three-level governance framework is initialised and operated by both 
local provincial and municipal governments. There is little sign of the direct 
intervention coming from central authority in the structural change or administrative 
decision of the YRD’s three-level governance framework. According to a chief 
member of the regional plan formulation team,  
“in 2007 YRD Economic and Social Development Forum, the former premier, 
Jiabao Wen, who officially represented the central State Council pointed out 
that the central government has no intentions of constructing an 
administrative institution at the trans-provincial regional level at that moment 
and its near future” (A chief member of expert team, interview, 23rd July).  
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The operation of the three-level governance framework mainly relies on the 
coordinated interaction and decision-making among local provincial and municipal 
governments in favour of the ‘scale model’ which considers mega city-regions to be 
“a strategic and political level of administration and policy-making, extending beyond 
the administrative boundaries of single urban local government authorities to include 
urban and/or semi-urban hinterlands” (Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000: 131). 
Although the YRD regional plan was formulated under the lead and supervision of 
the NDRC which is a department belonging to the central State Council, it was seen 
as comprehensive guidance on local economic-political development. The chapter 
twelve of the regional plan illustrates an ambiguous arrangement about how to 
implement the regional plan: 
“Three provincial governments have the joint responsibility for leading and 
organizing the implementation of the regional plan. … The relevant 
department in the central State Council are liable for providing the future 
guidance about the implementation of the regional plan. … NDRC retains the 
power of supervising and assessing the execution of the regional plan” 
(Chapter twelve of YRD regional plan). 
Moreover and as section 6.3.3 already mentioned above, the regional plan was 
made up of brief planning provisions which were mostly able to generate significant 
room for creativity in local authorities’ decisions. As a consequence, organising the 
trans-jurisdictional coordinated task remains as the accountability of the local 
decision-makers on the basis of their political interests and local economic context. 
Hence there is no guarantee that the YRD regional plan will certainly be realised by 
local political governance agenda.  
However, what becomes important about the YRD regional plan is that it highlights 
the primary aim of the YRD’s comprehensive development as enhancing the mega 
city-regional competitiveness. Achieving this aim shall largely depend on improving 
the YRD’s internal functional relations among local political territories while reducing 
the impact of administrative division in the city-regional economic coherence. In 
particular, the regional plan suggests that the YRD’s coordinated governance shall 
pay more attention to improving the city-regional regulatory environment in terms of 
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facilitating people and resource flow at the trans-jurisdictional level and reducing 
territorial political differences. Borrowing the statement of an academic planner,  
“this is suggesting that local governments’ main responsibility shall focus on 
effectively supervising the city-regional economic environment rather than 
conducting direct intervention in the market such as formulating particular 
beneficial policies for attracting investments from other places, which easily 
result in inter-city competition” (A professor from Nanjing University, interview, 
2nd August 2013).  
As we have tried to exemplify the geopolitical achievements in this chapter, the 
current YRD’s three-level governance framework is continuously working to reduce 
the administrative barrier and territorial policy differences. As one of the researchers 
who participated in the formulation of the YRD regional plan mentioned,  
“the current governance framework is able to slowly weaken the inter-locality 
isolation and even competition, and turns local authorities’ attention towards 
the coordinated development at the city-centric regional level” (A member of 
the comprehensive team, interview, 15th July 2013).  
The YRD’s three-level governance framework is becoming the bargaining platform 
for reaching consensus among local provincial and municipal governments in 
relation to a comprehensive range of functional activities. What we have witnessed in 
the past decade is an accelerating geopolitical consensus on an enlarging range of 
trans-provincial affairs. The result is that this on-going geopolitical city-regionalism is 
on its half way to identify and hence react to the specific challenges in the form of 
changing administrative method and continuous geopolitical bargaining towards the 
consensus. It is necessary to recognise the contribution of the governance 
framework to improve city-regional competitiveness. These are essential elements 
for regional construction to rely on in order to enhance its regional competitiveness 
amid globalisation.  
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6.5 Conclusion: Geopolitical mega city-regionalism as an ongoing and 
conflicted process 
There is no doubt that city-regions and their derivatives, including mega city-regions, 
have become the basic motors of the global economy in contemporary globalisation 
(Harrison, 2007). Similarly, the YRD has been long recognised as one of the motors 
of the Chinese economy by political authorities and in academic research. 
Enhancing the city-regional competitiveness has become essential to “justify change 
or the adoption of a particular course of policy action” (Bristow, 2005: 300). In 
particular, the city-regional competitiveness has been utilised to evaluate the 
appropriateness of relevant governance arrangements for a new spatial scale amid 
contemporary globalisation (e.g. Scott, 2001a, 2001b; Porter, 2001). However, mega 
city-regional competitiveness is such an abstract and complex concept that we may 
find challenging to recognise its most appropriate elements in order to measure its 
up-down movement. Following this argument, Scott (2001a: 4) has stressed that 
“city-regions today are facing enormous and unfamiliar pressures, so that they are 
being induced to search by trial and error for appropriate models of political 
response”. Therefore, this chapter examined the YRD’s comprehensive 
competitiveness through focusing on the three-level framework’s capability of 
identifying and reacting to the locational political-economic challenges as Huggins 
and Davies’ (2006) proposed.  
On the other hand, the YRD regional plan expressed the centrally-led political 
concern about the fragmented impact resulting from regulatory division over cross-
territorial socio-economic activities. The administrative barrier has been realised as 
the challenge faced by mega city-regional collective governance. After the previous 
experience of Shanghai EZPO which was considered to be an unsuccessful attempt 
to centrally command the trans-jurisdictional cooperation, there has been far less 
involvement of the nation state in actively leading the cross-territorial agenda in more 
recent years. The result was the emergence of the three-level governance 
framework under the co-lead of a group of various provincial and prefectural 
governments. The framework experienced continuous evolution over the past two 
decades in accordance with changing political-economic contexts.   
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In order to add knowledge to the understanding of the geopolitical tasks faced by 
mega city-regions, this chapter has asked what elements of the YRD’s current three-
level framework are crucial for enhancing mega city-regional competitiveness. The 
YRD’s three-level framework provides a bargaining platform for a group of various 
territorial governments to reach political consensus over a variety of aspects. More 
importantly, the historic evolving path of the framework is wide open for 
transformation and expansion on the basis of a changing environment. It is this 
flexible institutional arrangement enabling locational territorial interests to be 
reflected in the mega city-regional agenda, and then prompting the bringing together 
of cross-territorial interests at the mega city-regional level. Such political consensus 
largely reduces the fragmented impact of regulatory division over mega city-regional 
coherence. 
From another perspective, this locally orchestrated framework ensures that the 
three-level framework is able to pay attention to the emerging circumstances by 
employing flexible and carefully-structured arrangements in a feasible order. For 
instance, the YRD’s three-level framework is able to engage with a group of various 
territorial authorities under the regionally agreed principle of ‘recognising the 
common while reserving the differences’. According to Luo (2011), the framework 
has been operated to cover firstly the information exchange, then cooperation on 
trans-jurisdictional tourism projects, transportation construction and such like, and 
now the cross-territorial common market associated with the population and 
resource flow and integrated administrative policies.  
Overall, it is crucial to make sure that mega city-regions are equipped with an 
effective governance arrangement which activates their capabilities of recognising 
and adapting to emerging challenges in order to enhance their competitiveness at a 
sustainable path. This chapter has employed rich empirical data to illustrate how the 
collective governance has been operated to unite cross-territorial interests over as 
many various aspects as possible. Specifically, institutional interaction and 
bargaining has been mobilised to create political consensus and trust on a feasible 
and continuous basis. At last, local political attention has shifted, step by step, 
towards the mega city-regional agenda which considers and reflects cross-territorial 
interests over as many various aspects as possible through a continuous timeline. 
For our mega city-regional research, it is fundamental to pay attention to the details 
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of the ongoing geopolitical dynamics. The next chapter will take a closer look at the 
‘differences’ part of the agreed principles by exploring the tensions and barriers 
faced by the YRD’s collective governance.  
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Chapter 7: Tensions Faced by the Mega City-Region: Conflicts 
between Geoeconomic and Geopolitical Processes 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the tensions faced by the YRD mega city-region. Three 
principal points will be engaged with, shaped by the findings in the previous chapters. 
The first point is the mismatch between functional spaces and administrative 
jurisdictions at the mega city-regional scale. As discussed in chapter 5, the YRD’s 
three-level framework is operating across a combined geography which includes a 
functionally inter-linked space as well as substantial politically planned regional 
areas. According to the Wuxi Statistic Bureau’s publication of ‘The 2014 Economic 
Development Report for the Core Area of YRD’ (2014 Changsanjiaohexinqu 
jingjifazhan baogao), the ‘15+1’ version of YRD generated a GDP of 10600 billion 
Yuan which constituted 82.3% of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai’s GDP on 
aggregate, which was 12880 billion Yuan during 2014. According to table 10, the 
‘15+1’ version of the YRD is only occupying half of the broad sense of the YRD in 
terms of physical territory. Even four years after publication of the YRD regional plan, 
the ‘15+1’ version of YRD still contributed more than 80% of all three provincial 
jurisdictional economic volumes. Based on the above-mentioned statement, the 
readjustment of city-regional administrative territory raises the consideration of a 
territorial mismatch which is similar to Bennett’s (1997) term of ‘over-bounding’ 
whereby “functional activity space is only a small part of an administrative division” 
(Bennett, 1997: 326). 
Secondly, it becomes evident for territorial politics to be constitutive in the 
construction of intra-regional relations at the mega city-regional scale. As chapter 5 
illustrated, although we have seen a slow market-oriented spatial transformation of 
traditional labour-intensive manufacturing enterprises from the ‘15+1’ to the 
surrounding contiguous areas since 2000, local political authorities actively promoted 
and accelerated this functional transformation process within the broad sense of 
YRD after the mid-2000s. Therefore, Chinese political forces launched a direct 
intervention into shaping the mega city-regionalism as their locational response to 
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wider political and economic trends. Unlike Harrison’s (2008) concept of the 
‘regionally orchestrated centralism’, which documents the re-concentration of 
authority towards the region from its sub-regions, this thesis proposes a ‘locally 
orchestrated regionalism’ to stress the emerging territorial politics for voluntarily and 
collectively shifting local political attention towards the mega city-regional level.  
Finally, the YRD’s collective governance is still lagging behind the balance between 
the geoeconomic and geopolitical participation in the mega city-regionalism. The 
YRD regional plan indicates that it is crucial for local authorities to undertake the 
transformation of their responsibilities from direct intervention in the distribution of 
capital investments into constantly reviewing and modifying the supervisory policies 
and regulatory environment at the mega city-regional level. However, substantial 
local political interests remain for conducting intervention in containing and boosting 
the territorial socio-economic growth even at the expense of the market will. The 
imbalance between geoeconomic and geopolitical participation will be exemplified by 
the case study of Yixing government’s decision making about constructing Yixing 
high-tech industrial park. Yixing is a county-level city that belongs to Wuxi. 
Following Brenner’s (2004b, 2009) contextually specific investigations, this chapter 
contextualises the three key points mentioned above associated with the YRD’s 
mega city-regionalism. These three concerns will be engaged with through 
discussions embedded in each section. Section 7.2 proposes the term of ‘locally 
orchestrated regionalism’ to explain how Chinese specific context localised the city-
regionalism. Section 7.3 evaluates the lack of statutory recognition for both the 
YRD’s institutional arrangement and the YRD regional plan associated with Chinese 
territorial politics. Then both the vertical and horizontal nature of geopolitics will be 
examined in section 7.4. Finally, the concluding section connects all the findings and 
discussions to stress that it is difficult for one single framework to cover all the 
various categories of functional activities in the mega city-regional agenda. 
Furthermore, this chapter reinforces the significance of researching the 
specifications and diversities within the locational political-economic system for 
understanding mega city-regionalising process. 
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7.2 Locally orchestrated regionalism in China 
The researcher admits that the ‘locally orchestrated regionalism’ which this chapter 
proposes to document the rescaling process of authority between the region and its 
sub-regions is, to some extent, similar to Harrison’s (2008) ‘regionally orchestrated 
centralism’. They are both regionally specific but Harrison’s term explores how 
regional agencies devolve administrative authorities into sub-regional offices, and 
then re-concentrate, more or less, towards the regional centre which is argued to 
undermine the flexibilities of local decision-makings in the case of England’s 
Northwest Development Agency (NWDA). Such a process highlights “how particular 
material structures and processes have become (temporarily) fixed at or around the 
regional scale and how they are becoming unfixed at other scales” (Jonas, 2006: see 
Harrison, 2008: 936).  
Differently, locally orchestrated regionalism examines how sub-regional territorial 
authorities voluntarily shift their geopolitical attention from local to regional scale, and 
become willing to make collective decision-making for coordinating cross-
jurisdictional activities on the basis of institutionalised meetings and interactions in 
the Chinese context. The YRD’s three-level governance framework is established 
and operated by all chief political officers from each of the provincial and prefectural 
level political authorities. The rescaling process of administrative attention and 
geopolitical interest avoids local territorial jurisdictions to surrender regulatory 
authorities to regional institutions. Moreover, there is no official regulatory support for 
planning and governance at the mega city-regional level. The China constitution 
explains the state hierarchical organisation which includes provincial and prefectural 
level governments, but mentions nothing about the YRD’s three-level governance 
framework. Thus, provincial government is the highest ranked authority in the sub-
national political system.  
As a consequence, collective decision-making at mega city-regional level can only 
be achieved on the basis of reaching mutual trust and consensus among all of the 
involved sub-regional authorities for any particular aspect. The discussion of the lack 
of regulatory support for trans-jurisdictional governance in the Chinese context will 
be reinforced in section 7.3. Therefore, it is argued that locally orchestrated 
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regionalism enables processes and administrative capacities to fix at local territorial 
scale and unfix at or around the regional scale.  
On the other hand, the Chinese geopolitical context is filled with a highly centralised, 
one-party controlled political system. In most western states, such as the UK, 
Germany and the US, more than one party keeps competing for political leadership 
at all scales across the entire top-down administrative chain. It is then not abnormal 
to witness candidates who are each responsible for different parties taking over 
leaderships at different political scales. For instance, amid the period when national 
government was dominated by the Labour Party between 1997 and 2010, the Mayor 
of London who was in charge of the Greater London Authority which is central in the 
governance over ‘the only true global city-region’ of London (Harrison, 2012c) was 
firstly won by an Independent candidate – Ken Livingstone – in 2000; and then 
claimed by the Labour Party in 2004 until being defeated by the Conservative 
candidate – and current Mayor, Boris Johnson – in 2008. After 2010, and the 
election to power of a Conservative Party led UK national government ensured the 
Greater London Authority (major global city-region) and UK Central Government (the 
state) was only then controlled by the Conservative Party. The one-party Chinese 
context illustrates a very different story.  
Both national and sub-national governments have been held by the Chinese 
Communist Party since the birth of the P.R.China in 1949. This is mainly the result of 
the central-concentration of political nomination rights in the hierarchical political 
chain, despite the devolvement of economic decision-making rights we have 
experienced since the 1978 economic reform and the ‘Open Door’ policy. The 
personnel promoting opportunity is largely derived from respective political 
performance which is primarily judged by the extent of jurisdictional GDP growth. 
This is apparently enhancing the possibility and capability of inter-city competition for 
improving respective territorial economic growth. The tensions between key actors at 
sub-national level will be further illustrated by the discussions around conflicts 
between geoeconomic and geopolitical actors in section 7.3 and 7.4, and particularly 
exemplified by the case study of politically-controlled Yixing Environmental Science 
and Technology Industrial Park in section 7.4. 
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7.3 The mismatch between mega city-regional functional space and networked 
administrative jurisdictions 
Before the emergence of the three-level governance framework, the YRD’s regional 
market was divided by the political administrative boundaries in terms of regulatory 
and policy differentials in the YRD. Hence, the coordinated governance framework 
was constructed in the belief that it would facilitate the improvement of economic 
relations and more importantly the development of consensus on reducing the 
impact of administrative division over trans-jurisdictional functional activities among a 
group of local provincial and municipal governments. Both local provincial and 
municipal governments actively promoted the three-level governance framework 
from the bottom in order to respond to the political-economic change at the trans-
provincial level. However, this calls into question how far the current networked 
arrangement can go in the absence of enforcement power particularly at a moment 
when local authorities possess substantial economic decision-making rights. 
The single mega city-regional administrative scale may find itself struggling to deal 
with a broad range of diversified socio-economic activities at the same time. What 
we have witnessed in the past is that the YRD’s three-level governance framework 
successfully reaches inter-city consensus for particular issues, such as the spatial 
transformation of traditional manufacturing industries, but struggles with others. 
According to an academic planner,  
“It is very difficult to assess the appropriateness of the YRD’s governance 
framework because there are so many different categories of activities which 
could be related to the discussion. They may have worked out for some 
issues, such as constructing the trans-provincial highway network for 
achieving the YRD’s ‘one-hour economic circle’ or even ‘three-hour economic 
circle’. But there has been barely any progress on the reform of household 
registration and medical insurance system. Both of them are crucial for 
people’s permanent movement across different provincial territories” 
(Professor from East China University, interview, 11th July 2013).  
Relating to the interviewee’s doubt, we have witnessed an enlarged city-regional 
governance scale that has been able to deal with the accelerated spill-over of 
traditional labour-intensive manufacturing enterprises from the ‘15+1’ version into the 
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broad sense of YRD. But the enlarging administrative scale has not yet engaged with 
some other items, including the reform of household registration and medical 
insurance system in the YRD as the interviewee mentions. Based on these cases, 
there is an emerging mismatch between political administrative territory and 
interconnected functional space which is defined to cover particular activities. In 
short, we may not see an ideal single administrative arrangement which is able to 
perfectly bind a variety of functional geographies which are individually defined by 
different functional activities at the city-regional level (Bennett, 1997).  
 
7.3.1 Lack of enforcing mechanism in the trans-jurisdictional planning and 
governance 
As chapter 6 illustrates, the YRD’s current three-level governance framework is 
constructed and operated by local provincial and municipal governments. The 
framework provides a political platform for local provincial and municipal 
governments to reach consensus about how to overcome emerging intra-regional 
conflicts through conducting regular and institutionalised interaction. It is then 
realised as an ongoing bargaining process in favour of the principle of “recognising 
the common while reserving the differences” (Luo, 2011: 151). Consequently, 
concern has been raised about the framework’s ability to coordinate a group of local 
governments in relation to the part of ‘differences’ in an effective way. This concern 
comes from two different perspectives. 
Firstly, since the commanding power which could facilitate inter-governmental 
cooperation is missing at this trans-provincial level, collective governance only 
happens when trust and consensus can be built among all of the involved local 
authorities for any particular aspect. A chief member in the formulation team for the 
YRD regional plan argues in the interview that,  
“the current three-level framework is only an official arrangement for 
organising inter-government negotiations; no one particular authority can give 
the command to any others, so cooperation is happening only when members 
are able to reach an agreement” (A chief member of the expert team, 
interview, 23rd July 2013).  
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Horizontal cooperation among local governments, the interviewee implies, is only 
prompted by overlapping political intentions across political administrative territories.  
Luo and Shen’s (2008, 2009) research about the implementation of Suzhou-Wuxi-
Changzhou regional plan reveals the fierce rivalry for industrial distribution and 
infrastructure construction including a bridge and airport among three municipal 
governments. The authors highly doubt whether local governments have the 
capability of building trust and consensus to distribute opportunities which should be 
able to stimulate the social-economic improvement for their own jurisdictional 
territory in the absence of a proper enforcement mechanism. At this moment, there is 
no enforcement mechanism covering the YRD’s territory at the city-centric regional 
level. Hence organising the collective political actions mainly relies on local 
governments’ voluntary agreements which are not easily reached, in particular when 
the collective interest may be at the cost of any individual cities’ interest. 
The second point is there is no specific legislation officially supporting this voluntary 
collective planning and governance at the regional level. The China constitution 
explains the hierarchical structure of central-led state organisation and mentions 
nothing about the YRD’s three-level governance framework. Provincial government 
is acting as the highest administrative level in the local political system. The YRD’s 
three-level governance framework is only realised by two voluntary consents among 
YRD’s members, including ‘The Framework of YRD Regional Cooperation and 
Development Joint Conference (Changsanjiaodiqu hezuoyufazhan lianxihuiyizhidu)’ 
and ‘The Framework of YRD’ Key Cooperative Task Groups (Changsanjiaodiqu 
zhongdianhezuozhuantizu gongzuozhidu)’. Its enforcement power for prompting the 
trans-jurisdictional cooperation is questionable.  
Furthermore, the implementation of the YRD regional plan is not guaranteed by any 
relevant legal provisions. There is the Urban and Rural Planning Act, which was 
previously known as City Planning Act, for legitimately supervising the formulation 
and implementation of the city plan. This law fits with any urban and rural plan which 
is formulated for local municipalities or their affiliated counties. According to this act, 
the corresponding level of Urban and Rural Planning Department (URPD) has the 
responsibility for ensuring the planning provisions to be realised at each political 
level and violation against the planning content to be fully investigated. In our case, 
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the YRD regional plan covers three provincial territories and hence becomes not 
relevant to the Urban and Rural Planning Act. Local government’s decision of not 
complying with any particular planning provision is therefore not defined as illegal.  
Overall, the YRD’s three-level governance framework and the regional plan both 
ensure that collective governance can be prompted through a flexible and voluntary 
arrangement in accordance with locational political-economic contexts. Meanwhile 
the framework also generates a dilemma for the networked governance in relation to 
the part of ‘differences’ which may not be easily overcome between different local 
governments. It reflects how local territorial politics “shape city-regional institutions 
and politics from the below” (Jonas, 2013: 287). Hence the resurgence of mega city-
regionalism has much to do with local territorial politics including local governments’ 
incapability of contributing collective provisions in relation to some aspects. In order 
to understand their conflicted reactions toward a wider city-regional political-
economic environment, it is essential to recognise the reasons behind emerging 
disparate political interests. The following sections will investigate this claim further. 
 
7.4 Geopolitical over-intervention in the socio-economic development 
China’s 1978 economic reform started the delegation of economic decision-making 
rights towards local provincial and municipal governments from a previously centrally 
concentrated authority (see Leaf, 1998; Li and Wu, 2012a). Consequently, urban 
entrepreneurialism and fierce competition emerged among local political territories 
which have been frequently criticised for undermining the regional integration 
process in the YRD (e.g. Li and Wu, 2012b; Chien, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008; 
Luo and Shen, 2008, 2009; Zhang and Wu, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 2010). For 
example, “[China’s urban] entrepreneurialism has led to a series of crises which 
expose the limitations of the downscaling of governance. Inter-jurisdiction 
competition exacerbates redundant infrastructure development” (Wu and Zhang, 
2010: 60). To reinforce the debate, Luo and Shen (2008: 208) argue that “cities are 
keen on inter-city competition instead of cooperation; in the competition to attract 
foreign investors to their own cities, the local states are keen to embark on place 
promotion, prestige projects and mega events”.  
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Much of these literatures’ discussions and conclusions choose to focus on local 
governments’ transformation from managerial to entrepreneurial nature after China’s 
1978 economic reform, and then explain how the local competition is happening in 
selected aspects by relating to their growth-driven decision making. What we have 
seen is that plenty of literatures expressed their concern about the political 
administrative division and the resulting impacts in the regional political-economic 
development, including the conflicts emerging in the past construction of trans-
jurisdictional transportations (e.g. Ye, 2014) and industrial planning for the regional 
space (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2009). Similarly, as one participant in the formulating 
process of YRD regional plan mentioned,  
“During the research stage amid the formulation of many various trans-
jurisdictional plans, it is very often noticeable that every local government is 
significantly interested in recruiting inward investments for all categories of 
industries by issuing competitive policies. … It is normal to see them make 
efforts to maximise economic growth within their political jurisdiction instead of 
focusing on the agglomeration of any particular industry and coordinated 
development within a wider environment” (A researcher from NIGLAS, 
interview, 1st August 2013). 
The interviewee here is suggesting that local governments normally focus on the 
impact of policies on local economic activities. We have realised that the 
decentralisation of economic decision-making rights within the state hierarchical 
organisation ensures that local governments become capable of attracting inward 
investments through issuing competitive policies, including tax reduction and 
discounted land supply and such like. However, the questions of why the political 
intervention shall be interpreted as excessive and the underlying political intention 
are under-emphasised by current literatures.  
In the case of the YRD, locational decision-making has been ‘tailored’ by local 
authorities to improve economic growth in their controlled political administrative 
territories. According to the above-mentioned interview, how to enhance economic 
growth within a political jurisdiction becomes local governments’ primary concern 
instead of concentrating on the development of existing economic activities within 
their territories. This has resulted in critiques of industrial similarity and lack of 
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complementarities in functional structure across the YRD by a large number of 
Chinese regional literatures (e.g. Li and Wu, 2012a; Luo, 2008; Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 2011; Zhang et al., 2007). To briefly summarise by borrowing two 
academic planners’ words, “what is happening now is a small amount of production 
but almost all-inclusive in every city” (A researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 1st 
August 2013), and consequently “local governments’ participation in the regional 
market is frequently seen as overdone” (A professor from Nanjing University, 
interview, 2nd August 2013).  
One of the prominent examples is the preferential treatment which local 
governments generally provide for attracting inward investments. This topic has been 
brought up by several interviewees including local business leaders and academic 
planners in relation to inter-city competition. Such preferential treatment includes 
preferential tax exemption, discounted sales of industrial land and many other 
provisions. Local governments’ intervention is able to underplay the role of market 
forces in the distribution of capital investment across the city-centric regional space. 
What also becomes a part of this consideration is,  
“local governments are able to supervise and manage economic activities in 
the first place. However, who is able to correct local governments’ behaviour 
when their participation in the market is realised as overdone? … Based on 
this perspective, we need to investigate the political intention which is driving 
them to do so” (A professor from Nanjing University, interview, 2nd Aug 2013).  
Thus it is not fair to direct most of the criticisms against locational decision-making if 
we do not fully understand on what circumstances these local economic decisions 
are based.  
Finally, although there is emerging a large number of regional literatures explaining 
in what forms the inter-locality competition presents itself in reality, we are still not 
fully aware of why this is happening. In other words, current literatures focus much 
on the consequence of local entrepreneurial governance, but not on its cause. It is 
important and urgent for current debates to consider why this particular locational 
economic decision has been retained by YRD’s local governments since the 1978 
Chinese economic reform, which has been under-stated by existing literatures. This 
shall reinforce the understanding of why inter-locality competition and conflicted 
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interests have remained despite the efforts to develop the YRD’s regional integration. 
Section 7.2 already takes into consideration the lack of enforcement and disciplinary 
mechanisms. The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. Firstly, attention 
will be drawn to how regulatory power has been utilised to create locational 
advantage for attracting inward investments by looking at the historical path of 
political-controlled Yixing ES and TP. The second section will analyse the political 
intention behind the competition-driven decision-making process.  
 
7.4.1 Politically-controlled Yixing Environmental Science and Technology 
Industrial Park (Yixing ES and TP)  
Industrial park means an area which is politically marked out by local governments 
for agglomerating particular aspects of industries in accordance with political-
economic demand and their original advantageous industrial outputs. Industrial parks 
are planned, established, managed and promoted by a political authority which is an 
integral part of local urban government. At the moment, there are a large number of 
politically-controlled industrial parks across China, especially in the YRD which is 
considered to be one of China’s economic hot zones. One prominent example is 
Suzhou Industrial Park which primarily concentrates global investments, in particular 
from Singapore (Pereira, 2007).  
Yixing Environmental Science and Technology Industrial Park (Yixing ES and TP) 
was initially proposed with the aim of concentrating environmental protection 
industries by Yixing government and subsequently approved by the central State 
Council in 1992. The park is governed by the management committee which is 
controlled by three different political organisations, including the Yixing 
Environmental Protection Industries’ Development Centre (Yixingshi 
Huanbaochanye Fazhanzhongxin) in the park, the Yixing Environmental Protection 
Industries Association (Yixingshi Huanbaochanye Xiehui) which belongs to Yixing 
Environmental Protection Bureau, and the Administration Centre (Xingguanzhongxin) 
which is under the control of Yixing Economic and Information Technology 
Commission. Therefore, it is the state power controlling the development of the 
industrial park. The park’s entire planning area is proposed to be 102 square 
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kilometres. The established area for the first term of the construction is 15 square 
kilometres. 
Yixing is a county-level city under the control of Wuxi. Environmental protection 
industries have accounted for a significant proportion of local GDP for both Yixing 
and its subordinate town Gaosheng during the past decades. Constructing the Yixing 
ES and TP is the political attempt to eliminate the geographical separation of 
production sites by concentrating as many relevant environmental enterprises as 
possible in the park area. Thus the essential point here is to what extent the 
management committee’s decision-making in relation to the development of the park 
shall be determined as ‘unnecessary’ amid local functional activities.  
This section does not intend to produce a general conclusion for all Chinese 
industrial parks as they are planned and utilised by states as a ‘political tool’ to 
achieve their local economic growth at the expense of market indication. The Yixing 
ES and TP is a crucial component of Yixing’s current economic structure. It is not our 
attention to question the decision to construct the Yixing ES and TP in the first place. 
As an academic planner mentioned in the interview,  
“industrial park is a very complicated research target; … even the 
development path of every industrial park could be unique and very different 
from another’s; thus it is difficult to produce a general conclusion for industrial 
parks” (A professor from Nanjing University, interview, 30th July 2013).  
Agreeing with the interviewee’s statement, it is fundamental to realise that it is very 
hard to produce a general conclusion which applies to all Chinese industrial parks. 
The industrial park solely is not the end in our research objective. What this section 
is trying to achieve is explaining the extent to which political intervention can 
significantly affect local functional activities by looking at the past economic decision-
making that led to the development path of the Yixing ES and TP. This discussion 
should help us to understand, firstly the potential conflict of local governments’ over 
intervention in the YRD’s collective governance; and secondly the existing conflict 
between state power and market forces in relation to the operation of local functional 
activities. The central State Council’s statement, document of national ‘Five-Year 
Plan’, Yixing and Gaosheng’s government’s data and other relevant official news in 
this section are all found on the government website. 
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Environmental protection industry 
Environmental protection industries have experienced fast-paced growth for more 
than three decades in Jiangsu, particularly in Yixing and its subordinated town 
Gaosheng. Currently, the environmental protection industry is composed of four 
main subgroups, the manufacturing of protection facilities, resource recycling 
facilities, environment friendly products and protection services. According to Shen’s 
(2010) research, Jiangsu alone accounted for approximately one fifth of the entire 
national annual revenue resulting from environmental protection industries in 2008. 
Among all of Jiangsu’s municipalities, Wuxi, Suzhou and Nanjing together contribute 
approximately 70% of Jiangsu’s share. Wuxi in particular generates more than 61% 
of Jiangsu’s sales revenue coming from the subgroup of environmental protection 
facilities manufacturing, meanwhile Yixing ES and TP and Gaosheng are Wuxi’s two 
main contributors.  
Yixing is a county-level city under the direct control of Wuxi; and Gaosheng is a town 
belonging to Yixing. Both Yixing ES and TP and Gaosheng focus on improving 
manufacturing capacity of environmental protection facilities, and Yixing recently 
expanded to produce other environment-friendly products, such as energy-saving 
products, low carbon products and such like. According to Gaosheng government’s 
official publication of ‘Planning Scheme of Innovation and Specialised Development 
for Gaosheng’ Environmental Protection Industries (Gaoshengzhen Huanbaochanye 
Chuangxinzhuanyefazhan Guihuafangan)’, Gaosheng occupied about 10% of 
national market share for environmental protection facilities in 2008.  
Furthermore, the most favourable provision for environmental protection industries is 
the eleventh national ‘Five-Year Plan’ which for 2006-2010 requires 20% and 10% 
reduction of energy consumption for national GDP generation and total pollutant 
emission respectively. For even more requirements, the central State Council 
continuously issues the official statement of ‘Comprehensive Programme Work in 
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction (Jienengjianpai Zonghexing Fangan)’ 
as supplement to the national ‘Five-Year Plan’. This statement significantly expands 
and clearly specifies the requirements for both energy conservation and emission 
reduction (see table 16).  
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After the eleventh national ‘Five-Year Plan’, the increasing demand for 
environmental protection knowledge and facilities ensured that the environmental 
protection industry stepped into an accelerating growth period which has not seen its 
end even by today. According to the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection’s 
‘2011 National Environmental Protection Related Industries’ Circumstance Report 
(2011 Quanguo Huanjingbaohuxiangguanchanye Zhuangkuangbaogao)’, the 
average growth rate of annual sales revenue was 28.7% between 2004 and 2011. In 
2011, the central State Council produced an announcement of the even more 
rigorous requirements for both energy conservation and emission reduction after the 
twelfth national ‘Five-Year Plan’ (2011-2015).  
 
Table 16: The Reduction Command from the Central State Council’s 
Announcement 
Provisions Reduction Target by 2010 against 
2005 
 
Reduction Target by 2015 against 
2010 
Coal consumption for generating 
every ten thousand Yuan GDP 
 
1.034 KG (20%) 0.869 KG (16%) 
Water Consumption for Industrial 
Increment 
 
30% 30% 
The Quantity of Entire Principal 
Pollutant Discharged 
 
10% 10% 
Sulphur Dioxide Emission 
 
To 22950 thousand KG To 20864 thousand KG 
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
 
To 12730 thousand KG To 23476 thousand KG 
Disposal Rate of National Urban 
Sewage 
 
No less than 70% 85% 
Comprehensive Recycling Rate of 
Industrial Solid Wastes 
 
Above 60% 72% 
Source: Central Government Website of the PR. China, 2007, 2011 
 
The locational choice of Yixing ES and TP 
According to the statements of the director of Yixing ES and TP’s management 
committee and two local business leaders, the core aim of constructing Yixing ES 
and TP was to establish a business cluster for environmental protection industries by 
attracting potential investments and calling for the spatial relocation of existing 
businesses in Yixing and its subordinate town Gaosheng, while at the same time 
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persuading original manufacturing businesses not related to environmental industries 
to move away through utilising regulatory power. However, this does not mean state 
power is manipulated to exile traditional manufacturing industries from the industrial 
park on the basis of political intention. The result is the inclusion of hybrid industrial 
categories within Yixing ES and TP. The manipulation of regulatory power by local 
governments will be explained later in this section.  
Yixing was not the only location choice for Yixing government to select the industrial 
park before the construction proposal was raised for the environmental protection 
industrial park. According to Gaosheng government’s ‘Planning Scheme of 
Innovation and Specialised Development for Gaosheng’s Environmental Protection 
Industries’, Gaosheng’s environmental protection industries have experienced fast 
pace growth for more than three decades. It is extremely difficult to trace back the 
detailed decision making process which happened more than two decades ago. To 
make this even more challenging, since Gaosheng is a town belonging to Yixing, 
official economic statistics summaries for Yixing usually contain Gaosheng’s 
contribution during past decades, thus it is hard to make accurate comparisons 
between Yixing ET and TP and Gaosheng’s respective functional achievements. But 
we can still find some comparative indicators. Although we are not able to figure out 
the statistical work back to 1992, some more recent statistics are available.  
According to Shen’s (2010) research, Jiangsu generated 18.4% of national total 
sales of environmental protection facilities in 2008. But Gaosheng government’s 
report mentions that they alone occupied approximately 10% of national market 
share for facilities production in 2008. Then Yixing and other Jiangsu’s component 
cities share the remaining 8.4% market share. In addition, Shen (2010) also states 
that if we add both of Yixing ET and TP and Gaosheng’s respective facilities 
manufacturing enterprises together, the sum is approximate 900. However, 800 out 
of these 900 companies are owned by Gaosheng according to data on Gaosheng 
governmlyent’s website. According to data from the Environmental Protection 
Department of Jiangsu Province, Yixing ES and TP only owned about 30 out of the 
remaining companies in 2008, and lacks a giant enterprise which could be 
considered as market leader in the park. It means there are on average only two 
companies choosing to move into the park annually during the past sixteen years 
after it was founded in 1992. Therefore, at this moment there is a huge gap between 
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Yixing ET and TP and Gaosheng’s respective industrial volume which are stated as 
both of their main development focus. Furthermore, Gaosheng government 
introduced the manufacturing of environment protection facilities as their primary 
industry in the 1970s in their official publications. This leads us to the question how 
Yixing can replace Gaosheng as the primary location for the industrial park under the 
local political command. This cannot be understood without looking at local 
governments’ political logic. 
The interesting part of this industrial park is although Yixing is only a county-level city 
under the direct control of Wuxi, Yixing ES and TP is officially recognised as a 
national level environmental protection industrial park. The proposal of founding 
Yixing ES and TP was sent by the local government to obtain the central State 
Council’s approval in November 1992. In general, it is not necessary to seek central 
support before the establishment of an industrial park. Similarly, a large number of 
provincial and municipal level industrial parks have been built across China without 
central support. The central approval was finally obtained in accordance with the 
central State Council’s recognition of the significance of developing the 
environmental protection industries. Currently the Yixing ES and TP is the only 
national level environmental protection industrial park which is located in a county-
level city in China.  
According to the explanation of an academic planner who has many years’ 
experience of designing the industrial park for local governments, one of the key 
considerations here is  
“the qualification of ‘national level’ is considered to be important by Yixing 
government because this shall become more attractive for inward investments 
in particular overseas capital than provincial level and municipal level” (A 
researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 2nd August 2013).  
He also adds that  
“in official opinion, Gaosheng, as a town, may not be as attractive as a 
county-level city for external investors; and more importantly, it is very difficult 
for a town to acquire the central approval for constructing national-level 
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environmental protection or high-technology industrial park and there is none 
at the moment” (A researcher from NIGLAS, interview, 2nd August 2013).  
Based on the interviewee’s experience and explanation, it is highly likely the local 
government’s logic that the title of ‘national level environmental protection industrial 
park’ is able to become more attractive for existing and potential investors. Apart 
from local business, the park at last successfully brought in “more than 140 foreign-
funded investments from more than 20 international countries and places” (A director 
of Yixing ES and TP’s management committee, interview, 19th July 2013). However, 
it was still not successful to meet the original expectation of primarily concentrating 
environmental protection investments, and more importantly moving Gaosheng’s 
existing environmental protection business base into the park.  
 
The development path of Yixing ES and TP 
Although Yixing ES and TP is currently the only industrial park which aims to 
concentrate environmental protection industries under political control in China, the 
park has recently grown to cover many other high technological and environment-
friendly manufacturing categories, including electronics, mechanics, biological 
medicine, textile and fibre and such like. Again according to data from the 
Environmental Protection Department of Jiangsu Province, only 30 out of 320 
companies were related to the environmental protection industries in 2008. Here is 
another critical point relating to the transformation of the political aim from an initial 
focus on attracting environmental protection industries to recent diversified high-
technological manufacturing base. The statistical comparison between Yixing ES 
and TP and Gaosheng reveals that the proposed manufacturing agglomeration of 
environmental protection industries is not guaranteed for Yixing ES and TP, in this 
case at the expense of the local economic context, even under political intervention.  
Gaosheng has long been famous for its concentration of environmental protection 
industries. The political proposal of spatially relocating the environmental protection 
industry from Gaosheng to the industrial park is therefore difficult to achieve. An 
interview with a business leader in Gaosheng discloses his understanding about the 
conflict between market forces and political intervention: 
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“Although the Yixing government makes continuous attempts to persuade 
Gaosheng’s environmental protection businesses to shift towards the Yixing 
ES and TP by promising a variety of preferential treatments; … for example 
discounted industrial land sales and tax reduction or exemption for the early 
years operation; … however even taking into consideration all the promised 
preferential policy, we still believe that the relocation is not going to be a 
beneficial decision for us. Because: firstly we are able to take the advantage 
of existing industrial agglomeration in Gaosheng; and secondly, there will be 
the huge cost for the movement of entire business” (A business leader in 
Gaosheng, interview, 27th July 2013).  
There are two supplements to his statements for understanding the circumstance. 
Firstly, preferential policies apply to both of Gaosheng’s environmental protection 
industries & other potential inward investment. One prominent example is given by a 
business leader from Wuxi in the interview. He states that  
“as far as I know, about three thousand Mu (Mu: 1Mu = 667 square meters) of 
industrial land were sold to one Taiwan Enterprise at the rate of 30K Yuan per 
acre no more than ten years ago; but at almost the same time, the rate which 
was given to me is about 100K Yuan per Mu” (Owner of a chemical 
manufacturing business in Wuxi, interview, 07th August 2013).  
Secondly, the promised preferential treatments are to be weighed against 
Gaosheng’s existing advantage of industrial agglomeration. According to Gaosheng 
government’s ‘Planning Scheme of Innovation and Specialised Development for 
Gaosheng’ Environmental Protection Industries (Gaoshengzhen Huanbaochanye 
Chuangxinzhuanyefazhan Guihuafangan)’, more than 95% of Gaosheng’s business 
demands for raw and auxiliary materials can be met by the local supplier. 
Additionally, a long list of large national and foreign environmental protection 
companies which have subsidiaries or agency organisation in Gaosheng is disclosed 
by the report. This shows the international recognition of the significance of 
Gaosheng’s industrial agglomeration.  
For these remaining traditional labour-intensive manufacturers in the park area, there 
was no direct political order forcing them to vacate the occupied industrial land. 
Instead, local politics chose to encourage these businesses to voluntarily leave by 
204 
 
issuing incentives and compensation. This time the political promise accelerated 
business leaders’ decision making. The owner of a local chemical materials business 
says in the interview that,  
“At that time, the management committee constantly encouraged us to move 
out of Yixing ES and TP. The decision to relocate my production factory to 
somewhere else was finally made on a voluntary basis after considering a 
variety of factors. For example and firstly, the comparative operating costs 
between Yixing and other cities in Northern Jiangsu, including labour costs 
and tax reduction; secondly the shifting trend between the southern and 
northern Jiangsu for labour-intensive manufacturers, which was also 
encouraged by our government; thirdly much more rigid environmental 
regulations in Yixing ES and TP; and fourthly better transportation 
infrastructure in the YRD;… and finally a crucial one, the management 
committee’s promised compensation, such as purchasing our occupied 
industrial land at the market rate; … for my case in particular, I bought the 
land at 60k per Mu, and sold to the Yixing ES and TP at 300K per Mu; this 
transaction significantly accelerated my decision to leave” (A business leader 
from Wuxi, interview, 07th August 2013).  
As the interviewee’s statement shows, local government focuses on exercising direct 
influence over local business’ decision making through implementing rigorous 
environmental regulation, providing compensation for leaving businesses and 
actively establishing the connection between local business leaders and surrounding 
urban governments who are more willing to receive the labour-intensive 
manufacturers. So what we have witnessed is that local government constructs the 
Yingxing ES and TP for concentrating growing environmental protection industries 
which are considered to be a comparative newly rising sector through a serial of 
political interventions, despite Gaosheng being a better location for doing so. 
Although Gaosheng retained its primary manufacturing base for environmental 
protection industries, an increasing number of related investments, though at slow 
pace, are growing their businesses in the Yixing ES and TP.  
This case illustrates the active political intervention over local functional activities and 
potential competition for capital investments among political administrative 
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jurisdictions. In our case, the direct inter-city competition is less likely since 
Gaosheng is politically subordinated to Yixing government. On 4th July of 2012, 
Gaosheng became subordinated to Yixing ES and TP’s management committee and 
liable to Yixing ES and TP’s development planning and governance.  
In addition, there were expectations from local business leaders in the interviews 
about the responsibility of local governments in relation to the change of mega city-
regional business environment, which had been highlighted by the YRD regional 
plan. For example, borrowing the statement of a business leader from Gaosheng 
who has been manufacturing Environment Protection Facilities for many:  
“even today, after almost thirty years’ growth, we still have no unified official 
benchmark for manufacturing techniques and product quality in our 
environmental protection industry. Even not one unified standard for Yixing. … 
The benchmark should have been formulated under the lead of our 
government a long time ago” (A business leader from Gaosheng, interview, 
27th July 2013).  
The interviewee then adds that in the absence of industrial standardisation, it is 
difficult for local authorities and the market to supervise and regulate production 
quality. Without the official benchmark, it is challenging for local products to be 
transacted across political administrative territories because the mega city-regional 
market which covers many different cities and even provinces may struggle to 
compare products across the region in terms of quality. This leads to inappropriate 
market competition solely in the form of production costs and insufficient incentives 
for pursing qualitative improvements within the industry, which undermines the 
competitiveness of the environmental protection products in the regional, national 
and global market (see Wang, Dong and Shi, 2008). 
The YRD regional plan devotes one chapter calling for redefining the responsibility of 
local territorial politics in the mega city-regional functional development. Specifically, 
chapter ten recommends local governments to reduce their direct influence in local 
economic activities and then offer market forces to become more decisive in the 
distribution of capital investments within the mega city-regional market. Meanwhile 
local governments shall pay more attention to improving and integrating managing 
standards across three provincial territories in their role as supervisors. In particular, 
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there is one specific planning provision asking for the establishment of region-wide 
technical standards and mutual recognition systems for high-technological 
achievements. In our case of the Yixing ES and TP, the management committee 
chooses to invest substantial efforts in constructing the manufacturing base for 
environmental protection industry in the park and then growing the economic scale of 
the park. There has not been sufficient attention from local territorial politics towards 
the operating environment of functional activities in terms of cross-territorial 
standardisation.  
In short, the research of Yixing ES and TP reveals that local territorial politics has 
both the political interest and regulatory power to generate direct influence over the 
operation of local functional activities rather than supervising and regulating local 
socio-economic activities as administrative supervisors. Local economic decision-
making rights ensure local governments have the capability to compete with other 
territorial political authorities for many different economic activities amid the YRD’s 
mega city-regionalism. But why is there also an increasing possibility for local 
governments to conduct inter-territorial competition? In what circumstance does local 
government have increasing demand for the rivalry aiming for inward investments? 
According to Yixing ES and TP’s Industrial Development Planning for 2011-2015, the 
primary aim of the park is to grow the economic scale, including Gaosheng, to 100 
billion Yuan by 2015, which shall include 65 billion Yuan and 35 billion Yuan for 
manufacturing and service industries respectively. This clearly represents the GDP-
driven principle for the park’s future development. Bearing in mind the underlying 
principle is essential for us to understand the political mind-set within their focus on 
the functional expansion of their local political territory at this moment. The GDP-
oriented aim apparently enhances the possibility of emerging inter-city competition 
for inward investment. What is generating the continuous incentive for pursuing the 
GDP-driven growing aim? This question will be continued in the next section. 
 
7.4.2 The vertical and horizontal nature of geopolitics at the city-regional level  
An academic planner pointed out in the interview that “local governments should not 
take the full responsibility for the inter-city competition” (A professor from Nanjing 
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University, interview, 2nd August 2013), based on his rich experience of involvement 
in both national and local governments’ strategic planning projects. This raises some 
important questions, specifically: who else should be held accountable for causing 
local political rivalry; and how are these other parties prompting local governments to 
join in local competitions? Localised entrepreneurial governance has been explained 
as one of the most important causes for regional fragmentation in the past literatures 
(e.g. Xu and Yeh, 2011; Vogel, 2010). There is no denying the significance of this 
cause as this chapter has demonstrated. Entrepreneurialism is important for 
explaining local state’s economic decision-making in terms of its growth-driven 
nature after Chinese 1978 economic reform. However, past literatures often overlook 
the force behind the emergence of localised entrepreneurial governance. What is the 
local governments’ ultimate motivation for pursuing territorial economic growth, even 
if it sometimes means conducting hostile competition with neighbouring cities?  
Apparently no political enmity exists among provincial governments in Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Shanghai. Additionally, governmental officials’ salaries are not linked to 
the rate of local economic growth. Their concern was interpreted by an academic 
planner in the interview as,  
“these Chinese local governments … do not make the so-called trans-
jurisdictional ‘hostile competition’ which is frequently referenced by current 
literatures as an end in itself; … they compete to attract inward investments 
because they want to show better political accomplishments to their superior 
government in comparison with other political territories” (A professor in 
Nanjing University, interview, 2nd August 2013). 
Contrary to the decentralised economic decision-making rights, the Chinese national 
state centralises a range of other political administrative powers, such as macro 
strategic decision-making and political nomination rights (Zhou, 2003; Zhou 2004; 
Wang, Zhang and Qin, 2007). After the Chinese 1978 economic reform, the nation 
state started to realise the significance of discretionary decision-making for local 
political authorities; and the result is we no longer see the central state allocate 
specific mandatory assignments to local governments, such as the index-inclusive 
tasks which operated before the economic reform (Leaf, 1998; Li and Wu, 2012a). It 
is extremely difficult for the nation state to constantly keep up with the local changing 
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political-economic contexts across the national territory, not to mention scrutinising 
the local political achievements based on the changing contexts. Hence the 
asymmetric information between central and local governments is becoming the 
increasing concern for the central state to supervise and regulate the local political 
behaviour.  
Therefore, in order to effectively assess local governments’ political performance and 
ensure that their accomplishments would be able to generally serve for the national 
strategic aim, the Chinese central state currently chooses to rely on a range of 
economic indexes, including employment rate, tax income, GDP growth rate and 
such like (Zhou, 2003: 99). Among all of these indexes, the GDP growth rate for 
each local political administrative territory has been selected as the primary 
benchmark for assessing inferior governments inside the central-led state 
hierarchical organisation (Zhou, 2004: 34). More importantly, the comparison result 
generates direct influence over the potential promotion prospects of the local political 
officers.  
Li and Zhou (2005) investigated the historical cases of political promotion and 
termination among 254 provincial leaders who served in 28 Chinese provincial units 
from 1979 to 1995. Their conclusion was that “the likelihood of promotion of 
provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of 
termination decreases with their economic performance” (Li and Zhou, 2005: 1743). 
Their conclusion reinforced the academic planner’s statement in the interview who 
explained the political incentives behind local governments’ economic decision-
making. Their knowledge reflects on why promoting GDP growth, in our case 
expanding the economic scale for Yixing ES and TP, is given the priority by many 
local political authorities.  
Furthermore, the promotion of competition among local political officers across the 
national territory is argued as a ‘zero-sum’ game, given that only a limited number of 
officers can step up into higher ranking positions (Zhou, 2004; Wang, Zhang and Qin, 
2007). For example, the increasing possibility of political promotion for the mayor of 
Yixing is much more likely to undermine promoting opportunity for other county-level 
city mayors. This argument is fundamental for understanding the political logic within 
local economic decision-making. More importantly, this argument helps us 
209 
 
understand why enhancing economic outputs of local political territory could be 
favoured at great cost, including environment pollution and preferential treatment at 
discounted terms for inward investments. 
To make the argument even more complicated, Zhou (2004: 32) adds that Chinese 
local governments are encouraged to act not only in favour of growing the economic 
activities in their own administrative territory, but also against others’ economic 
growth. For example, and as mentioned in the last two chapters, there has been a 
long tradition for Chinese economic activities to operate in the context of geopolitical 
‘localism’. Liu Junde’s (2006) definition of ‘Administrative Region Economy’ 
recognised that the boundaries of local political jurisdictions were delimiting the scale 
of local functional activities in case they could spill-over across the political 
boundaries after the Chinese 1978 economic reform. Based on his research, the 
political boundary, in particular the provincial boundary, became the visible barrier for 
retaining local functional activities within each administrative jurisdiction. Although 
urban economic growth continued at a comparatively rapid rate in China after the 
1978 economic reform, the existence of ‘localism’ raised issues of economic 
fragmentation and inefficiency.  
In short, the GDP-driven benchmark for assessing local political performance within 
the central-led state hierarchical organisation has been able to create a GDP 
explosion during the past three decades as well as producing much concern about 
fierce competition among local governments. To counter this, we have initially seen a 
central intention and attempt to diversify the list of benchmarks largely towards 
environmentally friendly items during the last decade. Table 16 illustrates the central 
State Council’s specific command of reducing the environmental footprint in terms of 
reducing natural resources consumption and pollutant emissions within local 
economic development between 2006 and 2015. The impact of the transformation of 
central political interest has been reflected by the YRD’s three-level governance 
agenda. According to table 13, environmental protection has become one of the 
primary tasks for YRD’s regional cooperation almost at the same time. Such change 
reveals that the locational arrangements or decision-making still needs to respond to 
the nation state’s political interest although in a flexible way which may vary based 
on local intention and context. Therefore, following Harrison’s (2015b: 36) suggestion, 
we are agreeing with the realisation that “city-regions are not the quasi-autonomous 
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political-economic spaces many proponents of the new city-regionalism would have 
us believe”.  
Thinking beyond his argument, this section discussed the vertical and horizontal 
nature of geopolitics at the city-regional level in China. For the former vertical 
hierarchical administration, centrally designed benchmarks for assessing local 
political performance, such as GDP growth rate, and the resulting opportunities for 
personnel promotion in the Chinese governmental system are key to understand the 
top-down geopolitical impact in local and regional administrative agenda. Contrary to 
direct hierarchical control in the western mode of ‘centrally defined’ or ‘centrally 
dependent’ city-regionalism (see Herrschel, 2014: 104), what this thesis has 
witnessed in the YRD’s city-regional governmental framework, in the vertical 
dimension, is indirect top-down political impact which is primarily relating to the long-
existing Chinese wider political system, such as vertically controlled personnel 
promotion. We may find it difficult to believe that either Shanghai which is China’s 
most connected global city after Hong Kong, or the YRD which is one of China’s 
most developed mega city-regions would become free from regulatory shackles. 
Relating to the latter horizontal geopolitical relations, socio-economic connection 
plays a key role in facilitating the cross-jurisdictional cooperation mostly in the case 
of not jeopardising political officers’ promotion opportunity. Thus, local economic 
decision-making is able to reflect on locational circumstances while reacting to a 
wider national geopolitical context. Consequently, central and local geopolitical 
interests are negotiated at local and city-regional level in China differently compared 
to the western context.  
 
7.5 Conclusion: Conflicted economic-political considerations in the mega city-
regionalism 
This chapter does not intend to deny the significance of organising and operating 
collective governance for the YRD mega city-region. Also it is not our intention to 
determine whether the YRD’s current three-level governance framework is a 
completely successful arrangement. Rather, we pay attention to the ongoing 
territorial politics amid the geopolitical institutional arrangement rather than the 
existing structure of governance framework. Following Brenner’s (2004b, 2009) 
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suggestion of conducting contextually focused investigations, this chapter aims to 
study and understand the tensions faced by the YRD’s mega city-regionalism; and 
shed light on some of the comparative under-stated questions, such as: Why is the 
Chinese central state less likely to enforce another institutional arrangement for 
governing the emerging sub-national scale and in particular the implementation of 
the centrally-led YRD regional plan after dismantling the Shanghai EZPO? Why is 
the current three-level governance framework able to make evident progress about a 
broad but still limited range of aspects? Why do local territorial authorities choose to 
constantly generate direct impact over the operation of local socio-economic 
activities? This concluding section will link the findings from each of the previous 
sections and then reach a conclusion about a series of conflicted considerations in 
the geopolitical mega city-regionalism. The debate is raised on the basis of Chinese 
unique political-economic system, and one particular case study of politically-
controlled Yixing ES and TP.  
To begin with the Chinese 1978 economic reform, previous centralised economic 
decision-making rights were devolved towards local territorial authorities. The result 
is locational governance has been able to be tailored on the basis of local political-
economic contexts in favour of entrepreneurialism. Hence local governments started 
to act like business firm which means their decision-making was closely linked to the 
growth of territorial tax revenues. The case of politically-controlled Yixing ES and TP 
has examined local government’s enhanced likelihood and capability of generating 
direct impact in the operation of local economic activities even if it means to act 
against local market context. Relating to this perspective, local political rivalry is 
easily created, in particular when a group of neighbouring territorial governments are 
all seeking to improve the economic outputs within their political administrative 
jurisdictions. Local political-economic fragmentation thus generates serious 
challenges to the YRD’s internal consistency.  
Under this circumstance, the YRD’s three-level governance framework is making 
apparent progress in achieving collective governance in terms of a broad and limited 
range of aspects, meanwhile facing growing tensions from not being able to create 
political consensus about some particular aspects. The dilemma has been 
exemplified by Luo and Shen’s (2008, 2009) research about fierce rivalry for 
industrial distribution and infrastructure construction among three municipal 
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governments amid the implementation of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou regional plan. 
Consequently, the three-level governance framework has been operating on the 
basis of the principle of “recognising the common while reserving the differences” 
(Luo, 2011: 151). In relation to the part of ‘differences’, the political conflicts over a 
group of various functional items was left in abeyance in the YRD’s governance 
agenda for this stage.  
There are two main points which can be distilled from the operation of the YRD’s 
three-level governance framework. Firstly, current mega city-regionalism is closely 
related to territorial interests and political consensus. The decentralisation of 
economic decision-making rights and avoidance of central enforcement of 
governmental arrangement at the cross-provincial regional scale enables YRD’s 
networked governance to be conducted on a flexible and voluntary basis in 
accordance with locational political-economic contexts. Therefore, collective 
governance which reflects local political interests across a group of various 
administrative territories has been organised from below for governing at the mega 
city-regional scale in comparison with previous centrally orchestrated administrative 
arrangements.  
Secondly, it has been increasingly challenging for this single administrative 
arrangement to deal with a wide range of various socio-economic activities which all 
occupy their own specific functional spaces. There has been only partial integration 
in terms of a limited range of functional items where collective governance and policy 
can be applied at this broad cities-centric regional scale which covers three entire 
provincial territories. Relating to this perspective, current mega city-regionalism has 
not been able to prompt yet a single ideal governance framework for achieving 
comprehensive integration from below. 
In order to explain the Chinese GDP-oriented decision-making and its underlying 
intention to promote political rivalry amid the territorial politics, section 7.3 gives 
particular attention to local government’s logic embedded in their economic decision-
making. One of the most important concerns here is that the so-called ‘locational 
policy’ has been compromised by central state’s supervising system, including 
assessing local governments’ political achievements, such as GDP growth rate. 
Because the asymmetric information between central and local governments is 
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becoming an increasing concern for the central state to supervise and regulate the 
local political behaviour, the GDP-driven measurement becomes one of the most 
important tools for serving central supervisions. On the other hand and more 
importantly, the limited political promotion opportunities for a large group of local 
political officers largely rely on the assessment result. Therefore, it is to be expected 
that local economic decisions are formulated to generate positive, or at least not 
negative, achievements for central governments to view. It becomes clear that the 
central state is capable of making, more or less, impact over the constitution of 
locational arrangement which is expected to manage changing locational political-
economic contexts. Mega city-regionalism, under this circumstance, has been highly 
affected, though indirectly, by the central interest. It is not completely escaping from 
the administrative agenda of the state hierarchical organisation. 
Overall, current mega city-regionalism is a hybrid but conflicted ongoing process 
combining territorial politics and interlinked socio-economic relations. In particular, 
the territorial politics consist of considerations associated with both locational 
strategy as a response towards wider changing political-economic contexts from 
below and central interests and supervision from above. Similar to Jonas’s (2012: 
289) conclusion, “this is never simply a one-way process insofar as the national state 
must be self-interested in managing its own internal territoriality”. We have seen that 
collective governance and policy are trying to unite disparate material interests in 
relation to many different aspects across local territorialities. What also becomes 
apparent is the central indirect impact in the mega city-regional agenda. Therefore, 
there is the balance which cross-territorial collective governance must reach 
between pursuing the locational strategy for adapting to a changing socio-economic 
environment and following central interests and supervision in the mega city-regional 
agenda. Ultimately, conflicts are clear between geoeconomic and geopolitical 
processes in the construction of mega city-regional space. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Thesis summary 
This thesis set out to explore the constitutive role of politics in the construction of 
contemporary city-regional geographies by relating to the Yangtze River Delta (mega) 
city-region in China. Following the general recognition of the functional importance of 
emerging city-regional spaces and thereafter the political-economic expectation for 
the imagined success of potential city-regional spaces, we have witnessed many 
requests for setting out the appropriate governmental arrangements for managing 
and enhancing the economic success of these new spaces (e.g. Harrison, 2012c; 
Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Scott, 2001a). However, as chapter 2 explains, there 
has been too much emphasis on the economic prosperity in relation to city-regional 
spaces in terms of functional agglomeration and inter- and intra-regional functional 
relations. Consequently, emerging city-regions and their derivatives, including mega 
city-regions, to a large extent, have remained as our mental unit with blurry 
boundaries. More importantly, if it is unlikely that we can rely on the market itself to 
govern the identified functional spaces, then the involvement of a group of different 
economic, political and social actors in the construction and operation of city-regional 
governance frameworks becomes fundamental.  
On the other hand, the identified functional spaces change and expand on the basis 
of accelerated urbanisation and economic integration. Such uncertainty is therefore 
constantly challenging the involved political actors’ collective decision-making and 
the relevant mega city-regional administrative framework. Hence long-existing state 
scalar organisation, as one of the critical political actors, stands in an extremely 
awkward position while dealing with fast-paced changing economic geographies. 
Meanwhile, regional and local governments are each responsible for managing a 
fixed territory. They do not hold direct responsibilities for activities beyond their 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
Consequently, although we have seen proposals for linking the ‘stubborn’ conception 
of territory and scale with the relational viewpoints to re-introduce new city-
regionalism as some flexible ‘regional assemblages’ of social, economic and political 
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relationships (e.g. Allen and Cochrane, 2007), we still cannot deny that it becomes 
increasingly challenging for involved fragmented economic-political actors to 
voluntarily pursue the regional common interests in the face of a changing economic-
political context. This is particularly the case when the national state and a group of 
various local governments are proactively involved in the cross-territorial 
administrative agenda rather than withering away from the rise of city-regional 
geography, which Scott (2011a) and his proponents anticipated a decade ago.  
What is largely missing from the previous relational approach is a serious 
consideration of state scalar organisation and both the vertical and horizontal 
political relations among governments in the construction of mega city-regional 
geographies which usually covers a group of various political territories, and 
moreover, empirical evidence about how such political conditions interact, in either 
positive or conflictual ways, with social and economic actors in the emerging city-
regionalism. There is no way to think that local political actors will accept a new layer 
of governance which could generate potential conflicts with local interests and 
administrative capabilities without any resistance. Each local government has their 
own political-economic agenda for their administrative territories, which may not 
always correspond with the mega city-regional vision. Hence how to govern the 
cross-territorial functional space, which still largely remains ‘invisible’, becomes an 
urgent and crucial task for a group of diverse political-economic actors. 
Thereafter chapter 2 discusses the conceptual framework for empirical research in 
this thesis. Firstly, three distinct perspectives on conceptualising city-regions were 
each reviewed to justify this research about why and how the city-region shall be re-
constructed politically through understanding both wider and internal political-
economic conflicts and achieving the coalition of territorial interests across 
administrative jurisdictions around the enhancement of regional competitiveness. 
The geopolitical construction of city-regions had been comparatively overlooked by 
previous literatures in comparison to their geoeconomic significance within global 
economic networks. In particular, the research was initially inspired by Jonas and 
Ward’s (2007) recommendation that the city-region shall not be simply realised as a 
by-product of wider economic conditions and a finalised outcome of political 
orchestration, which primarily aims to enhance regional economic competitiveness, 
to engage with the on-going interplay among various political-economic actors amid 
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the constructing process of city-regional space and relevant institutional 
arrangements. It is then crucial to recognise that city-regional geographies are 
produced, reproduced, and struggled over on the basis of a variety of generative 
conditions and circumstances (Jonas and Ward, 2007). 
Meanwhile, three key questions, including who is involved, how they are involved 
and why they are involved, became the focus of this research while exploring the 
interaction of various political-economic actors in the spatial rescaling process (see 
more in Harrison and Growe, 2014b; Harrison and Hoyler, 2015c). Specifically, 
territorial interests were recognised by the research as the key to understanding the 
geopolitical dynamics in the construction of city-regions. Relating to this perspective, 
city-regional geographies and relevant governance structures are continuously 
modified as an ongoing process for fitting the specific purposes or the emerging 
coalition of interests (e.g. Brenner, 2004b; Freytag et al., 2006; Hoyler et al., 2006).  
Moreover, this research is also responding to Harrison’s (2015b) call of investigating 
the extent of internal coherence of, firstly, the contemporary varied city-regional 
construction and, secondly, the subsequent transformative state scalar structure. It is 
therefore fundamental to investigate and understand the emerging spatial scale, 
mega city-region in our case, as an integral part of the wider state scalar regulatory 
system. This thesis then follows advice from Brenner’s (2004b) ‘New State Spaces’ 
(NSS) framework and then illustrated the geopolitical city-regionalising process in 
favour of sub-national spatiality. As a consequence, external socio-economic 
relations shall not be over-referenced to evidence the quasi-autonomous existence 
of city-regions.  
The agglomeration model intensifies the recognition of the increasing significance of 
city-regional geographies in the global network around the world. While much of the 
prevailing focus has been on the Global North, there is increasing need for balancing 
the research attention towards East Asian, but in particular, Chinese mega city-
regions over the past decade. To start with the empirical research, it is essential to 
recognise that the locational specific political-economic contexts, including unique 
historic path of political-economic transformation, shall play a constructive role in the 
formulation and operation of the mega city-regional geography. The clues for 
understanding the motive for triggering the change of state spatiality and geographic 
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characteristics of new spatial units could be embedded in the historic trajectory of 
development. This thesis therefore has carefully researched the historic dimension of 
mega city-regionalism in the YRD. This is particularly important when there appears 
a surging interest in Asian mega city-regions while we are updating existing 
literatures about new city-regionalism, which are largely derived from North Atlantic 
case studies. Chapter 3 therefore analyses the historic transforming trajectory of the 
Chinese regional governance model since the establishment of the P.R. China in 
1949.  
During the centrally-controlled stage between 1949 and 1978, the great 
administrative regions were established in the middle of the hierarchical chain in 
order to ensure the central command to be enforced at the local level. Consequently, 
vertical control replaced horizontal connection as the prior relations among middle 
and local level authorities. Moreover, achieving region-wide spatial equality and self-
reliance became the focus of regional strategy for each great administrative region. 
In particular, cities had to give way to non-urban places in terms of population growth 
and economic investment for achieving even development within the regional 
jurisdiction.  
As a result of the shifting national interest between political concentration and 
economic advancement under the command of new central leadership, the 1978 
economic reform triggered the decentralisation of economic decision-making rights 
toward local governments. Therefore, urban authorities became the dominant force 
amid the formulation and operation of the local administrative agenda. Urban 
jurisdictions replaced the previous great administrative regions to become the 
primary spatial unit for organising economic, political and social activities. In 
particular, inter-city competition for capitalist investments started emerging on the 
basis of growth-oriented development strategies.  
After experiencing two decades of economic growth and capital accumulation, there 
has been increasing attention towards the switch between previously achieving 
economic growth and resource distributing efficiencies entrenched in urban 
jurisdictions, and building administrative efficiency and economic rationality at larger 
cross-jurisdictional scales among the scholars and government planners since 2000s. 
Or in other words, the local political divisions and boundaries acted as invisible and 
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proactive barrier which entrenched the capitalist interments in the political territory 
and then significantly undermined the functional relations among urban spaces.  
Before we relate the theory of new city-regionalism to the YRD which is seen as one 
of China’s economic engines, we must think of the above-mentioned historic path 
very carefully. There has been a long tradition for the state-controlled hierarchical 
organisation to proactively participate in the administration over socio-economic 
activities at all sub-national scales. Along with the transmission of economic 
decision-making powers along the hierarchical political chain, different levels of 
governmental territories, including great administrative regions and urban 
jurisdictions, take each of their turn to emerge as the dominant scale for attracting 
and containing socio-economic activities at different stages. On the other hand, 
political purposes, including national strategic interests and sub-national 
administrative efficiency, have provided the primary motives for triggering change or 
reorganisation of state spatiality since the establishment of P.R. China in 1949.   
Following to the latest stage which began with the turn of the 21st century, chapter 3 
explained the choice of the YRD as this thesis’ research location amid the rise of 
Chinese mega city-regions by producing a comparative discussion of the YRD, PRD 
and JJJ, and relating the YRD to both the centrally issued regional plan and the 
context of its sub-regional planning and governance. Chapter 4 then introduced the 
methodology framework employed by the thesis and then explains why it is 
appropriate for conducting research in the Chinese context. Thirty-two semi-
structured interviews were conducted with governmental officers, business leaders 
and other key stakeholders in summer 2013. Other useful documentary and 
numerical data were gathered from local governments and regional bureaus’ 
websites to contextualise interviewees’ statements. 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate the ‘constitutive role of politics’ 
in the spatial construction of the Yangtze River Delta (mega) city-region. By 
following this aim, there were three main research objectives, including: firstly to 
account for the transformation of the YRD as a new state space; secondly to analyse 
how new (mega) city-regional governance and institutional arrangements can 
enhance the YRD’s competitive capabilities in the global economy; and finally to 
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analyse the struggles and tensions around (mega) city-regional governance and the 
barriers to regional integration. 
In reply to the first research objective, chapter 5 examined the expanding process of 
mega city-regional administrative jurisdiction, which reflects the enlarging functional 
spaces, by relating to, firstly, the transition between the narrow sense and the broad 
sense of YRD and, secondly, dynamic territorial politics in terms of the interaction 
among provincial and prefectural level governments. Specifically, the second half of 
chapter 5 focused on the spatial transformation of traditional chemical manufacturing 
enterprises between the YRD’s core functional space and surrounding peripheral 
area under the administration of the state scalar organisation. One of the principal 
tasks for the mega city-regional governance framework is to secure the reflection of 
various cross-territorial political interests in the collective governance by maintaining 
constant interaction among a flexible group of political stakeholders. Moreover, it is 
not enough to solely rely on the economic relation in prompting the construction of 
mega city-regional space. Institutional communication and bargaining among 
provincial and local governments are needed for containing the extended functional 
activities within their own territorial jurisdictions through a continued timeline.  
Chapter 6 discussed the appropriateness of current mega city-regional governance 
and institutional arrangements by referring to the competitive capabilities of the YRD. 
The three-level governance framework has experienced continuous expansion and 
re-structuration for nearly two decades, beginning with the establishment of YRD 
Coordination Association of Urban Economies (YRD CAUE) in 1997. The framework 
is still wide open for more modifications in order to adapt to potential economic-
political challenges. The main reason for achieving such flexibility is that the three-
level governance framework is able to provide a bargaining platform for a group of 
local governments to reach political consensus and mutual trust which significantly 
facilitate the enforcement of collective governance, including the general realisation 
of the need for ‘recognising the common while reserving the differences’. Therefore, 
flexibility and bottom-up orchestration are two fundamental characteristics of the 
mega city-regional governance framework which is able to cope with global 
economic change, national political requirements, and internal changing economic-
political contexts. 
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Finally, chapter 7 explored the emerging weaknesses of the mega city-regional 
governance for the third research objective. The case of politically-controlled Yixing 
ES and TP reveals local government’s enhanced likelihood and capability of 
generating direct impact in the operation of local economic activities even if it means 
to act against the local market context. Hence ‘differences’ among local political 
interests remain as a challenge to the coherence of mega city-regional structure on 
the basis of political territories. The geopolitical divergence also leads to competitive 
rivalry between political territories. Reflecting on such struggles at the mega city-
regional level, there are clear signs of, firstly prioritising national political interest, 
including GDP-driven development model, before specific considerations of the local 
context even in the mega city-regional administration; and secondly it remains 
difficult to cover all categories of socio-economic activities in one single mega city-
regional governance framework.  
 
8.2 Contribution to the theory of ‘new city-regionalism’ 
The findings of this thesis improve our understanding of the construction process of 
mega city-regions through (1) engaging with the political involvement in the ongoing 
process of city expansion into larger city-regions, (2) analysing the political 
contribution to sustaining mega city-regional competitive capabilities, and (3) 
highlighting emerging obstacles in the attempt to create mega city-regional 
coherence. In short, this research is looking at how the city-region is constructed and 
modified politically in the wider political-economic conditions.  
As chapter 2 discusses, city-regions and their derivatives, including mega city-
regions, are replacing cities to become the primary spatial scale for organising 
human activities amid contemporary globalisation. However, both American form-
based and European relation-oriented mega city-regionalisms are questioned about 
the appropriateness of this scale for practical use, including the institutional 
arrangement for mega city-regional governance in our case, in the context of global 
economic integration and urbanisation (e.g. Harrison, 2015b; Harrison and Hoyler, 
2015c; Herrschel, 2014; Jonas and Ward, 2007; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon and 
Shaw, 2010). What is missing from current city-regional literatures is detailed 
empirical research into the role of political actors in matching the emerging city-
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regional administrative jurisdictions with cross-territorial functional spaces, 
particularly in a non-Western context. The principal expectation of this thesis is then 
to inject such a political contribution around the topic of enhancing city-regional 
comprehensive competitiveness into the theory of the new city-regionalism by 
relating to the Chinese YRD mega city-region to provide comparative research in 
relation to the dominant North Atlantic case studies.  
Although there has been a general agreement about the significance and urgency of 
governing mega city-regional spaces collectively by a group of actors rather than 
relying on the market itself in order to preserve and enhance their wealth and well-
being, conflicts are evident about who and how to organise and operate cross-
territorial governance. The existing geopolitical literature has critiqued that the 
previous relation-dominated discourses fell short of full realisation of extant state 
scalar organisation in the emergence of new mega city-regionalism (e.g. Brenner, 
2004b; Cox, 2010; Jonas and Ward, 2007; Harrison, 2015b). Thereafter the 
importance of understanding and constructing the mega city-regional governance as 
an interlinked scale within the state-led scalar regulatory system has been 
recognised. However, the lack of constitutional legitimacy is differentiating the mega 
city-regional scale of governance from the long-existing political hierarchical system 
as its legitimate existence, regulatory power and responsibilities are not secured by 
statutory provisions. Hence we have to consider how to delimit the functional spatial 
scope and then enforce collective governance within contained local territorial 
jurisdictions, which lacks detailed consideration and empirical evidence in the 
existing academic literature.  
Consequently, it is crucial to ensure the reflection of local political interests in the 
mega city-regional agenda in order to enable collective governance. Relating to the 
YRD’s mega city-regional governance, a locally orchestrated three-level framework 
is found to facilitate the mutual exchange and understanding of local political 
considerations across territorial jurisdictions. The framework acts as an interacting 
platform for local governments to constantly exchange their interests and concerns, 
including territorial GDP growth and environmental protection, in order to build trust 
and reach consensus about, for example, how to organise and supervise the spatial 
transformation of capitalist investments in the YRD’s mega city-regional scope.  
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From another perspective, the framework not only prompts the functional 
transformation towards high technological manufacturing and service industries in 
the core YRD, but also contains the traditional labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries in the extended regional and more importantly peripheral provincial 
territories. Functional linkages that existed in the primary urban jurisdiction have 
been extended into the surrounding less-developed administrative territories under 
the co-lead of local governments. At this moment, such a mega city-regionalising 
process has largely remained in the contiguous prefectural level jurisdictions which 
locate in the fixed provincial level boundaries, including Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
Shanghai.  
The empirical evidence considers the construction of mega city-regional geography 
as a process of producing and reproducing a new spatial scale through proactively 
building the coalition of territorial interests from internal perspective around a variety 
of economic, political and even social subjects. Constructing city-regional geography 
is then operated as a temporal solution for improving the regional comprehensive 
competitiveness in the face of changing wider economic pressure and central 
political demand. This is continuously happening on the basis of what Jonas and 
Ward (2007) called ‘the variety of generative conditions and circumstances’ which 
keep changing all the time. But differently, the research explains how the mega city-
regional agenda is built to improve the regional comprehensive competitiveness in 
the global network, in comparison with current geopolitical debates primarily around 
re-distribution and social reproduction (e.g. Brenner, 2004a; Jonas and Ward, 2007; 
McGuirk, 2007). This research is bringing back the topic of geoeconomic 
competitiveness while considering the geopolitical construction of city-regional 
geography. The connection between geoeconomic and geopolitical actors has not 
been seriously discussed since city-regional geographies and relevant institutional 
arrangements were previously over-referenced as the by-product of wider economic 
conditions.  
Contrary to the topics of re-distribution and social reproduction, one of the primary 
struggles and conflicts faced by emerging subnational scales are considered by this 
research as the divergence between geoeconomic and geopolitical actors in the 
case of the YRD mega city-region. It is insufficient to solely rely on socio-economic 
actors to build and improve the relational connection among cities and their regions 
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under the demand of establishing mega city-regional geographies. Chapter 5 
suggests that territorial interests shall be treated as one of a number of constitutive 
elements in the construction of mega city-regional space. It has become apparent 
that local governments have the intention and capability to attract and contain the 
socio-economic activities in their administrative territories. It is noted that the 
transformation of mega city-regional space shall be reflected in the spatial 
combination of political territories, and more importantly contained, though flexibly, 
by the fixed political territories, which is largely overlooked by current literatures. 
Therefore, it is essential to organise an ongoing bargaining process, which is 
supported and sustained by the YRD’s three-level framework, before reaching the 
coalition of territorial interests for the mega city-regional agenda.  
According to Jonas (2013: 287), one of the central geopolitical challenges facing city-
regions is “how to unite what are in many respects disparate material interests within 
– and hence different parts of – the city-region into a cohesive territorial unit”. One of 
the contributions this thesis makes towards this challenge is to exemplify a cross-
territorial governance framework which unites disparate territorial interests in many 
various aspects step by step over a span of more than one decade. Unlike many 
other city-regional literatures, which focus on evaluating the appropriateness of the 
outcome of institutional arrangements in terms of the regional plan and governmental 
agenda, chapter 6 examined the YRD’s three-level framework’s capability of being 
able to detect and adapt to new regional challenges through its past institutional 
evolvement at a sustainable rate. Bottom-up orchestration ensures the structural 
upgrade to be made flexibly and timely in the face of emerging political-economic 
pressures. Both the decision-making level and coordination level were established to 
involve provincial level governments in the framework when the bottom execution 
level struggled to ensure the interaction among a group of local governments which 
hold different political ranks, including provincial, vice-provincial and prefectural 
levels, to be conducted on an effective basis. Meanwhile, the number of task groups, 
as an integral part of the execution level, has been constantly adjusted in 
accordance with changing regional interests during different time periods.  
On the other hand, it has been too simple to mention the mega city-regional 
collective governance as an institutional arrangement for uniting local economic-
political interests across political jurisdictions. Hence, this thesis brings up extended 
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detailed debates about cross-territorial unions of many various aspects of territorial 
interests in comparison with many existing literatures. Specifically, each task group 
in the three-level framework is responsible for coordinating and governing the 
particular category of socio-economic activities across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Hence urgent and regionally-agreed tasks shall be prioritised through the 
establishment and operation of the specific administrative group. Moreover, mature 
cross-territorial cooperation over specific aspects shall trigger the independence of 
the corresponding task group from the lead of the three-level framework. The 
flexibility of the three-level framework enables the YRD’s mega city-regional 
governance to function under the principle of ‘recognising the common while 
reserving the differences’ and sustain its operation on the basis of mutual trust and 
consensus. The sustainability and bottom-up orchestration are two fundamental 
characteristics of the YRD’s mega city-regional governance framework. More 
importantly, the thesis borrows Herrschel’s (2002: 207) statement to reach the 
argument that, “a clear benefit from participation in this for the individual locality 
needs to be visible”. This is crucial for understanding how the new institutional 
arrangements for city-regional governance shall become compatible with existing 
state-controlled administrative organisation, which is territorially embedded.  
Pushing further debates around the conflicts between geoeconomic and geopolitical 
actors in the construction of city-regional geographies, this research has also 
contributed to the exploration of the struggles and tensions faced by Chinese mega 
city-regionalism. As existing literatures mention, the mismatch between functional 
geography and administrative jurisdiction is preventing the new city-regional space 
from best performing (Bennett, 1997; Harrison, 2012b, 2012c). Extending from the 
theory, this thesis provides detailed empirical evidence for dividing the general 
recognition of functional activities into a variety of concrete aspects. Although the 
thesis has seen the YRD expanding to cover the extended functional relations as a 
consequence of regional economic structural transformation, the YRD’s three-level 
framework has to show respect to the other emerging ‘differences’ which is 
constituted to the regionally agreed principle of ‘recognising the common while 
reserving the differences’. This is reflected by the operation of task groups in the 
execution level. Task groups are standing for a number of distinct socio-economic 
activities which are recognised to be the proper aspects for engagement by the 
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cross-territorial collective governance through the continuous timeline. Therefore, the 
challenge is apparent that a single framework is not able to cover all various 
categories of functional activities at the mega city-regional level.  
For further relating the YRD’s mega city-regionalism with the existing state scalar 
organisation, chapter 7 also contributes to explain the primary motivations for local 
governments’ direct intervention in the territorial socio-economic activities, which 
often results in intra-regional conflicts. Many existing literatures focus on illustrating 
inter-city competition and call for a debate about governmental decision in favour of 
either ‘soft’ cross-territorial governance or ‘hard’ consolidated regional government. 
What is comparatively missing are the primary motivations underlying such growth-
oriented competition in relation to non-western contexts.  
In our case of the YRD, the GDP-driven measurement becomes an essential tool for 
the Chinese central state to evaluate local political achievements. Local political 
officers’ potential promotion prospects largely rely on such central assessment 
results. It is therefore becoming evident that local governments have the intention to 
find the balance between achieving local territorial GDP growth and shifting towards 
mega city-regional vision under supervision of the central state. This is challenging 
the enforcement of YRD’s collective governance which is organised on the basis of 
local political-economic voluntary agreements. The point this thesis can extract from 
the case of the YRD is that specific context-sensitive research is much needed in 
order to understand how the central state generates direct or indirect intervention in 
any unique mega city-regional governance. Such empirical evidence shall be able to 
reveal how the new mega city-regionalism is ‘layering’ into the locational economic-
political contexts with unique and varied constitution. 
In conclusion, this thesis strongly argues that mega city-regionalism must be 
considered as an economic-political conflicted process, responding to both a 
geoeconomic logic for constructing an agglomeration model in a wider connected 
network and to geopolitical claims for territorial interests in the context of the unique 
state scalar politics. Specifically, assembling a group of cities and their regions into a 
mega city-region has been completed under collective political co-operation in the 
case of YRD. This even means that geoeconomic aspects have become, more or 
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less, subservient to the geopolitical interests and dynamics. The thesis’ argument 
follows Herrschel’s (2014: 168) suggestion that: 
“the governance of city regions is a product of a complex interaction between 
continuously changing external and internal parameters which impose a 
dynamic framework for the impact of globally defined economic pressures, 
and the relationship between, cities and state in terms of territoriality, and 
democratic principles and legitimacies”; 
It also borrows from the notion of ‘compromised city-regionalism’, which explains the 
geopolitics of city-regionalism as “the mediated outcome of trans-regional economic 
flows and political claims to territory” (Harrison, 2010: 17). Finally, this thesis extends 
these arguments for considering the geopolitics of city-regionalism by providing a 
deeper understanding of the processes underpinning the political construction of the 
mega city-regional scale under the direct or indirect control of top-down political 
decision-making by focusing on the conflicted relationship between geoeconomic 
and geopolitical considerations. On the other hand, it is crucial for mega city-regional 
research not to judge the relevant institutional arrangements for governance solely 
based on either the temporal structure of the framework or territorial constitution of 
the spatial unit. Rather, more attention must be focused on the mega city-region’s 
capabilities to recognise and adapt sustainably to emerging challenges.  
In order to highlight how contemporary city-regionalising processes were 
provincialised in the Chinese context – identified as one of the most important 
contributions that this thesis aims to produce – Table 17 presents comparative 
evidence from three perspectives identified as starting points for constructing city-
regions (population, geoeconomics, geopolitics) for the North American, European 
and Chinese contexts. Highlighting important differences between each context, this 
provides an overview of why my thesis is arguing that existing theories of ‘new city-
regionalism’, which are primarily derived from a ‘western theory’ that draws on the 
North American and European contexts, is currently ill-equipped to satisfactorily 
account for how city-regionalism is unfolding in the Chinese context. Indeed, it is my 
argument that this thesis should be able to provide a starting point for arguing why 
we need to better understand different varieties of city-regionalism generally, and 
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Chinese city-regionalism in particular – something which requires less borrowed 
concepts and more concepts which emerge from detailed empirical work in situ. 
To unpack this further, as Table 17 reveals, China is experiencing much more 
explosive growth relating to population and economic expansion than two main 
representatives of the Global North. In relation to the geopolitical perspective, the 
thesis investigates the unique Chinese political context, including the one-party 
system and highly-centralised macro strategic planning and political nomination 
rights, and then explores a new mode of ‘locally-orchestrated regionalism’ embedded 
in the indirect state scalar control, such as the GDP-led political performance 
appraisal system; local concern in favour of jurisdictional economic growth; and 
extended inter-city relations in wider provincial territories. Importantly, in contrast 
with surging interest in re-distribution and social reproduction as an alternative 
concern for politically constructing mega city-regional geographies in the western 
literature, for empirical research in the Global South, like China’s YRD mega city-
region, the primary motivation behind, and barriers to, mega city-regionalism is 
closely connected to territorial economic growth.  
Furthermore, as chapter 1 argues, the Chinese context is very specific and therefore 
the Chinese version of city-regionalism shall not be easily applied to the rest of Asian 
city-regionalism or other cases in the wider Global South. Conducting more context-
sensitive empirical research around mega city-regional governance in the Global 
South would be fundamental for exploring more appropriate comparative evidence 
and arguments in order to improve the existing theories of ‘new city-regionalism’.  
This thesis contributes to the understanding of new city-regionalism by illustrating the 
constitutive role of politics in the construction of mega city-regions on the basis of 
detailed empirical research. The latter is critical because, although much detailed 
empirical research has been conducted on city-regions in North America, Western 
Europe and Asia, conceptual accounts of the rise of mega city-regionalism have 
been almost exclusively developed from research undertaken in North America and 
Western Europe. But whereas city-regionalism in these two contexts is derived from 
studying city-regions of a particular size and dynamism, city expansion into larger 
city-regions is occurring at a scale and pace never before seen.  
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Table 17: Framing North American, European and Chinese city-regionalism 
 United States 
 
European Union China 
Population 
 
(2010) (2010) (2010) 
Number of cities: 
 
1 million + 
 
5 million+ 
 
10 million + 
 
20 million + 
 
 
39 
 
3 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
31 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
79 
 
8 
 
2 
 
0 
Urban population 
(’000) 
261,375 371,875 635,839 
Level of 
urbanisation 
82.3% 73.72% 47% 
Geoeconomics 
 
(2013) (2014) (2014) 
Economic profile: 
 
Primary 
 
Secondary 
 
Tertiary 
 
 
 
 
1.4% 
 
20.5% 
 
78.1% 
 
 
 
1.52% 
 
23.75% 
 
74.73% 
 
 
 
9.2% 
 
42.7% 
 
48.1% 
Rate of economic 
expansion 
2.2% 1.29% 7.3% 
Geopolitics 
 
   
Political structure 2 party system (Democrat, 
Republican) 
Multi-party systems 1 party system 
(Communist Party) 
Centre-local 
relations 
Federal – local government 
rooted in localism and 
providing services for the local 
community 
Mixture – many state centric 
governance structures 
Highly-centralised political 
powers, including macro 
strategic planning and political 
nomination rights, while 
devolved economic decision-
making rights towards provincial 
and prefecture governments 
Business 
involvement 
Entrepreneurial 
“growth coalitions” 
More statist, protectionist 
“streak” - 
“public-private partnerships” 
Conflicted geoeconomic and 
geopolitical relations – 
fragmented regional market in 
favour of jurisdictional economic 
growth 
Primary concern 
for geopolitical 
city-regionalism 
Facilitating and planning 
comprehensive urban-
economic expansion 
Various alternative concern, 
including economic growth, 
democracy, re-distribution and 
social reproduction 
Promoting economic growth 
embedded in respective 
territorial jurisdiction 
Starting point for 
defining mega city-
regions 
Urban form Functional Population 
Production of 
Scales 
Informal, network-based and 
self-organising principles of 
regionalisation 
Centrally orchestrated 
regionalism and regionally 
orchestrated centralism 
Locally orchestrated regionalism 
City – State 
relations 
Liberally inclined, pioneering-
inspired mentality – against 
state regulation (or 
community-based control) 
Strong autonomous state 
function – even substituting 
statehood (or government 
control) 
Indirect state scalar control in 
the form of centralised political 
nomination rights – GDP-led 
political performance appraisal 
system 
Jurisdictional 
boundary for mega 
city-regional 
governance 
Extending to fulfil the 
requirement of community-
based control – even 
sometimes means to be blur 
Fixed but usually 
“compromised city-
regionalism” 
Extending to capture peripheral 
and other interlinked functional 
areas 
Cross-border 
connection 
Raised borders – cities are 
firmly embedded inside except 
special cases, i.e. New York or 
Los Angeles 
Open borders – integration 
and cross-border cooperation 
Opening borders – cross-border 
cooperation 
Source: Compiled from UN-Habitat (2013), The World Bank website, Herrschel (2014) and the thesis.  
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This thesis has therefore examined the applicability of Western-derived city-region 
concepts, vocabulary and frameworks for understanding the geopolitics of city-region 
formation as a first step in considering the importance of developing city-region 
theory from China and the east. The next step of research in this field should be the 
refinement of comparative work for North American, Western European and Chinese 
mega city-regionalisms by considering other Chinese mega city-regions. Looking 
beyond China, city-regionalising processes embedded in other Asian contexts (and 
beyond) shall be useful – and indeed, necessary – for enriching the theory of ‘new 
city-regionalism’. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewee details 
 
ID Length of 
Interview 
 
Category Titles Responsibilities and Relevant Biographies 
1 150 minutes Government 
Official 
Chief Officer of Yixing 
Economic and Information 
Technology Commission 
(EITC) 
1. EITC was the crucial participator of seven 
out of ten city-regional task groups within the 
YRD’s governance framework. 
 
2. Facilitating intra- and inter-city interaction 
and cooperation in relation to the business and 
trade management. 
 
2 120 minutes Business 
Leader 
 
Entrepreneur Mineral material manufacturing business in 
Wuxi. 
3 120 minutes Academic 
Professor 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
1. Leading five national and Shanghai 
municipal governments-funded scientific 
research and consultant projects in relation to 
urban planning and manufacturing clusters; 
 
2. Urban and Regional Economy Department; 
 
3. Research interest in regional economy and 
business cluster amid globalisation. 
 
4 120 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Urban and 
Demographic Studies of the 
Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences (SASS) 
1. Member of comprehensive team for 
formulating YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Participating in several YRD’s research and 
consultant projects which are organized by 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang’s provincial-
level governments together. 
 
5 60 minutes Academic 
Professor 
Professor in Business 
School of Shanghai Fudan 
University 
1. Member of Shanghai Academy of 
Development and Reform which is subordinate 
to Shanghai Municipal Development and 
Reform Commission and providing 
consultancy service for the latter in relation to 
economic and social development and reform 
issues; 
 
2. Officer of YRD Research School in Fudan 
University. 
 
6 120 minutes Academic 
Professor 
Professor in the Urban 
Study Center in East China 
Normal University 
1. Member of Regional Planning and Urban 
Economy Committee in China Association of 
City Planning which is subordinate to the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development of PR. China. 
 
2. Organizing several national government-
funded research projects in relation to the 
development of YRD’s spatial space. 
 
7 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Urban and 
Demographic Studies of 
SASS 
1. Member of comprehensive team for 
formulating YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Rich experience of leading and participating 
national and provincial level governments-
funded research and consultant projects. 
 
8 75 minutes Government 
Official 
Director of Investment 
Promotion Department of 
Nanjing Municipal 
Government 
Part of policy-making for attracting demanded 
labor, capital investment and other resources. 
His department has key influence over the 
Nanjing industrial structure. 
 
9 90 minutes Business 
Leader 
Entrepreneur Powder Material Manufacturing Business in 
Changzhou. 
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10 60 minutes Government 
Official 
Government Official Chief Officer of Economic Development 
Bureau in China Yixing Industrial Park for 
Environmental Science and Technology 
(ESandTP). ESandTP is a national level High-
technology industrial development zone which 
was approved by the central State Council in 
1992. ESandTP experienced the 
transformation between traditional 
manufacturing and high-technological 
industries within its jurisdiction during last two 
decades. 
 
11 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in Business 
School of Shanghai Fudan 
University 
1. Leading several national and Shanghai 
municipal governments funded projects, 
included Ministry of Education’s research in 
urban agglomeration and coordinated 
development of urban spatial space in YRD, 
and Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development’s research in urbanisation 
process and assessment of Urban and Rural 
Planning Law. 
 
2. Leading urban economic development 
research at the invitation of a variety of local 
governments. 
 
12 150 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
1. Senior member of expert tem for formulating 
YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Extreme extensive experience of educating, 
researching and providing consultancy for 
different level governments in relation to 
YRD’s city-regional strategic development, 
sustainable development and population 
mobility and etc. 
 
13 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
1. Leading a large number of national and 
local government’s research and consultant 
projects in Shanghai; 
 
2. Research interest in urbanisation, regional 
economy and regional governance. 
 
14 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
1. Leading a range of research and consultant 
projects for Shanghai Municipal Development 
and Reform Commission and The 
Development Research Centre of Shanghai 
Municipal Government in relation to the YRD’s 
regional integration and economic 
development, and cross-jurisdictional 
governance; 
 
2. Large number of publications in studying the 
‘new regionalism’. 
 
15 120 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Urban and 
Demographic Studies of 
SASS 
1. Member of comprehensive team for 
formulating YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Leading a range of research and consultant 
projects for NDRC, Shanghai Municipal 
Development and Reform Commission, and 
The Development Research Centre of 
Shanghai Municipal Government in relation to 
the YRD’s regional integration and economic 
development, and cross-jurisdictional 
governance. 
 
16 60 minutes Business 
Leader 
Entrepreneur Environment Protection Facilities 
Manufacturing Business in Wuxi. 
 
17 40 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in Nanjing 
University 
1. Member of comprehensive team for 
formulating YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Participating a range of research and 
consultant projects for NDRC, Jiangsu 
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provincial government, and Anhui Provincial 
Development and Reform Commission. 
 
18 30 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in Nanjing Normal 
University 
Leading a range of national government-
funded research projects in relation to the 
transformation of spatial construction, 
distribution of spatial function and regional 
conflicts in YRD. 
 
19 120 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Nanjing 
Institute of Geography and 
Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences 
(NIGLAS) 
 
Member of expert team for formulating YRD 
regional plan; 
 
20 80 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Nanjing 
Institute of Geography and 
Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences 
(NIGLAS) 
 
Member of expert team for formulating YRD 
regional plan - he was responsible for 
contributing to the provisional chapters of 
population and regional industrial layout in the 
regional plan. 
21 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Nanjing 
University 
1. Leading a range of provincial and municipal 
level governments funded research and 
consultant projects mainly in relation to the 
urban and regional plan in YRD; 
 
2. Translating several important western city-
regional publications from English to Chinese. 
 
22 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Lecturer in Nanjing 
University 
A range of publications in the European 
Journals in relation to the governance of YRD. 
 
23 75 minutes Business 
Leader 
Entrepreneur Raw mineral powder manufacturing business 
in Wuxi. 
 
24 60 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in Nanjing Normal 
University 
1. Leading a range of national and local 
governments-funded research and consultant 
projects in relation to regional cluster and 
innovation; 
 
2. Particular research interest in the 
comparative study between Chinese and 
European city-regional governance; 
 
25 60 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in Nanjing Normal 
University 
Leading a range of national and local 
governments-funded research and consultant 
projects in relation to inter- and intra-regional 
conflicts; 
 
26 45 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
1. Participating a range of municipal 
governments’ formulation of urban plan – he 
focused on industrial layout; 
 
2. Research interest in the planning of 
transportation among urban spaces. 
 
27 75 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Professor in East China 
Normal University 
Leading a range of national and local 
governments-funded research and consultant 
projects in relation to regional cluster and 
innovation; 
 
28 60 minutes Government 
Official 
Chief Officer of the Regional 
Cooperation and Exchange 
Office of Shanghai Municipal 
Government 
Shanghai keeps the YRD Economic 
Coordination Association’s (ECA) liaison 
office, named The Regional Cooperation and 
Exchange Office of Shanghai Municipal 
Government, as a part of the Shanghai 
Municipal government 
 
29 50 minutes Business 
Leader 
Senior manager Raw mineral powder manufacturing business 
in Wuxi. 
 
30 60 minutes Business 
Leader 
 
Senior manager Construction business in Wuxi. 
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31 90 minutes Academic 
Researcher 
Researcher in Urban and 
Demographic Studies of 
SASS 
1. Senior member of comprehensive team for 
formulating the YRD regional plan; 
 
2. Member of Shanghai Academy of 
Development and Reform which is subordinate 
to Shanghai Municipal Development and 
Reform Commission. 
 
32 90 minutes Government 
Official 
Chief Officer of Yixing 
Economic and Information 
Technology Commission 
(EITC) 
1. EITC was the crucial participator of seven 
out of ten city-regional task groups within the 
YRD’s governance framework. 
 
2. Facilitating intra- and inter-city interaction 
and cooperation in relation to the business and 
trade management. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
 
General Questions 
1. How is the concept of YRD defined? Defined by whom? Based on what 
measurement? Economic? Political? Others? 
2. Has the above-defined YRD’s boundary evolved/changed over time? If so, 
when and why?  
3. Are the above-defined boundaries contentious? 
 
Transformation of the YRD as a state space 
4. When was the initial sign for YRD, included Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 
to become a state-coordinated space for planning and governance? YRD 
Economic Coordination Association (Changsanjiao Jingji Xietiaohui) in 1992? 
5. Who was the main driving force behind the found of the YRD ECA? NDRC? 
6. How do association members reach agreement about the decision on cross-
jurisdictional governance? 
7. How does association force its decision? Over industrial layout? Any difficulty? 
8. Why expansion of association? Expansion of functional space? State-led 
expansion? Industrial transformation at larger scale?  
9. Is there a sense that by making the YRD bigger it will make it more 
economically competitive? 
10. Where does the YRD fit within the national planning/economic development 
strategy? 
11. Are there competing visions for the economic development of YRD? 
 
YRD’s governance framework at the city-regional scale 
12. What is the YRD’s current governance model? 
13. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this particular governance model? 
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14. Was the governance model implemented in YRD inspired by developments in 
other large metropolitan areas? If so, where, and what did they learn? 
15. What influence do asymmetric administrative ranks of different delta members 
make over inter-city interaction in the above-mentioned framework?  
16. How much of an issue is jurisdictional fragmentation in relation to implement 
the YRD regional plan’s coordinated industrial planning in the YRD? 
17. It is argued that the YRD’s scope is so huge that Shanghai Government is 
currently more interested in improving the suburban areas’ economic 
competitiveness by bringing the inward capital investment through issuing the 
favorable policies and project; thus it becomes an urgent issue for other two 
provinces, to rethink of their relationship with Shanghai. Is such bargaining 
among different provincial- and prefecture- level governments prevalent in the 
current YRD? 
18. How much of an issue is ‘localism’ in relation to the economic integration and 
governance framework at the city-regional scale in YRD? 
19. What are the motives behind local fragmentation? Personnel promotion? 
Fiscal decentralisation? 
20. Are there any other challenges for promoting the city-regional vision for 
governance? 
21. How can the city-regional governance framework be further improved? 
22. The YRD regional plan -  
1) Motive for formulating the regional plan? 
2) Why was initiated in 2005? 
3) What preceded the 2011 YRD regional plan? What worked well under 
previous regional structures? What maybe did not work well? 
4) How was the plan formulated? 
5) What is each team’s responsibility? Force Implementing? 
6) Did decision-maker look at other city-regions for examples of ‘best 
practice’? If so where did they look? What did they learn? How has this 
been implemented in the YRD regional plan?  
7) What were the main challenges in creating the YRD regional plan? 
8) Does the implementation of YRD draw down more powers towards the 
YRD? 
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9) To what extent is the YRD regional plan aiming to improve the regional 
integration? 
10) Does the above-mentioned governance model have anything to do 
with the implementation of YRD regional plan? 
11) Thus which section of the plan the China Development Bnak is going to 
raise finance for? If it does, will the funding facilitate the implementation 
the regional plan? 
12) Is the YRD an appropriate scale to plan/govern? Do you think planning 
at the scale of the YRD is practical/feasible? Is the YRD a scale at 
which to holistic planning/governance or more specific policy areas and 
political interventions, especially for the distribution of industrial 
concentration? 
13) There are statement of ‘strengthening the functional connection 
between Shanghai and Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou’ in both of YRD and 
SWC regional plans. Although it is not hard to catch a few points in the 
regional plan which towards this aim, such as Shanghai is planning to 
be a high-tech design center and financial center and trading center, 
and Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou is going to be the high-tech designing 
and manufacturing centers (well, it is my personal opinion of this could 
be the potential connection); there is barely clear indication for how the 
connection is going to be promoted in the YRD regional plan. Not 
mentioning the proposed projects and specific index or measurement 
for improvement of regional connection. Thus what is the main thought 
behind this aim in the making process of the YRD regional plan?  What 
is the level of integration/cooperation between Shanghai and the other 
major cities in the YRD? 
14) Even further, it is stated in the regional plan that Shanghai is going to 
lead the development of financial services and high-tech design 
industries in the YRD. How is the industrial growth going to be 
distributed among Shanghai and SWC? Will this lead to inter-city 
competition? 
15) Referring to the YRD regional plan, YRD Commission Member, Chen 
Jianjun, is quoted as saying ‘more coordination [i.e. internal linkage] is 
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needed to maximize the benefits’ to overcome regional fragmentation. 
How is this being taken forward? 
16) According to the YRD regional plan, Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, 
Changzhou and other core delta members are each commanded to 
make different industrial focus, such as Shanghai needs to concentrate 
on the growth of commercial services industries etc. How is this 
distribution of regional economic industries planned in the planning 
process, or based on what facts? 
17) There has been more than two years after the birth of the regional plan, 
how do you think of its implementation in general? From what other 
perspective does the regional plan enhance the city-regional vision in 
the governance agenda? 
 
Business Sector 
23. How do you think of the development of regional common market? 
Transportation? Product quality assessment system? Cross-jurisdictional 
industrial association? 
24. How much of an issue is ‘localism’ in relation to the cross-jurisdictional trading? 
25. Are there differences among administrative policies towards different 
industries in the local? Preferential policy for any particular industry? 
26. What is state-led mechanism for forcing industrial transformation? 
Compensation? 
27. How do traditional manufacturing industries select the location for potential 
transformation? 
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Appendix 3: List of Codes 
 
Interview Coding 
1. Scale 
1) Global 
2) National 
a. Central Government 
a) The State Council 
b) NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) 
3) Pan-Regional 
b. Pan-YRD (Yangtze River Delta) 
c. Pan-PRD (Pearl River Delta) 
4) Regional 
a. Provincial Government 
a) Provincial Governor 
b) Provincial Party Secretary 
b. YRD 
c. PRD 
d. JJJ (Jing-Jin-Ji) 
5) Sub-regional 
6) Local 
a. Municipal Government  
7) Other 
a. City-Regions 
b. Urban Agglomeration 
c. One-Hour Economic Circle 
d. Three-Hours Economic Circle 
 
2. YRD 
1) Shanghai  
a. Shanghai Metropolitan Area 
2) Jiangsu 
a. Northern Jiangsu 
b. Southern Jiangsu 
a) Taihu Lake Basin 
b) SWC (Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou) 
c) Nanjing Metropolitan Area 
3) Zhejiang 
a. Northern Zhejiang 
a) Hangzhou Metropolitan Area 
b) Taizhou City 
b. Southern Zhejiang 
265 
 
4) Anhui 
5) History 
a. Relation between SH and Others 
 
3. Organisations 
1) Shanghai Economic Area Planning Office 
a. The City Mayor 
2) YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economies (YRD CAUE) 
a. Permanent President - Shanghai City Cooperation and Exchange 
Office 
b. LDRC (Local Development and Reform Commission) 
3) YRD Federation of Medium and Small businesses  
a. EITC (Economic and Information Technology Commission) 
4) CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) 
5) SASS (Urban and Demographic Studies of the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences) 
6) NIGLAS (Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology of Chinese Academy 
of Sciences) 
7) Zhejiang Prov. Development Planning and Research Institute 
8) Others 
a) CDB (China Development Bank) 
b) Industrial Park 
c) Other Associations 
d) NGO 
 
4. Define YRD 
1) History 
a. Market Forces vs. Political Forces 
b. Context 
2) Definition 
a. Regional Structure 
3) Regional Core 
4) Trans-provincial 
5) Expansion 
a. Economic Connection 
b. Industrial Park 
a) Land  
b) Technique 
c) Policy 
6) Pan- 
 
5. Economic 
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1) Chinese Private Enterprise 
2) State-Owned Enterprise 
3) Foreign Investment 
4) Similar Industrial Composition 
5) Regional Focus 
6) Intra-regional competition 
7) Transformation 
8) Hukou 
9) Market Forces 
a. Regional Economic Integration 
10) Political Intervention 
a. GDP Competition 
b. Administrative Divisions Economy 
c. Localism 
d. Non-Tax Trade Barrier 
e. Photovoltaic 
f. Integration 
a) One Card Solution 
b) Brand Promotion 
11) Transport 
12) Infrastructure 
a) Transportation 
13) Land 
14) Labour 
15) Toll station 
16) Medical Care 
17) Tourism 
18) Housing 
19) Environmental Protection 
20) Clusters 
21) 2nd Industries 
22) Third Industries 
23) Regional Issues 
24) Marine Economy 
 
6. Political 
1) Chief Officers’ Will 
2) GDP-Driven Decision Making 
3) Political Performance 
4) Local Governments’ Debts 
5) Politicians’ Attitude 
a. National Level 
a) Premier of the State Council 
b. Regional Level 
b) Provincial Governors 
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6) Preferential Policy 
7) Government Coordination 
a. Interest 
8) YRD Governance Model 
a. Decision-Making Level 
b. Coordination Level 
c. Execution Level 
a) N+1 
9) YRD Regional Plan 
a. Team Composition 
b. Plan Making Process 
c. Implementation 
d. Other plans 
e. Law 
10) Jurisdiction 
11) The Role Of The Central Governments 
12) Political System 
13) Common Interest 
14) TAX 
15) Other Plans 
16) Communication 
 
7. Cultural 
1) Cultural Similarities 
2) Ethnic Group 
3) 2010 Shanghai World Expo 
 
8. YRD Coordination Association of Urban Economies (YRD CAUE)  
1) More Members 
2) Communication 
3) Projects 
4) Legal position 
 
9. Industrial Planning 
1) Difficulties 
2) Reasonableness 
3) Basis 
4) Governors’ thoughts 
5) IP Implementation 
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10. Governmental Connection 
1) Reimbursement 
2) Dead Pigs 
3) Vertical Governance System 
4) Horizontal Communication 
5) European Union 
 
11. Private Companies 
1) Origin 
2) Customer Base 
3) Competitor 
4) Pollution 
5) Movement of Industries 
6) Environmental Protection Industry 
 
